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It has been three years and more that I have been trying to learn where the Jesuits are holding 
my son.  If I had discovered the place, I would have made this remonstrance to him privately.  
But seeing that I was losing time, and more, my hope, I wanted to write to him as to the 
contumacious….This being done, I leave it to his illiberal will to obey or disobey me.1   
 
 
Pierre Ayrault addressed this short note to the reader as part of his ongoing struggle to find his 
son René, whom he wanted to believe the Jesuits were holding captive, in spite of his nagging 
suspicion that the Jesuits had corrupted his son to defy his paternal authority.  In response to 
the latter presumption, he wrote a treatise entitled De La Puissance Paternelle: Contre ceux 
qui sous couleur de Religion vollent les enfans à leurs peres & meres (On Paternal Power: 
Against those who under the guise of Religion steal children from their fathers and mothers) 
addressed to his son, whom he labeled contumacious.  Contumacy described people who held 
the law in contempt, especially those who refused to appear in court or to speak, and 
Ayrault’s considerable discourse on it will be analyzed in depth in Chapter One.  This piece 
will attempt to contextualize Ayrault among his peers whose values inform many of the 
choices he made in his remarkable treatise. 
Pierre Ayrault is not a household name.  He remains a relatively obscure historical 
figure overshadowed by such sixteenth century names as Jacques Cujas, Montaigne, Étienne 
Pasquier, Jean Bodin, François Hotman, Jean Calvin, François Baudouin, and Charles 
Dumoulin, to name only a few.  As such, he appears literally as a footnote to history, making 
his way into studies about law and the family in at most a few paragraphs or a passing 
                                                 
1 “Il y a trois ans & plus, que je suis à apprendre où les Jesuites tiennent mon fils.  Si je l’eusse peu d’escouvrir, 
je luy eusse faict ceste Remonstrance en privé.  Mais voyant que je perdois temps, &, qui plus est, mon 
esperance, je luy ay voulu escrire comme aux contumax….Celà fait, je luy laisse en son illiberal arbitre de 
m’obeyr, ou ne m’obeyr point.”  Pierre Ayrault, De La Puissance Paternelle : Contre ceux qui sous couleur de 
Religion vollent les enfans à leurs peres & meres (Tours: Jamet Mettayer, 1593), note to the reader.  Spelling of 
his last name varies among the sources and is often listed as Airault. 
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reference.  The one notable exception is Cristina Quarta’s study on Ayrault and Bodin.2  The 
Angevin judge has received attention for his discourse on ambassadorial immunity in a 
context of a study on international relations. 3   His apparent legal relativism has been 
compared to the moral relativism of Montaigne.4  But two points of interest stand out among 
the rest in recent studies.  The first appears in a discourse on actual legal trials of animals, 
corpses, and inanimate things for which he wrote a small, and certainly odd, book in 1591 
(Des Proces Faicts au Cadaver, aux Cendres, à la mémoire; aux bestes brutes; choses 
inanimees; & aux contumax—On Trials Made to a Cadaver, to Ashes, to Memory, to Brutish 
Beasts, Inanimate Things, and to the Contumacious) which has been variously interpreted.5  
The other is usually summarized rather mysteriously as the “Ayrault affair,” which is a non-
committal way to describe the controversy which surrounded his son René joining the Jesuits.  
However, even these two topics are overshadowed in scope of larger histories devoted to the 
rising legal class. 
Ayrault was a member of a rising bureaucratic class frequently dubbed the gens de 
robe or robins.  This group has been difficult to classify and is occasionally referred to as the 
fourth estate.  Contemporaries also found classifying these magistrates problematic, which 
was amplified at convocations of the Estates General, which at different times made them 
                                                 
2 Cristina Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin: Diritto, famiglia, e formazione morale nel XVI secolo (Manduria, Italy: Piero 
Lacaita Editore, 2004). 
3 Montell Ogdon, “The Growth of Purpose in the Law of Diplomatic Immunity,” The American Journal of 
International Law 31: 3 (Jul., 1937): 449-65; 455-6. 
4 Donald R. Kelley, Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the French 
Renaissance (New York: Columbia University Press: 1970), 290-1. 
5 Pierre Ayrault, Des Proces Faicts au Cadaver, aux Cendres, à la mémoire; aux bestes brutes; choses 
inanimees; & aux contumax: Livre IIII de l’Ordre, Formalité, & Instruction Judiciaire (Angers: Antoine 
Hernault, 1591);  Esther Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice: Law and Culture in Late Medieval France (New 
York: E.J. Brill, 1993) see especially chapter 8, pp. 134-45; Cohen, “Law, Folklore, and Animal Lore,” Past and 
Present No. 110 (Feb., 1986): 6-37; Sadakat Kadri, The Trial: A History from Socrates to O.J. Simpson (New 
York: Random House, 2005) see especially chapter 5; Edward P. Evans, The Criminal Prosecution and Capital 
Punishment of Animals: The Lost History of Europe’s Animal Trials (London: Faber and Faber, 1987) reprint of 
(London: W. Heineman: 1906). 
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representatives of the nobility, the third estate, or judicial moderators.6  These men were 
essentially royal bureaucrats, who purchased magisterial or secretarial offices from the king.  
Technically, they belonged to the bourgeoisie, but their family enjoyed enough wealth to buy 
them a sort of hybrid status through a royal office and/or a marriage with a member of the old 
nobility (noblesse d’épée).  Even so, their noble status was still in a state of development and 
disputed especially in cases of inheritance.  In these instances, local and Parisian Parlements 
tried to determine whether the person made the office noble or the office made the person 
noble and whether the status was inheritable should a person be ennobled.  The difference was 
significant under customary legal systems because the nobility practiced primogeniture while 
lower classes practiced plenary inheritance.  It was not until the seventeenth century that they 
received the classification of noblesse de robe. 7   The sixteenth century was a time of 
transition in this regard, as in so many others.   
Ayrault was a typical robin.  Born in 1536, his uncle François paid for him to study 
humanities and philosophy at the University of Paris before moving on to study law at 
Toulouse under the renowned Jacques Cujas.  The erudite legal scholar was not shy about his 
royalist allegiances, and like many of his peers, Ayrault was a Gallican, promoting the 
privileges of the French church against the papacy while identifying himself as strictly 
Catholic.  It is unclear from the sources whether he was a moyenneur—someone who 
doctrinally sought a reformed middle ground between Catholicism and the Protestant faiths—
like Baudouin.8  Ayrault categorically opposed the rebellions of the Catholic League, writing 
                                                 
6 Adrianna E. Bakos, “Meddling Chaperons: The Involvement of the Parlement of Paris in the Estates General of 
1593,” in Politics, Ideology, and the Law in Early Modern Europe: Essays in honor of J.H.M. Salmon, ed. 
Adrianna E. Bakos (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1994), 91-105. 
7 Robert Descimon, “The Birth of the Nobility of the Robe: Dignity versus Privilege in the Parlement of Paris, 
1500-1700,” trans. Orest Ranum in Changing Identities in Early Modern France, ed. Michael Wolfe (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1996), 95-123. 
8 Thierry Wanegffelen, Ni Rome Ni Genève: Des fidèles entre deux chaires en France au XVIe siècle (Paris: 
Honoré Champion, 1997). 
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several pieces of propaganda from 1589 to 1594, one of which was titled Deploration de la 
mort du roy, Henry III, & du scandale qu’en a [éprouvé] l’Eglise (Deploration of the death of 
King Henry III and of the scandal which afflicts the Church).  He had it published in 1589,9 
after the assassination of the king (to which the Jesuits were attributed a role as Leaguer 
agents) and while Henry IV was still trying to gain entrance to Paris.10  Ayrault maintained 
correspondence with Pasquier11 (a legist and famous historian known for his nascent sense of 
nation and anti-Jesuit works) and probably knew other members of Pasquier’s circle fairly 
well.12   
It is important here to note that France was not “simply” a Catholic country in the 
sixteenth century.  Much of the country, especially the royalist portions, tended to adhere to a 
special French ideology known as Gallicanism.  This ideology asserted the privileges and 
relative autonomy of the French Catholic Church, citing the Gauls’ relationship with the 
Roman Empire.  Gallican policy was basically Catholic but anti-Roman: the monarchy tried 
to distance itself from the papacy while still remaining within the Catholic faith.  It 
encouraged an idea of Gallicanism that promoted the ancient rights and privileges of the 
Franco-Gallican Church, which included a sort of immunity from excommunication and 
interdiction and the recognition of Church Council decisions above those of papal policy.13  
Paris, in particular, seemed to be a major center of anti-Jesuit sentiment.  In the words of A. 
Lynn Martin: “The rights of the Gallican Church in opposition to papal supremacy were 
                                                 
9 Pierre Ayrault, Deploration de la mort du roy, Henry III. & du scandale qu’en a l’Eglise (n. p., 1589), French 
political pamphlets, 1547-1648, UM Special Collections.  The Dictionnaire de Biographie Française shows 
“éprouvé” in the title.  G. Lazare, “Pierre Ayrault,” in Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, ed. M. Prevost and 
Roman D’Amat (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1948), 4:965. 
10 J.H.M. Salmon, Society in Crisis: France in the sixteenth century (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1975).   
11 Étienne Pasquier, “Les Lettres d’Estienne Pasquier,” from Les Recherches de la France in Les Œuvres 
D’Estienne Pasquier, (Amsterdam: La Compagnie des Libraires Associez, 1723), see especially 2:295-300, book 
9, letters 7-9 and 2:367-76, 385-90, book 13, letters 6 and 11; Dorothy Thickett has recently published an 
annotated collection Estienne Pasquier, Lettres Familières, (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1974). 
12 Kelley, Foundations, see especially part 4. 
13 Salmon, Society in Crisis.   
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ardently championed by the University, the Parlement, and the Bishop of Paris.” 14  
Theologians (at the Sorbonne) and royalists set Gallicanism as theoretically opposed to 
Romanism, including Roman law, language, and to a certain extent, religion. 
Gallicanism was a crucial element of the French thought-world in the sixteenth 
century.  However, it was far from a monolithic ideology.  Frederic J. Baumgartner argues 
that two versions of Gallicanism existed, stating that “Royal Gallicanism emphasized the 
authority of the king in the French Church, especially his right to appoint the occupants of its 
major offices; ecclesiastical Gallicanism placed that power in the hands of the clergy itself.”  
He explains further that “The two competing theories of Gallicanism battled both the papacy 
and each other until the end of Louis’ [XII] bitter dispute with Julius II toward the end of his 
reign.”15  This “bitter dispute” entailed an embarrassing scandal of a failed council which 
Louis called to remonstrate the “warmongering” of Julius II, who had been challenging 
French supremacy in Italy.16  An alliance between England, Spain, Venice, and the Holy 
Roman Empire forced Louis to negotiate with Julius II, who had already made preparations to 
crown Henry VIII as king of France.17   
Baumgartner argues that Royal Gallicanism prevailed.18  This international threat, 
created at the hands of the papacy, only strengthened Gallican fears and suspicion of Rome.  
Gallicans denied that the pope had the authority to depose and replace kings.  This heightened 
suspicion created difficulties for the Jesuits, whom the Gallicans described as agents of the 
pope—due to their special vow of obedience to him—and Spain.  Spanish power was nearly a 
continual concern for the French monarchy and it did not help that “[t]he reasons why the 
                                                 
14 A. Lynn Martin, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1973), 25. 
15 Frederic J. Baumgartner, “Louis XII’s Gallican Crisis of 1510-1513,” in Politics, Ideology and the Law in 
Early Modern Europe: Essays in honor of J.H.M. Salmon, ed. Adrianna E. Bakos (Rochester, NY: University of 
Rochester Press, 1994), 55. 
16 Ibid., 63. 
17 Ibid., 69. 
18 Ibid., 55. 
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Society has always been identified with the diplomatic and military programs of Philip II 
seem to be that the founder was Spanish, the first five generals were subjects of Philip, and 
many of the early members were Spaniards.”19  As a result, the Jesuits faced fierce opposition 
in France, not only from the Huguenots, but from Catholics as well because of their 
international character and presumed international loyalties. 
Much anti-Jesuit sentiment stemmed not only from Gallican fears of radical Catholic 
ambitions but also as a means of criticizing unpopular Church policy.  Many robins were 
unhappy with the Council of Trent’s decrees.  These included its unsatisfactory resolution, for 
reform-oriented Catholics, to what were viewed as corruptions and its stance on clandestine 
marriage (which will be discussed in depth in Chapter One).  This dissent became more and 
more obvious and determined with the thinly veiled procrastination on the part of the robins 
to ratify the Council of Trent.  As Martin characterizes it: “Since the close of the Council of 
Trent in 1563 the French monarchy’s concern for the privileges of the Gallican Church and 
tendency towards Caesaropapism had defeated the strong papal efforts to obtain the 
publication of the decrees in France.”  Furthermore, he continues: “it is ironical to discover 
one of these shock troops [Jesuits], Emond Auger, arguing against the acceptance of the 
decrees of the Council of Trent on the grounds that they would be detrimental to the rights 
and privileges of the Gallican Church.”20  Gallicanism was a difficult and complex ideology 
on many fronts.  
Amidst these controversies, Ayrault spent about ten years in Paris where he 
established himself as a lawyer, began his family,21 and pleaded a case against the Jesuits in 
                                                 
19 Martin, Henry III, 216. 
20 Ibid., 174, 216. 
21 He married Anne Desjardins, who came from a magisterial family.  Barbara B. Diefendorf, “Give Us Back 
Our Children: Patriarchal Authority and Parental Consent to Religious Vocations in Early Counter-Reformation 
France,” The Journal of Modern History 68:2 (June, 1996): 265-307; 289, note 66. 
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1564 before Parlement (highest appeals court) on behalf of the curés of Paris.22  Following 
this, he bought (a common practice) the assignment to Angers (in Anjou) as lieutenant 
criminel in 1568, which he held at the time he published Puissance.  In Angers, he earned a 
reputation for being a strict upholder of law and custom, and it is rumored that he earned the 
nickname Cassius Angevin.23  The position of lieutenant criminel was new to the sixteenth 
century and grew out of the bailli.  The lieutenant criminel became a branch of (and 
eventually replaced) the bailli after the unmanageable growth of the legal system and the 
practical need to divide responsibilities.  A lieutenant criminel was the provincial judge who 
presided over criminal (as opposed to civil) cases.24  In 1589, Henry III named him lieutenant-
général (customarily an important military post, performing functions similar to the 
gouverneurs)25 a title he held until 1591, after which he resumed his position as lieutenant 
criminel.  Ten years later, Ayrault died.26 
Among his books, Ayrault’s contemporaries appear to have valued his Pandectae 
most,27 but it was his Ordre et Instruction Judiciaire,28 a discourse on judicial procedure first 
published in 1576, which earned him esteem among nineteenth century writers29 and remains 
                                                 
22 Musset attributes the Jesuits’ procurement of René to be revenge for this case.  Paul de Musset, Histoire de 
Pierre Ayrault et de Son Fils René Pseudo-Jésuite (Paris: E. Dentu Libraire de la Société des Gens de Lettres 
Galérie d’Orléans, 1879), pp. 13, 19, and 34. 
23 Musset, Histoire de Pierre Ayrault. 
24 John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1974), 220. 
25 Robert R. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). 
26 One source places his death in 1604.  V. Rosenwald, “Pierre Ayrault,” Nouvelle Biographie Générale depuis 
les temps les plus reculés jusqu’a nos jours, avec les renseignements bibliographiques et l’indication des sources 
a consulter ed. Hoefer (Paris: Firmin Didot Freres, 1855), 3:902-3. 
27 Pierre Ayrault (Petrus Aerodius), Rerum ab omni antiquitate judicatarum Pandectae (Paris: Michael Somnius, 
1588).  It was even popular across the Channel, being a favorite source in the second Earl of Leicester’s 
commonplace book.  Germaine Warkentin, “Humanism in Hard Times: The Second Earl of Leicester (1595-
1677) and His Commonplace Books, 1630-60,” in Challenging Humanism: Essays in Honor of Dominic Baker-
Smith, ed. Ton Hoenselaars and Arthur F. Kinney (Newark, University of Delaware Press, 2005), 229-53. 
28 Pierre Ayrault, De L’Ordre et  Instruction Judiciaire, dont les Anciens Grecs et Romains ont usé en 
accusations publiques (Paris: Jacques du Puys, 1576). 
29 Langbein, Prosecuting Crime, 235, note 122.  Langbein studies Ayrault alongside Jean Imbert, lieutenant 
criminel of Fontenay Lecomte.  The Dictionnaire de Biographie Française states that some confusion exists 
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the work for which he is best known.  In it, he argues that every suspect must receive a formal 
judicial proceeding in order for the justice system to work properly.  The only exception he 
cited was raison d’état, but this excuse was to be handled with the utmost care and only to be 
used in cases where the trial of the suspect posed a threat to the security of the realm.   
Some scholars cite this argument as evidence for his having been humane.  While this 
interpretation is plausible, it is equally plausible that he was promoting the royal judicial 
system, as opposed to private or seigneurial (lordly—a remnant from feudal systems) justice 
with which it theoretically, if not practically, still competed.30  The discourse also promoted a 
level of immunity for ambassadors—presuming that the represented country would reprimand 
him—but excluded assassination attempts.   
His claims, in this work and De La Nature, Variété & Mutation des Loix (1564) that 
laws or customs must be taken in context and that what was appropriate in one context is not 
necessarily so for another, reveal his apparent legal relativism.31  Such relativism primarily 
addressed Roman law and promoted an understanding of legislative intent.  Not only partially 
Gallican in its reservation regarding Roman law—Rome being strongly associated with the 
pope—it was also an exercise of interpretation popular among his legist peers.32  Finally the 
text concluded with a discourse on the trials of animals, corpses and memory (added in the 
1591 edition), arguing that animals are to be tried in order to call attention to the dangers of 
neglecting children and that corpses are to be tried in the memory of a person—reasoning that 
                                                                                                                                                        
between the two authors because Imbert published a book with the same title under Ayrault’s name in 1602.  p. 
965. 
30 Salmon, Society in Crisis; Langbein, Prosecuting Crime. 
31 Pierre Ayrault, De La Nature, Variété & Mutation des Loix, preface to François Grimaudet, Advocat du Roy, 
Angers, Paraphrase du Droict de Retraict Lignager, Recueillie des coustumes de France, & glossateurs d’icelles, 
divisee en dix livres (Paris: Hierosme de Marnes & la veufve Guillaume Cavellat, listed as 1582 but title page 
says 1585); and Kelley, Foundations, 290-1.  The Dictionnaire de Biographie Française lists its first publishing 
date as 1564, p. 964.  The title page does not indicate which edition was published in 1582/5. 
32 George Huppert, The Idea of Perfect History: Historical erudition and historical philosophy in Renaissance 
France (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970); and Ian MacLean, Interpretation and Meaning in the 
Renaissance: The Case of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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if a person can be exonerated posthumously, he can be condemned.  These bizarre subjects 
were to be tried in the same manner as the contumacious. 
“Un énorme scandale”33 
Like most fathers of the time and of his standing, Pierre Ayrault had a vested interest 
in paternalism.  He sent his oldest son of fifteen children to be educated in Paris at the College 
of Clermont, a Jesuit school.  After completing several years of study, the first-born’s letters 
stopped coming.  In 1586 René, against his father’s will and plans for his magisterial career, 
joined the mysterious international society and disappeared, never to communicate with his 
father again.  All of the distraught father’s attempts to locate him failed.  As a well-connected 
member of the judiciary system, he soon involved some the most influential people in France 
in tracking down his son.  Parlement, King Henry III, and even the pope attempted 
interventions with the Jesuits but to no avail.34  In his anger and frustration at the Society and 
his son, Ayrault wrote a treatise about the history of paternal power as a remonstrance and 
plea to his son.35  He declared that a son’s primary duty is to obey his father and mother and 
suggested that his own son was rebellious and irreverent for not responding to his attempts at 
communication.  He denounced the Jesuits as hypocrites, who under a pretext of religion 
(which commands people to honor their parents), taught impressionable children to disobey, 
despise, and abandon their parents.36  Ayrault appears to have modeled part of his treatise on a 
letter by St. Bernard to his nephew.37   
The crux of Ayrault’s case for convincing others to become involved in recuperating 
his son was René’s age.  Not surprisingly, a discrepancy among both primary and secondary 
                                                 
33 Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, 964. 
34 Several of these letters can be found following the text of Puissance and also in Victor Jeanvrot, “Notice 
Biographique” in preface to Pierre Ayrault, Ordre et Instruction Judiciaire (Paris: A. Chevalier-Marescq, 1881). 
35 Jeanvrot, “Notice Biographique,” 1881. 
36 Ibid. 
37 St. Bernard of Clairvaux, “To Robert, His Nephew,” in The Letters of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, trans. Bruno 
Scott James (Phoenix Mill, Great Britain: Sutton Publishing, 1998), letter 1, pp. 1-10. 
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sources has arisen over René’s actual age (see Appendix A).  For example, the Dictionnaire 
de Biographie Française states in Ayrault’s biography that René entered the Society of Jesus 
at 16 years old in 1586.  In René’s biography, on the following page, it lists René’s date of 
birth as 1567.  It follows by reiterating that René entered the Society in 1586 which would 
make him 19, not 16 years old when he joined the Jesuits.38  Part of this discrepancy appears 
to be Ayrault’s handiwork.   
Ayrault spent a large part of his treatise making a case for rapt, which is a term 
borrowed from cases of clandestine marriage and which relies on the presumption that the 
child was underage at the time he or she took vows (this phenomenon will be developed more 
fully in Chapter One).  He published the edition of the treatise used here in 1593, and in it he 
cites an arrêt passed by the Court of Parlement, ruling in favor of René’s return to his father, 
for the same year René disappeared: 1586 (a difference of seven years).39  If René was 15 
going on 16 as his father suggests40  (which would be pushing the ecclesiastical age of 
majority at 16), then he would be only 18 at the time this treatise was originally published and 
therefore still under the secular age of majority at 25.41  This interpretation would support the 
conclusion of Paul Musset who stated that the father would know his son’s age best and that 
the Jesuits, in high conspiracy, changed his date of birth—plausible but unsubstantiated.42  
Conspiracy theory aside, it appears that many subsequent scholars have used Musset’s work.   
                                                 
38 Dictionnaire de Biographie Française lists Musset as a source, as well as Gilles Ménage (see note on Musset 
below), 965. 
39 Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 88. 
40 “en quinze à seize ans,” Ibid., 67. 
41 Barbara Diefendorf summarizes this “disparity” in the legal age of majority in her article.  Her research also 
notes that 16 was the official age designation of the Council of Trent and that it was only in 1615 that the 
Gallican Church officially accepted its decrees.  “Give Us Back Our Children,” 285-6. 
42 Musset, Histoire de Pierre Ayrault.  This same author began his biography of Ayrault with a nine page 
biography of Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuits, so his objectivity must be suspected.  He does not use 
modern citation practices but admits in the preface to have based his work on a biography of Ayrault written by 
Gilles Ménage, Ayrault’s grandson (p. 4).  He then, in a rather striking footnote, admits that Ménage lists René’s 
date of birth in 1567 from a letter written to a Jesuit but that it was a “lie” that the Jesuits “imagined,” because 
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On the other hand, if René was 18 going on 19 at the time he disappeared as every 
available biographical date of birth suggests, then he would be 25 at the time this edition was 
published and had reached the age of majority by either system.  This interpretation would 
also mean that Ayrault himself fudged the figures.  Consider the following passage: 
But just as the girl abducted immature, as long a she remains with her abductor, does not reach 
adulthood, the majority that you acquired in the hands of those who hold you against my will, 
will never excuse you, nor them either, that what you will attempt thereafter does not proceed 
from induction and impression made at the improper place and time and what is more, by 
detainers and possessors of bad faith.  The Holy Spirit is not where there is crime.  As the 
furtive thing is always so until it be returned into the power of its lord, so as much of a major 
as you may be, you will always be grievously and plagiaristically where you are, until my will 
intervenes.  To whomever will tell you the contrary, tell him that he does not have 
understanding.  For Plato wrote thus: Neither God nor wise man would ever advise a child to 
scorn his father and mother.43 
 
This passage is the last of the edition used here, which would have made it an easy addition.  
Ayrault’s suggestion that his son had reached the age of majority seems to support the latter 
interpretation that Ayrault fudged the figures for his son’s age (because who would know the 
age of a son better than a father?) for dramatic effect and to strengthen his case.  He was after 
all, a lawyer.  René would not have reached the secular age of majority by the time the first 
edition was published, so assuming that Ayrault was appealing to his peers, he probably had 
the secular age of majority in mind.  A copy of the 1589 edition, should one be found, would 
verify or correct this conjecture that the above passage was an addition and that the latter 
interpretation stands.  Ayrault cites the year in which René disappeared, the youth’s age at the 
time, and that he has reached the age of majority by the time he published the second edition.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Ayrault says himself in De patrio jure (Puissance) that his son was 15, so the child born in 1567 “is without 
doubt an elder sister of René Ayrault” (p. 31). 
43 “ Mais tout ainsi que la fille enlevee immatura, quandiu apud raptorem est, aetatem non attingit, aussi la 
majorité que vous acquerriez entre les mains de ceux qui vous detiennent contre ma volonté, ne vous excusera 
jamais, ne eux aussi, que ce que vous attenterez par apres, ne procede d’induction & impression faite en lieu, & 
en temps inconvenable, & qui plus est, par detenteurs & possesseurs de mauvaise foy.  Le S. Esprit n’est point 
où il y a crime.  Comme la chose furtive l’est toujours jusques à ce qu’elle soit retournee en la puissance de son 
seigneur: aussi, ta-t majeur que vous puissiez estre, vous serez tousjours doleusement & plagiairement où vous 
estes, jusques à ce que ma volonté y intervienne.  A quiconque vous dira le contraire, dites luy qu’il n’a point 
d’entendement.  Car Platon escrit ainsi: Jamais Dieu, ny homme sage ne conseillera à enfant de mespriser ses 
pere & mere.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 99-100. 
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However, he never cites René’s date of birth in the treatise.  That allows him to make a case 
to his robin friends without appearing to contradict himself or create any inconsistencies in 
his case, which logically, he would be careful about given his position as judge.   
In any circumstance, René was too young, by secular standards, to take vows, but the 
incentive for Ayrault to fudge the figures would lie in his attempt to persuade an ecclesiastical 
audience, putting his son’s majority in doubt by that system as well.  The latter interpretation 
has been adopted by Barbara Diefendorf, who states definitively that René was born in Paris 
in 1567 and entered the Jesuit novitiate at Trier in 1586.44  Unfortunately, her use of a Jesuit 
source does not totally discredit Musset’s conspiracy theory.  She does however use a 1588 
pamphlet, which is a mini-version of Puissance, verifying Ayrault’s version of René’s age as 
stated in either edition of Puissance.  Whichever interpretation is correct, the issue is 
important because the only legal claim Ayrault could make was that his son was too young.  
Presumably, it would be much easier for Ayrault to subtract three years from his son’s age in 
his treatise than it would be for the Jesuits to sneak into a record hall and change the young 
man’s date of birth. 
Notice on the Source 
Pierre Ayrault first wrote De La Puissance Paternelle in 1589, three years after his 
son’s defection to the Jesuits, and it appears to be an elaboration of a pamphlet he wrote in 
1588.45  This project will examine the second edition published in 1593.  Cristina Quarta used 
the same edition, which she found in the Miscellanea Ecclesia Gallica, in her study of Ayrault.  
She notes that another copy of the treatise, signed by Ayrault, indicates its “perfect 
adherence” to the 1589 edition;46 while perfect adherence is unclear, its authenticity seems 
                                                 
44 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children,” 293. 
45 Ibid., 278, note 38. 
46 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 25. 
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certain.  No copies of the first edition have turned up in major databases.  The second edition, 
published by Jamet Mettayer, has two different emissions. The first was published in 1593 in 
Tours; the second was published in 1595 in Paris.  This treatise also appears in a collection of 
Ayrault’s works entitled Opuscules et divers traictez, which survives mostly in a third edition 
published in 1598 by Jérémie Perier.  It is unclear whether earlier editions of the collection 
contain the treatise.  Of the 1593 edition, I have only been able to locate five copies and of the 
1595 edition, only three.  This small survival suggests a modest distribution and perhaps a 
more targeted audience. 
Jamet Mettayer, a well known royalist publisher, was prolific from 1580 to 1600, 
publishing a wide array of royalist propaganda.  Included among these are anti-Leaguer tracts 
(works about those who do not want peace in France); declarations and edicts from the king; 
reports about the wars; and works concerning the Jesuits, in particular the Jean Chastel 
scandal, which involved this student at a Jesuit collège being arrested for attempted regicide.  
Thus, it is probable that De La Puissance Paternelle played a propagandist role, especially 
since the first publication came in the year that King Henry III was assassinated (to which the 
Jesuits were attributed a role).  This book, however, appears to be the only book of Ayrault’s 
that Mettayer published. 
Preliminary investigation also indicates that the surviving editions of De La Puissance 
Paternelle were published in octavo.  Thus it is unlikely that this treatise would have been 
treated as a luxury work aimed exclusively at professional legal bibliophiles, but rather, would 
have been more useful as propaganda.47   
                                                 
47 However, one source lists the 1593 Latin edition as having been published in octavo and presumably for the 
same year the French edition in quarto, which would have been more common among collections of legal 
scholars, the audience which he was most likely targeting.  Biographie Générale, 903. 
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While few copies have survived, the book appears to have held some appeal, 
especially among Protestant circles.  Ayrault apparently had the book published in Latin (De 
patrio jure ad filium pseudo-jesuitam dissertatio juridical) in Paris by Perier in 159448 and 
then again in 1597, as a second edition.  The Latin publication was then translated into 
English and published in London by Harper in 1614 and Barnes in 1616.  The book also 
appears in German and Dutch editions in the 1680s. 
The Project 
 
Quarta offers an interesting study of Ayrault’s assertion of paternal authority in 
response to René’s disappearance, but it appears to be incomplete.  Her work focuses 
primarily on Roman law, and while covering the philosophical context of the treatise well, it 
neglects the robin context to which Diefendorf’s and the present study speak.49   
In composing his treatise, Ayrault had both exterior and interior problems to negotiate.  
His first problem was the Catholic Church.  His royalist leanings and Gallican sympathies set 
him almost directly opposed to the Jesuits, who had the unfortunate reputation of being 
Spanish agents.  Ayrault added the corruption or “theft” of children to this reputation.  More 
specifically, the Council of Trent threatened Gallican privilege and removed parents from the 
contraction of marriage at a time in France when the idea of the necessity of parental 
permission had a firm grip on society.  Nevertheless, Ayrault was, along with many 
Frenchmen, a self-proclaimed Catholic.  A question of obligation emerges.  To whom does 
one owe allegiance at a time when institutions and ideologies are shifting?  This thesis 
explores the way in which the Angevin judge tries to reconcile legal, political, familial,50 
                                                 
48 Dictionnaire de Biographie Française lists the year as 1593, 965. 
49 Cristina Quarta.  Ayrault e Bodin; and Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.” 
50 “Family” had a much broader designation in the sixteenth century.  It included not only what modern people 
know as the “nuclear family,” but also extended kin such as uncles, cousins and other such blood relatives.  It 
also included in-laws, especially patrilineal ones, and servants under the other designation “household.”  This 
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moral, and spiritual obligations and uses the Jesuits and fatherhood as a cover to discuss 
bigger issues in France during the latter half of the sixteenth century.  
This study will divide Ayrault’s reasoning on paternal privilege and power along the 
lines of a popular ideology: une loi, un roi, une foi.  This motto corresponds neatly to his three 
main points in the treatise, which he wrote as a response to his son René’s clandestine 
religious vows with the Jesuits.  The first (une loi) will address his case of rapt and his 
understanding of his son’s disappearance as a crime.  It will follow in particular, Ayrault’s use 
of a letter written by St. Bernard of Clairvaux to his nephew Robert.  The second (un roi) will 
examine Ayrault’s understanding of the father as a king (and vice versa), leading to fears of 
sedition and treason to family and state, which the Jesuits appeared to encourage.  The 
similarities between this treatise and Jean Bodin’s “De La Puissance Paternelle” in his De La 
République will be especially useful.  The third (une foi) will address Ayrault's attempts to 
reconcile a perceived conflict between spiritual and familial obligations, while at the same 
time looking at his confused sense of hierarchy and his adherence to Gallicanism.  Of course, 
it will also examine his hostility toward the Jesuits.  In presenting the material thusly, I hope 
to show how Ayrault, if inadvertently, grapples with the shattered ideology and to explore 












                                                                                                                                                        
thesis will employ the very broadest sense of the term and seeks only to define it as it relates to paternal authority, 




Timeline for René 
 
1567: born (the official record noted by Diefendorf and the Dictionnaire de Biographie  
Française) 
1570: born? (suggested by subtraction in DBF, Musset, Ayrault) 
1586: disappeared (undisputed); 15/18 years old (age derived for this year from Ayrault and  
Musset listed first hereafter/age derived from official record second hereafter) 
1588: Conclusion de l’Ordre published (pamphlet written by Ayrault) lists René as 15 in  
1586; 17/20 
1589: first edition of Puissance might list René as 15 going on 16 in 1586; 18/21 
1593: second edition of Puissance lists René as 15 going on 16 in 1586 and as having reached  
the age of majority; 22/25 
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Chapter One: Une loi 
 
 
[W]e see that if he [the son] wants to make himself a Religieux or to make himself of the 
Church, his will is followed although that of the father and of the mother are contrary to it or 
without seeking it [parental will] or desiring it out of honor…[W]e will treat principally…[this 
point] because it’s this one to which either you or I have erred: you, to undertake to be a Jesuit 
against my will, me, to be offended by it, if the Church gives you this faculty to make and 
dispose of it thusly.1   
 
On May 19, 1586, the highest court in France, Parlement (a “mixed body of people of the 
Church and laypeople”) officially forbade the Society of Jesus to accept René into their 
order.2  This case was part of a larger jurisdictional conflict between religious and secular 
authorities over the requirements for taking marital or religious vows and over the authority to 
dissolve ones contracted clandestinely.  Barbara B. Diefendorf has shown that attempts to 
restrict the taking of religious vocations utilized similar language and methods as those to 
restrict marriages.  The legists in Parlement tried to enforce an age of majority of 25 for men, 
before which sons had to obtain parental consent in order to take marital or religious vows.  
These robins declared all vows made without parental consent null and void, while at the 
same time ruling that violation of this law was to be prosecuted as rapt (abduction).3 
A case of rapt centered fundamentally on age because legislators, prosecutors, and 
otherwise interested parties presumed that a minor was not mature enough to make a sound 
decision in such grave matters.  Therefore, when a minor chose to take vows without parental 
                                                 
1 “Et quant à l’Estat & condition à qouy le pere, sans controverse de tous les Philosophes, pouvoir voüer & 
dedier son enfant: nous voyons que s’il se veut rendre Religieux, ou se faire d’Eglise: sa volonté est suivie, quoy 
que celle du pere & de la mere y soit contraire, ou sans la rechercher ny desirer par honneur.  Or de ces deux 
poincts, nous en traicterons principalement le second, parce que c’est celuy auquel vous, ou moy avons erré: 
Vous, d’entreprendre d’estre Jesuite contre ma volonté.  Moy, de m’en offenser, si l’Eglise vous donne ceste 
faculté d’en faire & disposer ainsi.”  Pierre Ayrault, De La Puissance Paternelle: Contre ceux qui sous couleur 
de Religion vollent les enfans à leurs peres & meres (Tours: Jamet Mettayer, 1593), 36-37. 
2 Ibid., 88-89. 
3 Barbara B. Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children: Patriarchal Authority and Parental Consent to Religious 
Vocations in Early Counter-Reformation France,” The Journal of Modern History 68:2 (June, 1996): 265-307; 
Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors in the Sixteenth Century: The Politics of Patrimony (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), especially chapters 4 and 5. 
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consent, others concluded that there were parties involved who were taking advantage of the 
youth.  But because of the sacramental nature of the vows, there was little parents could 
actually do after the fact except disinherit the children (which incidentally was a major issue 
for the children in question but not always satisfactory to the parents),4 although the crime 
was technically a capital offense for the abductor (ravisseur).  Regardless, only the Church 
could nullify the vows, and the Church set the age of majority considerably lower, at age 16.5  
Both parties agreed that vows made under the age of reason were not valid, but they differed 
substantially on what that age was.  Jurisdictional tension between secular and ecclesiastical 
authorities added an interesting complication to questions of paternal authority. 
This emphasis on age arose in part from early modern stereotypes of youth.  Griffiths’ 
study on Tudor and Stuart England is particularly insightful in this regard.  He argues 
primarily that “The problem of youth was an issue of authority and socialization.”6  While 
addressing the problem of defining the age of youth, he notes that “Marriage, setting up an 
independent household, and full participation in a trade marked various points at which young 
men and women crossed into adulthood.”7   The importance of marriage as a bridge to 
adulthood and independence helps explain the controversy over clandestine marriages and 
when authorities wanted to define adulthood.  Griffiths’ suggestion that youth was “contested 
territory” applies not only to questions of socialization in a moral sense, but also in the sense 
of defining adulthood in the interest of having reasoning minds controlling society and 
hopefully maintaining some semblance of order.8   
                                                 
4 Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors, 167. 
5 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children;” Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors, chapter 5. 
6 Paul Griffiths, Youth and Authority: Formative Experiences in England, 1560-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), 13. 
7 Griffiths, Youth and Authority, 32. 
8 Griffiths, Youth and Authority; and Robert Muchembled, “Fils de Caïn, enfants de Médée: Homicide et 
infanticide devant le Parlement de Paris (1575-1604),” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales 62:5 (Sept., 2007): 
1063-94. 
 19
These questions of socialization stem from what Griffiths has dubbed “The Politics of 
Age.”9  He examines metaphorical designations of youth to reveal complex early modern 
stereotypes: “Youth implied incompetence and inadequacy; age implied seniority, proficiency, 
and knowledge.”10  Thus, he argues, youth and boy served as derogatory terms and insults.  
He continues by stating that: “There were two principal ways in which age functioned as a 
principle of authority; in a direct relationship in which an elder guided a junior, and in a 
metaphorical fashion in which expressions of authority were given a paternal edge by 
disguising superiors as fathers—‘political fathers’—and subordinates as children.”11   
The complex early-modern understanding of youth—both of its boldness yet inherent 
simplicity12—sheds light on rapt charges and Ayrault’s conflicted perception of his son’s 
action as a crime.  Rapt stemmed from the presumed simplicity and lack of discretion of 
youths, who were clearly misled because they had nothing to gain from the unfavorable 
alliances of which their families disapproved.13  At the same time, youth’s penchant for 
defying authority implicated minors into the crime to a certain degree because despite having 
been seduced, they knew that they were defying parental will, making these youths 
perpetrators and victims simultaneously.  Rapt was a means of removing responsibility from 
the child and of undermining the discretion which ecclesiastical authorities presumed he had.  
Nevertheless, once an offending child had realized that he had been “deceived” (or had 
incurred the displeasure of his parents), he had to accede to his parents’ judgment or risk 
facing accusations of willful disobedience.  The difference between returning to parents or not 
could tip the scale of guilt against the child.  Ayrault designed his treatise in many ways to 
                                                 
9 Griffiths, Youth and Authority, chapter 2, especially pp. 100-3. 
10 Ibid., 63. 
11 Ibid., 73. 
12 Ibid., chapter 1. 
13 Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors, chapter 5. 
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serve as a moment of realization.  Thus, he blames his son not so much for his disappearance 
as his failure to return. 
These perceptions of youth and its challenges to authority corresponded to ideas about 
fatherhood and the reassertion of paternal authority.  Fatherhood in the sixteenth century fell 
into what Delumeau and Roche have called the “Golden Age of the Sovereign.”14  Fathers 
enjoyed extensive and thorough legal privileges.  But these privileges came with an 
understanding of responsibilities.  On the one hand, fathers had the duty to provide for the 
continuation and support of the family, so as Alain Molinier has noted, “Marriage and 
profession of children enters therefore into a paternal and familial calculation of growth and 
of the profit of lineages which do not go without bullying individuals and creating notably 
false religious vocations.”15  In addition, fathers could not escape specific duties to raise their 
children properly, providing the right balance of love and discipline along with nourishment 
for mind, body, and soul, for “As much in countries of statute law as in countries of 
customary law, maintenance and upbringing [religious and profane] were considered a debt 
that the father owed his child: the heir did not have to bring back, to the paternal succession, 
what was paid for his upkeep and his education.”16  Nevertheless, Ayrault argues that these 
gifts demand gratitude—which means obeying parental will. 
On the other hand, once the demands on education became more sophisticated, it 
became necessary for fathers to make provisions for education beyond what could be 
provided in the household, and it follows, according to Molinier, that trivializing “the 
delegation of the right to childcare can only…[diminish] paternal authority to the profit of the 
third party.”  Molinier uses Ayrault’s grievances as a case in point, claiming that Pierre 
                                                 
14 Jean Delumeau and Daniel Roche (eds.), Histoire des pères et de la paternité (Paris: Larousse, 1990), part I. 
15 Alain Molinier, “Nourir, éduquer, et transmettre,” in Histoire des pères et de la paternité, ed. Jean Delumeau 
and Daniel Roche (Paris: Larousse, 1990), 118. 
16 Ibid., 103. 
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Ayrault wrote his treatise in response to this diminution and to “demonstrate the superiority of 
his authority over that of the religieux, his delegates.”17  Ayrault and the robins had an 
implicit understanding with their delegates, hence their outrage when they felt that these 
delegates betrayed their trust by inciting their children to defy parental will. 
Molinier continues by noting that the monarchy profited from the diminution of 
authority at the expense of fathers because it could enlist youths in the army without parental 
consent; however it is necessary to proceed with caution on this point because, ideologically, 
as shall be discussed in Chapter Two, many discourses on monarchical power likened the king 
to a father.  Moreover, Molinier notes for religious vocations that royal law resisted 
ecclesiastical prerogative and insisted, notably in the Ordinance of Blois of 1579, that children 
could take vows after reaching the age of 16 but that they had to have parental consent if they 
had not reached the age of 25, which suggests that royal law supported parental prerogative in 
some matters.18  The monarchy, in negotiating its own authority along the often-blurred line 
between secular and ecclesiastical prerogatives, applied the same apparently vacillating 
technique to parental authority and the family.  Furthermore, the legislation appears to 
compromise between both parties’ ages of majority. 
This chapter will discuss Ayrault’s legal understanding of his son’s defection.  It is 
framed by questions of provision and gratitude, which centered on robin initiatives to define 
and secure their newly developing position in society.19  Cristina Quarta sees Ayrault as 
focusing on education and correction rather than patrimonial concerns, but she has perhaps 
                                                 
17 Molinier, “Nourrir,” 113. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children;” Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors; see also Sarah Hanley, 
“Engendering the State: Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern France,” French Historical 
Studies 16:1 (Spring, 1989): 4-27; Hanley, “Family and State in Early Modern France: The Marital Law 
Compact,” in Connecting Spheres: European Women in a Globalizing World, 1500 to the Present, ed. Marilyn J. 
Boxer and Jean H. Quataert, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 61- 72; Hanley, “‘The 
Jurisprudence of the Arrêts’: Marital Union, Civil Society, and State Formation in France, 1550-1650,” Law and 
History Review 21:1 (Spring, 2003): 1-40. 
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overlooked the implications of rapt.  Nevertheless, she rightly asserts that Ayrault argues that 
the Jesuits had violated divine and human law. 20   Ayrault was deeply immersed in the 
jurisdictional conflict, but while he sided definitively with Parlement against the Council of 
Trent on the issue of parental consent, he left himself, and fathers everywhere, room to 
maneuver outside of the controversy by appealing to a higher ideal of respect.  Nevertheless, 
Ayrault understood his son’s defiance as a crime.  He spent a considerable part of his treatise 
constructing a case of rapt by contumacy.  In so doing, he employed the rhetoric of abduction, 
coercion, and deception which had developed around the idea of rapt.  His utilization of this 
rhetoric culminates in the resonances he saw between his case and a letter by St. Bernard, 
which he comments on extensively and which he appears to follow closely when composing 
his own work.  At the same time, an interesting contradiction emerges because fundamentally, 
contumacy presumes guilt for the son while rapt presumes innocence.  This hesitation to 
definitively assign blame to one party or the other reveals Ayrault’s conflicted feeling toward 
the crime and the complex relationship between youth and authority. 
Parlement v. the Council of Trent 
The Council of Trent formed the famous centerpiece of counter-reform initiative, but 
it had important secular implications in addition to ecclesiastical ones, notably in this study, 
for marriage, which inhabited both secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions.  It promoted 
ecclesiastical prerogative to the detriment of secular interests, denying parental consent as an 
essential legitimizing force in the contraction of marriages.  In a time where paternal authority 
was on the rise, this policy threatened to undermine parental prerogative.  The Parlement of 
Paris, on behalf of scandalized fathers, cited its own precedents and Gallican ideology in 
order to contest this council, which it only officially accepted in the early seventeenth century, 
                                                 
20 Cristina Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin: Diritto, famiglia, e formazione morale nel XVI secolo (Manduria, Italy: Piero 
Lacaita Editore, 2004), 15, 30, and 58. 
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nearly fifty years after the council concluded and in spite of its religious importance and the 
robins’ tendency toward Catholic self-identification.  Religious grievances will be discussed 
at length in Chapter Three; nevertheless it is important to sketch the boundaries of robin 
concern in relation to this controversial council in order to better understand how Ayrault 
perceived his own son’s disappearance. 
By Parlementary standards, there was more than one reason to reject the Council of 
Trent,21 but Chapter 24 of its decrees—that which addressed questions of marriage—was 
particularly troubling.  The Catholic Church had always promoted ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
when it came to marriage.  While adamantly reaffirming marriage as a sacrament, it 
simultaneously and fundamentally removed parents from the entire process: 
CANON XII.-If any one saith, that matrimonial causes do not belong to ecclesiastical judges; 
let him be anathema. [….] 
 
Although it is not to be doubted, that clandestine marriages, made with the free consent of the 
contracting parties, are valid and true marriages, so long as the Church has not rendered them 
invalid; and consequently, that those persons are justly to be condemned, as the holy Synod 
doth condemn them with anathema, who deny that such marriages are true and valid; as also 
those who falsely affirm that marriages contracted by the children of a family, without the 
consent of their parents, are invalid, and that parents can make such marriages either valid or 
invalid; nevertheless, the holy Church of God has, for reasons most just, at all times detested 
and prohibited such marriages.22 
 
The Church strongly encouraged the couple to seek parental consent before taking vows but 
denied that parents could contract or annul marriages.  However, while it did not deny a 
couple the ceremony, it did make the process more difficult, stiffening the requirements for 
the publication of announcements and placing restrictions on witnesses and location. 
                                                 
21 For more information on the Council of Trent and its controversy in France see especially Theirry 
Wanegffelen, Ni Rome Ni Genève: Des fidèles entre deux chaires en France au XVIe siècle (Paris: Honoré 
Champion, 1997); Wanegffelen, Une Difficile Fidélité: Catholiques malgré le concile en France, XVIe-XVIIe 
siècles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999); Alain Tallon, La France et le Concile de Trente (1518-
1563) (Paris: École française de Rome, 1997), especially pp. 656-86. 
22 J. Waterworth, ed. and trans., The Council of Trent, The Twenty-Fourth Session: The canons and decrees of 
the sacred and oecumenical Council of Trent (London: Dolman, 1848), 192-232, on Hanover Historical Texts 
Project, Scanned by Hanover College students in 1995, http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct24.html (accessed 
March 9, 2008), Chapter I, 196. 
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Not surprisingly, many felt that these reforms were insufficient, and in opposition to 
this decree, Parlement cited a body of legislation which denied that clandestine marriages 
were valid at all.  In particular, it invoked the edict of 1556, which allowed parents to 
disinherit offending children and which attempted to “separate the sacramental nature of 
marriage…from its temporal effects.”23  It also stated that the age of majority would be 30 
years for men and 25 years for women.24  The Ordinance of Blois (1579) was also crucial, for 
it formally confirmed that any marriage contracted without parental consent was rapt and thus 
invalid.  Priests who performed the ceremony were to be charged as accomplices to rapt, 
which officially became a capital offense for the ravisseur, although as Jean Gaudemet notes: 
“this sanction was so severe that the tribunals most often hesitated to pronounce it.”25  The 
edict expanded the definition to include sons as “victims” and to qualify rapt as any form of 
abduction, coercion, or deception of minors (rapt de séduction; as opposed to simply 
forcible—rapt de violence), 26  inducing them to take marital vows without formal 
permission.27  These impressionable minds included any man under the age of 25 and woman 
under the age of 20.  It is also interesting to note, as Sarah Hanley does, that “the French 
charge [rapt; as opposed to its precedent in Roman law] concentrates on damages to a whole 
family injured by covert removal of a son or daughter from the family, or by covert entry of a 
person into a family, its lineage, and its property holdings.” 28   The controversy over 
clandestine vows cannot, therefore, be easily separated from the patrimonial strategies of 
these elite families. 
                                                 
23 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children,” 287. 
24 “Édit contre les mariages clandestins” reprinted in François André Isambert et al., Recueil Général des 
Anciennes Lois Françaises Depuis l’An 420, jusqu’à la Révolution de 1789, (Paris, 1822-33), 13:469, item 363. 
25 Jean Gaudemet, Le Mariage en Occident: les moeurs et le droit (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1987). 
26 Sarah Hanley, “Family and State,” 63-65. 
27 See Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children,” 287-8; Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors, chapter 5; and 
“Ordonnance rendue sur les plaints et doléances des états-généraux assemlée à Blois en novembre 1576, 
relativement à la police générale du royaume,” in Isambert, Recueil des Lois, 14:391-92, item 103, articles 40-4. 
28 Hanley, “Jurisprudence of the Arrêts,” 7. 
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This controversy over the legitimacy of clandestine marriages interests this study of 
clandestine religious vows precisely because authors from the period chose to make 
connections between the two.  That is, as Diefendorf has shown, outraged fathers employed 
the language of rapt upon learning that their child had taken religious vows without their 
permission and formally appealed to the authorities on such grounds.29  This connection 
should not be too shocking given the sacramental nature of the two sets of vows—giving them 
a permanence and formally removing them from parental jurisdiction—and the language of 
marriage of the two (either betrothed to a beloved or Christ).  Ayrault, in keeping with his 
Parlementary connections and judicial profession, chose to infuse his treatise on parental 
power with this legal charge of rapt leveled against the Jesuits.  It is within this context that 
people such as Pasquier found Ayrault’s case compelling and useful, both in pursuing their 
own cases and in trying to have the Jesuits expelled from the kingdom.30 
Adding to these reservations about the Council of Trent, the new religious orders that 
emerged in the sixteenth century were controversial in France.  Monastic orders certainly 
were not new; nor was the idea of an ascetic lifestyle particularly innovative.  Nevertheless, 
Diefendorf has argued, many parents were reluctant to give their sons (and daughters) over to 
this new lifestyle, regarding the vigorous ascetic practices with shock and horror.  Aside from 
parental affection and concern for their children, was concern for the future of the family in 
general, especially regarding the eldest sons and daughters.  Monastic orders were historically 
places to put spare heirs, and such vocations could add to the status and prominence of a 
family if the child took over the position of abbot from another relative at a major monastery.  
                                                 
29 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.” 
30 Étienne Pasquier, The Jesuites catechisme, 1602, ed. D. M. Rogers, vol. 264 of English Recusant Literature, 
1558-1640, (London: The Scolar Press, 1975);  “De la Secte des Jesuites, Livre III, Chapitre XLIII,” and 
“Plaidoyé de l’Université de Paris, encontre les Jesuites, Livre III, Chapitre XLIV,” from Les Recherches de la 
France in Les Œuvres D’Estienne Pasquier, (Amsterdam: La Compagnie des Libraires Associez, 1723), 1: 323-
52. 
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These kinship networks were not as strong within the new orders nor were they intended to be.  
Diefendorf attributes part of the tension to a generational conflict.31  Kelley also sees a 
generational conflict in the tension surrounding the reforming fervor with “the mentality of 
alienation and defiance underlying the struggles of that age.”32  Although it is doubtful that 
this tension would be absent from any period, nevertheless, the idea of generational conflict is 
important because it provides insight into early modern conceptualizations of youth and its 
relation to paternal authority.33 
Furthermore, the regulation of religious vocations had similar implications to those of 
clandestine marriages.  It was relatively easy to adapt the same arguments for restricting the 
taking of marital vows to taking religious ones.  Restricting the taking of vows of either sort 
was an important means for the robins to maintain their prominence within society.  Hanley 
has done considerable work on the relationship between the French state and the new 
bureaucratic class in the early modern period.34  Her idea of a “Family-state compact” and 
“marital regime” will be discussed at length in Chapter Two; nevertheless, it suffices here to 
note that she has argued that robins sought security for their social status in the next 
generation, which they did through the regulation of marriages.35  Diefendorf has also noticed 
this among the Parisian elite.36  Robins worked to secure marriages among their members or 
more prominent members of society.  Regulating marriage and preventing clandestine 
marriages became critical to solidifying the new class because they wanted to restrict the 
number of people moving into their class too.  J.H.M. Salmon has also argued that they even 
tried to convince the king to limit the number of offices he created and filled, but a series of 
                                                 
31 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.” 
32 Donald R. Kelley, The Beginning of Ideology: Consciousness and Society in the French Reformation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 79. 
33 Griffiths, Youth and Authority. 
34 Hanley, “Engendering the State;” Hanley, “The Jurisprudence of the Arrêts.” 
35 Hanley, “Engendering the State.” 
36 Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors. 
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financial crises hindered such restrictions because it was too tempting to resort to venality to 
make up for fiscal shortcomings.37 
The introduction discussed how the new bureaucratic class was negotiating its noble 
status, and in so doing, it reveals a potential flaw in the above arguments.  As Robert 
Descimon has shown, nobility (i.e. social position) for these people was still in a state of 
development.  While seeking security, they simultaneously undermined their position: 
Society therefore posed a crucial question: Was nobility such a desirable possession?  The 
question seems astonishing for a so-called society of orders.  The answer reflected the 
conflicts and divisions within families moved by ‘the different motivations of honor and 
interest,’ and was, in fact, painfully banal: the oldest children were partisans of nobility, and 
the younger ones were against it, inasmuch as they sought for themselves the privileges of 
personal ennoblement that would permit them to avoid the inconveniences that came with the 
old nobility [primogeniture].38   
 
In other words, Descimon complicates the previous argument by suggesting that at times of 
inheritance, younger children often denied their father’s status and did not support his position.  
They perhaps supported the exclusiveness of his bureaucratic privileges but not his inherent 
nobility.  Thus, the position which the robins were supporting and for which they were 
seeking security was fractured by a question of the desirability of nobility; meaning that they 
were not perhaps trying to secure their position so much as trying to create it in an official 
capacity.  That is, the class as a whole may have moved generally toward legitimizing its 
position, but on an individual family scale, the reservations of younger children had the 
potential of undermining a family’s strategies for advancement, thereby forcing a new 
beginning in the ennoblement process and leaving less to secure. 
These technicalities aside, Ayrault lends credence to the concept of hope resting in the 
next generation.  “[Is] it not that the son is the pillar of the house? that it is he who retains the 
                                                 
37 J.H.M. Salmon, Society in Crisis: France in the sixteenth century (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1975).  
38 Robert Descimon, “The Birth of the Nobility of the Robe: Dignity versus Privilege in the Parlement of Paris, 
1500-1700,” trans. Orest Ranum in Changing Identities in Early Modern France, ed. Michael Wolfe (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1996), 111. 
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name and weapons? consequently it is in him where there is more fear that he will ally 
himself badly? it is he who owes more honor to his father and mother, more example, more 
respect?” he asks.39  The hope and security of the family rested on the son, who inherited the 
responsibility to provide for and protect the family.  Following this, Ayrault suggests that 
joining the Jesuits, especially against parental will, was to “ally badly.”  This notion of a poor 
alliance stems directly from the clandestine marriage controversy, developing from concerns 
for good social and political alliances (and reputation) in addition to those for patrimonial 
security.40  Therefore, clandestine vows posed a significant threat to a family’s well-being and 
so provoked a strong response.  Ayrault sides firmly with Parlement against the Council of 
Trent, while trying to make his son recognize the gravity of the consequences of his actions. 
Like his robin associates, Ayrault cites secular precedents to support his argument.  
The most notable is article 19 of the ordinance of Orléans (1560), made by King Charles IX in 
response to the doléances of the Estates General41:  
‘We prohibit fathers and mothers, tutors and parents, from permitting their children or pupils 
to make a religious profession, if they have not reached 25 years for males and 20 years for 
girls.  And before the said time [that] the said professions would be [made], the said professed 
will be able to dispose of their portion of the hereditary share or to leave in direct or collateral 
line, to the profit of whichever of his parents will seem good to him and not the monastery.’42   
 
Ayrault’s citation is remarkable on at least two accounts. 43   First, it addresses fears of 
monasteries attracting heirs to usurp their inheritances.  If nothing else these directions for 
                                                 
39 “N’estoit-ce pas que le fils est la colomne de la maison?  Que c’est luy qui retient le nom & les armes? 
consequemment que c’est luy où il y a plus de crainte qu’il s’allie mal? c’est luy qui doit plus d’honneur, à ses 
pere & mere, plus d’exemple, plus de respect?”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 50-51.  Quarta finds the 
reference in Numbers 30.  She sees Ayrault arguing that joining a religious order is contrary to divine law.  
Ayrault e Bodin, 30. 
40 Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors, chapter 5. 
41 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.” 
42 “‘Defendons aux peres & meres, tuteurs & parens, de permettre à leurs enfans ou pupiles, faire profession de 
Religieux, qu’ils n’ayent, sçavoir est, les masles xxv ans, & les filles xx ans.  Et où avant ledit temps lesdites 
professions se seroient, pourront lesdits profez disposer de leur portion hereditaire escheuë, ou à eschoir en ligne 
directe ou collateralle, au profit de celuy de ses parens qui bon luy semblera, & non de Monastere.’”  Ayrault, 
Puissance Paternelle, 87.  Ayrault quotes the ordinance word for word; see “Ordonnance d’Orléans,” in 
Isambert, Recueil des Lois, 14:69, item 8, article 19. 
43 Quarta states that Ayrault never cites passages in their original words, which may be true for his citations of 
Roman sources but is not in this case.  See Ayrault e Bodin, 19. 
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renouncing and recuperating the inheritances of these children reveals that such usurpations 
were an actual concern of people like Ayrault and unveil the importance of patrimonial 
strategies in filing complaints.  At the same time, Ayrault used such grievances and concerns 
to his advantage in making his case to recover his son.  They become more acute in light of 
Ayrault’s supposed religious concerns, and an accusation of greed will be examined more 
fully in Chapter Three.   
Second, the above citation appears to deny that children can take religious vows under 
the age of majority even if they have parental consent.  That is, it undermines paternal 
prerogative from a secular angle by denying fathers the right, should they so desire, to allow 
their children to take vows.  It is the ultimate opposition to the Council of Trent, but it is a 
curious addition for one arguing for the absolute supremacy of parental will.  It appeals to 
secular authorities and indicates part of the intended audience for this treatise—officials in 
Parlement, who strangely enough accepted the legislation to support their own status as 
fathers.  Ayrault invokes a piece of legislation which directly addresses rapt, thereby 
associating his case with the crime of rapt and allying himself with Parlement.  He therefore 
established paternal authority as a secular authority.  However, at one point he places paternal 
authority outside of government control: “It happens that this private authority often has more 
force, more credit than that of all the Republic put together: that is to say that the father has 
more over his son than the Magistrate, the assembly, and the army.”44   Thus, he paradoxically 
placed the family both inside and outside of the legal order.  The private authority which he 
extolled held a place of prestige and in some regards defied secular limitations.  In fact Quarta 
                                                 
44 “Il advenoit que ceste auctorité privee avoit souvent plus de force, plus de credit que celle de toute la 
Republique conjoinctement: c'est-à-dire, que le pere pouvoit plus sur son fils, que Magistrat, qu’assemblee & 
armee qui fust.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 3. 
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sees Ayrault as establishing a decentralized corrective power for fathers;45 although one must 
proceed with caution in qualifying decentralized.  Nevertheless, he was attempting to combat 
an ecclesiastical prerogative by whatever means possible, even if it involved abandoning 
some of his personal authority to a higher secular cause. 
Contumacy 
While establishing paternal authority as a secular authority by siding definitively with 
Parlement against the Council of Trent, Ayrault offers another indication that he thought 
about his case in legal terms.  In the opening letter of this treatise, Ayrault addresses the 
reader and claims to be addressing his son as a contumace, 46 which in sixteenth century 
French legalese was someone who was summoned but failed to appear in court (originally 
ecclesiastical) for his trial and roughly translates as being in contempt of court or 
insubordinate.  Contumacy presumed guilt, and those accused were tried accordingly.  The 
use of this term indicates that Ayrault articulated his understanding of his relationship with 
René as analogous to one between judge (father) and defendant (son).  Ayrault spends a 
significant part of another book expanding the utility of this term, so there is reason to believe 
that his use of the term was deliberate.47  It was also clever.  While pleading a secular case of 
rapt, he borrowed a term from the canon legal system.  The extent to which this term was 
borrowed into the French legal system is beyond the scope of this study; nevertheless, 
Ayrault’s legal education and wide experience would have taught him the original use of this 
word.  Thus, he complicates his secular case by constructing a crime using both secular and 
ecclesiastical terminology, making the issue difficult for ecclesiastical courts to ignore 
                                                 
45 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 31. 
46 Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, note to the reader. 
47 Pierre Ayrault, Des Proces Faicts au Cadaver, aux Cendres, à la mémoire; aux bestes brutes; choses 
inanimees; & aux contumax: Livre IIII de l’Ordre, Formalité, & Instruction Judiciaire (Angers: Antoine 
Hernault, 1591); see also Pierre Ayrault, De L’Ordre et  Instruction Judiciaire, dont les Anciens Grecs et 
Romains ont usé en accusations publiques (Paris: Jacques du Puys, 1576). 
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because he is trying to use their own system against them.  In other words, he employs the 
ecclesiastical system to press a secular agenda; however it also introduces an inherent 
contradiction in Ayrault’s conceptualization of the crime.  That is, contumacy presumes a 
culpability for René which rapt theoretically removes.  This contradiction need not be a fault 
in Ayrault’s argument but rather represents an interior struggle and a complex understanding 
of his son’s and the Jesuits’ actions. 
Ayrault borrows “contumacy” to add canonic validity and perhaps urgency to his 
argument as he approaches his problem from as many sides as possible to recover his son 
(recall that the pope sent a letter forbidding the Jesuits to accept René into the Society).48  
However, he transforms its meaning slightly.  He gives it a broader connotation of 
insubordination: “You will say…that all just piety and bounty cease if the son wants to make 
himself a monk, that then cruelty is piety, incivility reverence, contumacy fidelity and 
obedience.” 49   Succeeding a quote by St. Jerome, Ayrault claims that his son is not 
contumacious simply because he failed to answer his father’s summons, rather he is 
disobedient, disloyal and perhaps faithless—if we take the previous accusation of infidel in a 
double sense (loyalty and faith).  It also underscores canonical relevance.  He accentuates his 
son’s disobedience via military analogy, comparing René’s contumacy to the “contumacy of 
the soldier to his captain.”50   Ayrault expands the meaning of contumacy beyond mere 
absence, which is obvious to this case, to include more cases of disobedience and contempt of 
                                                 
48 Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, letter following text; see also Victor Jeanvrot, “Notice Biographique” in 
preface to Pierre Ayrault, Ordre et Instruction Judiciaire (Paris: A. Chevalier-Marescq, 1881), pp. 95-113. 
49 “Vous direz que ce passage prend son exception de l’autre: c’est à dire, que toute juste pieté & bonté cesse, si 
le fils se veut rendre Moine que lors la cruauté, est pieté: l’incivilité, reverence: la contumace, fidelité & 
obeissance.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 78.  See also St. Bernard of Clairvaux, “To Robert, His Nephew,” 
The Letters of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, trans. Bruno Scott James (Great Britain: Sutton Publishing, 1998), letter 
1, pp. 1-10; 4. 
50 “contumace du soldat à son Capitaine.”  Ayrault, Puisance Paternelle, 22. 
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court.51 Ayrault usurps, to a degree, canonical authority to summon his son and so perhaps 
this would compete with the spiritual and at least legal authority of clerics.   
Because of the original designation of the term, Ayrault, by using it, suggested that 
part of René’s crime was one of irreverence.  However, a distinction must be made between 
Ayrault’s argument that René’s religious motives were flawed (which will be discussed later) 
and his conception of the deed as a crime.  While this distinction seems superficial and was 
probably not explicitly conceptualized as such during Ayrault’s lifetime, Ayrault did address 
two different audiences in two different ways.  His primary stated audience was his son; his 
unstated and de facto audience was authority figures, whether secular or ecclesiastic.  Ayrault 
did not particularly care who delivered his son and appealed to all sources of authority.  He 
presumed that he was not going to change his son’s mind by a legal argument; his son rejected 
secular forms of authority when he defied paternal authority, so Ayrault addressed his son’s 
motives.  This dispute on the merit of these motives was a covert way of attacking the 
Church—which was reasserting its own motives and morals—by means of the Jesuit 
“façade.”  He addressed the Church directly through its ongoing struggle with Parlement, 
appealing to the authority of law instead of religious spirituality.  Using the word 
“contumacy” allowed Ayrault to subordinate ecclesiastical priorities to secular interests.  
Again, secular and religious legal systems were not clearly distinguished, despite opposing 
jurisdictions—including elements of both woven tightly together—although the sixteenth 
century was an important period of this long process of dividing these competing sources of 
authority.  Thus, when Ayrault employed an example from the life of St. Gregory, these 
concepts overlapped considerably; however, it is useful to examine them each separately. 
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Ayrault used an episode from the life of St. Gregory—a case where he saw profound 
resonances with his son’s—in a notably secular manner: “[I] know that he withdrew from 
worldly affairs (as they say) fleeing the bishopric, and that he elected a contemplative and 
monastic life, against the intention of his father who was destining him his successor; 
however, he feared in the end to fall into this crime of disobedience, irreverence, and impiety 
toward his father.  He returned from the monastery…”52  Like René he had answered a 
religious calling against his father’s intention, but unlike René, he changed his mind.  It is 
important to emphasize this difference.  St. Gregory may or may not have been deceived into 
defying his father, but after a moment of realization, he did return.  The decision to return 
provides an active role to René in his culpability which in turn allows Ayrault to accuse him 
of contumacy.  René was deceived and then recalled (moment of realization) but did not 
return.  However, St. Gregory did not simply have a change of heart.  Ayrault draws particular 
attention to the excuse that he feared to be disobedient to his father.  Going against the will of 
a father, even to serve God, is thus portrayed as a crime.  Moreover it is not surprising that 
this case would attract the attention of a robin.  The “intent” of the father and the idea of 
succession resonate strongly with the class’s own attempts to secure its position through the 
regulation of vows and vocation, which prompted an elaborate construction of rapt with full 
criminal implications.  Likewise it is important to note that Gregory fled the bishopric, which 
was a part of the secular clergy and often included benefices which factored into family 
fortunes. 
Ayrault’s equation of paternal authority and law becomes clearer when he attributes 
the role of judge to fathers.  He does so by recalling ancient privileges of fathers from secular 
                                                 
52 “jaçoit qu’il se fust retire des affaires de monde (comme lon dit) fuyant l’Evesché, & qu’il eust esleu une vie 
contemplative & monastique, contre l’intention de son pere qui le destinoit son successeur: il craignit toutefois 
en fin de tomber en ce crime de desobeïssance, d’irreverance & impieté vers son pere.  Il retourna de 
Monastere…”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 17. 
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and biblical sources: “By these human laws [Greece and Rome], the father himself is judge of 
disobedience done to him.”53  He continues with an example drawn from the pre-Flood era: 
“the father’s denunciation alone had the place of full proof whether he came to present his son 
to the elders as contumacious, or fathers had in that time private and domestic power and 
authority over their children.”54  Ayrault seems to assert that the father possessed the supreme 
authority in the household and that his domestic authority spilled over into a semi-official 
capacity in the public sphere (to the degree that these two places were theoretically 
distinguished because in Ayrault’s time such distinction was ambiguous in practice).55  On the 
father’s word alone presumably, one could bypass criminal procedure as it developed in the 
sixteenth century and due process in the modern sense.  Here Quarta sees Ayrault lamenting 
the decline in fathers’ corrective power and the superficiality of paternal authority while 
claiming that public jurisdiction should be an extension of the paternal one.56  The father 
interpreted the law and crime in a domestic legal system, and such infractions were 
recognized as being threats to society as a whole.  Furthermore, the father probably was the 
legal system because he most likely made the laws in his family and then decided when they 
were broken.   
However, these interpretations are not so simple.  Most notably, Ayrault gives other 
indications that he was an avid supporter of due process (ordre et instruction judiciaire) and 
wrote an entire book advocating it.57  He also claimed that a lack of due process was a major 
                                                 
53 “Par ces loix humaines le pere est luy-mesme juge de la desobeissance qui luy est faicte.”  Ayrault, Puissance 
Paternelle, 3. 
54 “la seule denonciation du pere n’eust eu lieu de pleine preuve, s’il venu presenter son fils aux Anciens comme 
contumax & proterue, si les peres n’eussent eu dés ce temps là, de l’auctorité & de la puissance privee & 
domestique sur leurs enfans.”  Ibid., 6. 
55 See Julie Hardwick’s study of notarial families, who conducted their business primarily at home: The Practice 
of Patriarchy: Gender and the Politics of Household Authority in Early Modern France (University Park, 
Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). 
56 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 27. 
57 Ayrault, Ordre et Instruction, 1576. 
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fault of the League’s assassination of Henry III.58  As soon as we acknowledge Ayrault’s 
assertion that according to ancient custom, parents had the right of life and death over their 
children (citing Abraham and ancient law), we realize that at least in the case of Abraham, the 
father was not acting on his own initiative but rather obeying a higher authority.59  Similarly, 
when Ayrault writes, “It is well true that in Rome…fathers sometimes, by consequence of 
their domestic power, undertook jurisdiction of their children, even for crimes committed 
outside of the family,”60 he does not necessarily advocate fathers usurping public jurisdiction 
and punishing crimes in the public sphere; quite the opposite in fact, in light of his 
professional position as royal judge.  He used this example more to illustrate the extent of a 
father’s “domestic power,” that is, the power he has over his family, which figuratively and 
customarily also included the right of life and death than to incite others to action.61  “[O]ur 
Gauls had it too.”62 Ayrault, adding a little Gallican perspective, appeals in this instance to 
custom, which derived its authority from its age.63  Thus, patriarchal authority had a long and 
powerful history that, in Ayrault’s eyes, commanded respect.  This authority developed from 
both secular and divine sources, of which the divine was more important but which remained 
in the hands of the patriarch and God rather than strictly filtered through the Church.64  The 
                                                 
58 Pierre Ayrault, Deploration de la mort du roy, Henry III. & du scandale qu’en a l’Eglise (n. p., 1589), French 
political pamphlets, 1547-1648, UM Special Collections. 
59 Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 5-8, 17-22.  Quarta interprets these references as a demonstration of God’s will 
alone having supremacy over a father’s.  Ayrault e Bodin, 32. 
60 “Il est bien vraye qu’à Rome…les peres ont quelquesfois, en consequence de leur puissance domestique, 
entrepris jurisdiction sur leurs enfans, voire pour crimes commis hors la famille…”  Ayrault, Puissance 
Paternelle, 19. 
61 One sees this phenomenon also in adultery cases where a husband is permitted to kill an adulterous wife.  See 
Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth Century France 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987).  For a medieval tradition of this phenomenon as it 
pertains to adultery, see R. Howard Bloch, Medieval French Literature and Law (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977). 
62 “nos Gaulois l’avoient aussi.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 2. 
63 Esther Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice: Law and Culture in Late Medieval France (New York: E.J. Brill, 
1993). 
64 Quarta sees Ayrault opposing religious orders.  Ayrault e Bodin, 26-30. 
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Church was both essential to (in performing services such as marriage for religious 
legitimization), but in a sense not to interfere with, the family (and robin machinations).   
The most important thing to grasp from this discussion is the concept that these 
distinctions between public and private spheres, laws, and jurisdictions were still developing.  
Ayrault seems to discourage multiple jurisdictions and in particular, the legal jurisdiction of 
fathers: 
I say that their [the ancients] principal intention was not to introduce a form of magistrate in 
the person of fathers (I know that one gives them this name sometimes) nor to establish a 
diversity of jurisdictions, one public, the other private and domestic; that is, if the children 
were delinquents against the public, then they had their fathers for judges.  The magistrate was 
ordained for this, and to be a son is not a quality that merits this privilege of only being 
judiciable from his proper father.65   
 
As a royalist judge, he would probably have been supportive of the monarchy’s campaign to 
monopolize law and justice.  The royal courts had for a long time been in competition with 
seigneurial and decentralized courts.66  Of course the rebellions of the Catholic League also 
urgently necessitated the maintenance and control of law and order.  Advocating such an idea 
then would be part of his professional duty.  But he never went so far as to deny them an 
unofficial magisterial position, even admitting that “one gives them this name sometimes.”  
Officially, a crime within the private sphere could (and should) be tried in the public sphere 
but never vice versa.  However, as previously mentioned, Ayrault placed the authority of the 
father above that of the magistrate to the degree that he had a more direct magisterial role 
within (and for the benefit of) the family. 
 
 
                                                 
65 “Je dy que leur principale intention n’estoit pas d’introduire une forme de Magistrat en la personne des peres 
(jaçoit qu’on leur donnast ce nom quelquefois) ny pour establir une diversité de jurisdictions, l’une publique, 
l’autre privee & domestique: c’est à dire, que si les enfans delinquoient contre le public, qu’il eussent leurs peres 
pour juges.  Le Magistrat estoit ordonné pour cela: Et estre fils, ce n’est pas une qualité qui merite ce privilege de 
n’estre jurisdiciable que de son propre pere.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 19. 
66 Bloch, Literature and Law; and Salmon, Society in Crisis. 
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Rapt 
We have seen how Ayrault articulated his case in secular terms and how he sided 
firmly with Parlement against the Council of Trent.  Paternal authority was especially 
vulnerable to such conflicts of jurisdiction because it had both a secular and a sacred element 
to it.  Fathers had legal rights over their children, but fathers were also thought to have been 
placed in a position of authority as head of household by God.  In addition, Ayrault presumes 
that René is to be held accountable for his actions.  First and foremost, however, Ayrault was 
influenced by and dialoguing with Parlement’s conception of rapt because it was the only 
legal grounding he had—the only hope he had—for recovering his son.  In building his case 
Ayrault appears to closely follow a letter of St. Bernard of Clairvaux.  This case of rapt 
suggests that René is in fact innocent in his disappearance and that the Jesuits are guilty, but 
Ayrault unmasks the Jesuits’ deception with this treatise, thereby assessing blame to both his 
son and the Jesuits. 
Ayrault includes, as part of his case, an appeal to the secular hope embodied in all 
children: 
Whether therefore the son, vowing what belongs to the father, had made a pious choice or not, 
it would have been from the other side a species of theft [furt] and injustice…[T]he father and 
the mother by the child’s profession and adoption would have lost their hope, their heir, the 
continuation of their family, the profits and emoluments that were owed them from their 
negotiations and actions.  It follows therefore that to the vow of Religion that the son or 
daughter had made, the wish and consent principally of the father was required there.  
Religion is a very favorable thing but not such as against the natural and essential forms that 
thinking to favor it, one annuls or profanes it.67   
 
                                                 
67 “Quand donc le fils voüant ce qui est au pere, eust fait chose pieuse, que non: c’eust esté de l’autre costé 
espèce de furt & d’injustice.  Car les biens n’estoient pas au fils, mais au pere…le pere & la mere par la 
profession & adoption de leur enfant, eussent perdu leur esperance, leur heritier, la continuation de leur famille, 
les profits & emolumens qui leur revenoient de leurs negotiations & actions.  S’ensuit donc qu’au vœu de 
Religion que le fils ou la fille eust fait, le vouloir & le consentement principalement du pere y estoit requis.  La 
Religion est bien chose fort favorable: mais non pas tellement contre les formes naturelles & essentielles, que 
pensant la favoriser, on l’annulle ou on la prophane.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 42-43. 
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This passage is a robin way of saying that the choice of taking religious vows does not pertain 
to the son (or daughter), and that going against the formality of the father offering the son to a 
monastery (“what pertains to the father”) profanes religious intent.68  Ayrault maintains that 
going against patriarchal prerogatives is irreligious and his use of the word “annul” is 
interesting because Ayrault flips the legal maneuvering of the clerics and robins.  That is, the 
robins pressured clerics to annul clandestine vows by an argument of secular prerogative, but 
a dispute arose with clerics about the prerogative of religion.  In this case, the undermining of 
secular prerogative annuls religious intent instead of vice versa. 
In addition to cleverly reversing the usual jurisdictional argument, Ayrault employed 
the rhetoric of rapt and linked it to the robin motives for the extension of this term.  The word 
“furt” appears to derive from the Latin fur, which means thief.  It implies a willful 
wrongdoing and suggests a secrecy and theft that incorporates the idea into the realm of rapt. 
Furthermore, if justice is understood to be “rendering to each his due,” then “injustice” in this 
case is denying what is owed through the “stealing” (abduction) of a possession (the son).69  
By enumerating a list of abstract and concrete goods that would be lost by the taking of 
religious vows, he argued that all hope of livelihood and continuation of the family rested on 
the son, and so he belonged to the family, which the father controlled.  Because so many other 
conditions pertaining to the well-being of the family were attached to the son, and the father 
was responsible for ensuring the well-being of his family, the son could not, as a possession, 
operate under his will alone.  Therefore the father had to consent to how the son chose to 
dispose of himself because in so doing he disposed of the family.  The father’s preservation 
and protection of his family was “natural” and his consent was “essential.” 
                                                 
68 Quarta argues that Ayrault supports religion but disdains religious orders.  Ayrault e Bodin, 26. 
69 Quarta uses the analogy of creditor and debtor to father and son, claiming that the first relationship is material 
while the second is one of subordination.  However, this passage (and others) suggests that the father/son 
relationship had a material aspect as well.  Ibid., 57. 
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Linking his construction of rapt to robin motives necessarily leads to the typical failed 
distinction between “types” of rapt.  This connection is evident when he reiterates a work by 
his friend Pasquier:  
[F]inally the fathers [religious delegates] declared at the Council of Trent, in Session xxiiii 
that although clandestine marriage (such as that which is made without the consent of the 
father and mother) is marriage, so much and so long as the Church will not have broken and 
annulled it; [the Church] herself, however, has always prohibited and detested it for very just 
causes.  The Church desires that, if it is marriage, it depend on her and not the father.  He has 
moreover the Ordinance of the Christian Princes, who say loud and clear that it is rapt and if it 
is marriage that they have from God a good sword to dissolve it.  I will add however two 
passages, not for undertaking to confirm or quash what the Church or the Prince wanted from 
it, or would want to define, but to make children think twice, three times, that all of which is 
permitted is not honnête and think again to disobey so easily in an act which will never show 
them in a good light.70   
 
While Ayrault coyly denies that he takes a side in the conflict in this place, his robin 
perspective is evidently coloring the secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictional conflict if for no 
other reason than the fact that he chose to insert this passage into his treatise in the first place.  
The style is one frequently employed in refutation, beginning with the opponent’s claim and 
finishing with one’s own.  He (through Pasquier) acknowledges that there is a difference 
between what the clerics and the lawyers consider prerequisites to marriage.  He also 
grudgingly acknowledges that the lawyers cannot annul the marriages which the Church 
deems to be legitimate.  He does insist, however, that reasons for dissolving such marriages 
are “just,” adopting the term of the Council of Trent and implying that parental disapproval 
qualifies as such.  Ayrault recognizes the Church’s adamancy about monopolizing the control 
of marriage as a sacrament.  But then he turns around and suggests that God approves of the 
                                                 
70 “Il a pour luy, qu’enfin les Peres ont declare au Concile de Trente, en la Session xxiiii que bien que le mariage 
clandestin (tel qu’est celuy qui est fait sans le consentement du pere & de la mere) soit mariage, tant & si 
longuement que l’Eglise ne l’aura cassé & annullé: que toutefois elle-mesme l’a tousjours pour tres-justes causes 
defendu & detesté.  L’Eglise veut, si c’est mariage, que cela depende d’elle, non pas du pere.  Il a encores 
l’Ordonnance des Princes Chrestiens, qui disent haut & clair que c’est rapt: &, si c’est mariage, qu’ils ont de 
Dieu une bonne espee pour le dissoudre.  J’ajousteray toutefois deux passages, non pour entreprendre de 
confirmer, ou infirmer ce que l’Eglise, ou le Prince en ont voulu, ou voudroient definir: mais pour faire que les 
enfans pensent deux fois, trois fois, que tout ce qui est permis, n’est pas honneste: & pensent outre à ne desobeïr 
pas si facilement en acte qui ne leur produira oncques.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 37-38. 
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bureaucrats’ outrage and desire to annul clandestine vows.  By inserting Pasquier’s words into 
this treatise, Ayrault links the virtue of parental consent in the case of both marital and 
religious vows.  Because of Church monopoly, though, the only weapon these fathers had was 
to appeal to a higher code of reverence and obedience outside of the conflict of jurisdiction, 
which carried more weight since such an appeal was attached to reverence and obedience to 
God.  He tries to make the argument that children should not be tempted to take advantage of 
the opportunity presented to them, that it is not always right to do what is permissible. 
Ayrault cleverly maneuvers around the jurisdictional conflict concerning age as well.  
He presents his son as a minor by both secular and ecclesiastical standards: “At the age of 
fifteen to sixteen years you have undertaken to vow yourself to the Jesuits.  You had and (if it 
is to have what one despises) you still have your father and mother in this world.”71  Ayrault 
continues, though, by acknowledging robin values: “Consider now if this text [St. Jerome] 
excuses you, you who were and are still a minor of 25 years, who have your father and mother 
living, who were not already required by another vow to be a Jesuit.”72  It is important to note 
that even though Ayrault had claimed that René was fifteen when he joined the order against 
his father’s will, he still asserts the secular age of majority, that is 25 years old, to make 
doubly sure that others, regardless of jurisdiction understood that his son had not reached the 
age of reason.73  Nevertheless, the passage shows that Ayrault’s loyalties lay more with civil 
law prescriptions than those of canon law.  It also resonates closely with part of a letter by St. 
                                                 
71 “En l’aage de quinze à seize ans vous avez entrepris de vous voüer aux Jesuites.  Vous aviez, & (si c’est avoir 
ce qu’on mesprise) vous avez encores vostre pere & vostre mere en ce monde.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 
67-68.  St. Basile (to whom this passage refers) according to Ayrault, delayed taking monastic vows until his 
parents died. 
72 “Considerez maintenant si ce texte vous excuse, vous qui estiez & estes encores mineur de xxv ans: qui avez 
vostre pere & vostre mere vivans: qui n’estiez point desja oblige par autre voeu à estre Jesuite.”  Ibid., 81. 
73 Diefendorf notes that Ayrault, in another work, fudged René’s age from about nineteen to about fifteen for 
dramatic effect.  “Give Us Back Our Children,” 293. 
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Bernard of Clairvaux, whose nephew defected to Cluny on the grounds that his parents had 
previously dedicated him there.74 
In addition to addressing specific legal questions regarding his case of rapt, such as 
age and jurisdiction, Ayrault deepens the rhetoric of rapt by attacking his adversaries’ 
methods.  In so doing, he argues that Jesuits seduced his son with misinformation: “But the 
greatest evil in this is that it seems that our Religion…instead of establishing this domestic 
power, destroys it and that nothing dispenses much our children to the honor, reverence, and 
obedience that they owe, that…to serve well God and men conjointly…are reduced as 
contrary and incompatible.”75  He argues that the Jesuits enticed his son to defy his father by 
means of an “evil,” reductionist argument which seemed to put parents (“domestic power”) 
and religious devotion at odds.  Ayrault continues along this line: “[I]f the theology, or those 
who attract you to them, give you a pertinent solution to it, I would be well at ease that you or 
they taught it to me.”76  The Jesuits “attracted” the impressionable young man, which implies 
a sort of malice, or at least deception and dishonesty.  Instead of being the active decision-
maker characteristic of a contumace, René here becomes a passive, entranced subject.  The 
quote also suggests underhandedly that no justification in “theology” exists and that the 
secrecy, at least on the part of the Jesuits, is designed to cover illicit behavior.  Ayrault cloaks 
this invitation to open text-based argument in an “innocent” request for an explanation.  
Moreover, Ayrault suggests that René is being misled by his “teachers,” who have selected “a 
                                                 
74 St. Bernard, letter 1. 
75 “Mais le plus grand mal qui est en cecy, c’est qu’il semble que nostre Religion (comme nous avons dit) au lieu 
d’establir ceste puissance domestique, la destruise: & que rien ne dispense tant nos enfans de l’honneur, 
reverence & obeisance qu’ils doivent, que la difficulté qu’on veut dire estre à bien servir Dieu & les homes 
conjoinctement Preceptes qui s’accordoient & marchoient d’un pied, sont rendus comme contraires & 
incompatibles.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 31. 
76 “Que si la Theologie, ou ceux qui vous attirent à eux, vous y donnent solution pertinent: je seray bien aise que 
vous, ou eux me l’appreniez…”  Ibid., 39. 
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truncated passage” (out of context), and he presents the ensuing “perplexities” as deliberate 
on the part of the Jesuits, who seduce and lure children into the Society.77   
This attack against the Jesuits presumes the accusation of rapt, that René was not 
wholly to blame for his decision to join the Jesuits.  Rapt was considered a form of coercion, 
and under Parlementary law, such a transaction was null and void.  Ayrault explicitly links his 
case to the various connotations of rapt which were circulating at the time he wrote his 
treatise.  He may have delighted in the irony of a young man being seduced or that a group of 
celibates were seducers—sexual innuendo intended.  However, ambiguity arises from the verb 
séduire, which had multiple meanings such as to corrupt innocence, to deceive, to lead astray, 
to make fall into error, to make to shirk a duty, and to persuade78 and which can be interpreted 
in various ways. 
Ayrault’s use of the rhetoric of rapt culminates with an episode from the life of St. 
Bernard of Clairvaux.  In fact, Ayrault appears to model at least part of his treatise on a letter 
which St. Bernard wrote to his nephew Robert.  Ayrault evidently saw some striking parallels 
between St. Bernard’s case and his own.  Apparently, Robert had been promised to the abbey 
of Cluny by his parents when just a boy.  However, he entered Cîteaux as a novice and began 
a sort of father-son relationship with St. Bernard.  After a few years as a Cistercian, Cluny 
looked more and more desirable to the youth.  He snuck out of Cîteaux with the help of some 
Cluniacs and justified his action based on his parents’ previous vow and the transfer of 
property which had accompanied it.  Needless to say, this defection to a rival order troubled 
St. Bernard, prompting him to write a letter, mixed with admonition and tenderness, to his 
                                                 
77 “un passage trunqué, vous mettre en des perplexitez.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 65.  Quarta notices an 
emphasis on direct reading.  Ayrault e Bodin, 26. 
78 See Émile Littré, vol. 6 of Dictionnaire de la langue française, (Paris: Gallimard-Hachette, 1961-2); and 
Edmond Huguet, vol. 6 of Dictionnaire de la langue française du sixième siècle, (Paris: E. Champion, 1925). 
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adopted son, which Ayrault’s treatise echoes.79  In using this letter, Ayrault not only borrows 
St. Bernard’s voice for his treatise but also speaks through St. Bernard’s letter. 
In recounting St. Bernard’s story, he interprets it as a robin case of rapt.  It will be 
useful here to juxtapose the texts in question.  First, Ayrault gives his account of the young 
man’s disappearance: “There was a quarrel between these two monasteries.  St. Bernard 
blamed first of all the way which those of Cluny had used…to have proceeded by secret 
inductions and persuasions…they had deceived the doormen of the convent and had drawn 
and raised this Robert without the seal of his superiors and his uncle….Fefellit te80 sanctitas, 
seduxit religio, perdidit auctoritas seniorum.”81  Compare this narrative to that of St. Bernard:  
[H]e [hypothetical youth] was duped by sanctity, misled by religion, allured by the authority 
of age.…Outwardly he [a Grand Prior] came in sheep’s clothing, but within he was a ravening 
wolf.  Alas!  The shepherds were deceived…The smallest sheep in the fold did not fly from 
this wolf, he too was deceived….This wolf in sheep’s clothing fascinated, allured, and 
flattered.  He preached a new Gospel….By such sophistries the too credulous boy was talked 
around, led astray and led off by his deceivers.82   
 
Notice in particular the language of secrecy, persuasion, and deception in the two accounts.  It 
is intriguing that Ayrault, in playing the role of St. Bernard, appears to equate the Jesuits with 
the monks of Cluny.  At first glance, this equation might seem counterintuitive.  After all, the 
Cistercians were the reformed order, recapturing the spirit of earlier monasticism.  However, 
the Cistercians were highly ascetic, and the Jesuits operated uniquely in the world.  Thus, the 
accusation of luxury from St. Bernard toward the Cluniacs: “Who else would not scold your 
                                                 
79 St. Bernard, letter 1. 
80 The Latin passages from Ayrault’s account are translated in the juxtaposed excerpts of St. Bernard’s letter.  
This te appears to have been inserted by Ayrault and seems to be a way of personalizing the account through 
Latin because the corresponding passage in the letter is impersonal “that man” (illum) not “you”: fefellit illum 
sanctitas, seduxit religio, perdidit auctoritas seniorum.  See Bernard de Clairvaux, “Ad Robertum, Nepotum 
suum, qui de Ordine Cisterciensi descenderat ad Cluniacensem,” in Lettres I (1 à 41) vol. 2 of Oeuvres 
complètes, (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1997), 66. 
81 “Querelle entre ces deux Monasteres.  S. Bernard blasmoit premierement la façon dont ceux de Cluny avoient 
usé: sçavoir est, d’y avoir procedé par inductions & persuasions secrettes…ils avoient deceu les portiers du 
Convent, & en avoient tiré & enlevé ce Robert sans le sceu de ses superieurs, & de son oncle….Fefellit te 
sanctitas, seduxit religio, perdidit auctoritas seniorum, luy escrit-i.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 82-83. 
82 St. Bernard, 3-4. 
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disobedience and be angry at your desertion, that you should have left the coarse habit for soft 
raiment, a fare of roots for delicacies, in fine poverty for riches,” could be echoed by Ayrault 
against the Jesuits: “you for whom it was not a question of fleeing Paganism or its 
persecutions, not to go into the desert of Scythia but into the most beautiful places and richest 
houses and most beautiful (cities) in the world.”83  The accusation that the Jesuits were soft 
derived principally from their concern to stay fit and thus remain able to perform their duties 
in the world.84  By extension Ayrault concludes: “St. Bernard… condemns without doubt your 
pretended vocation and inspiration of which you flatter yourself.”85 
Ayrault continues by emphasizing the primary role of parents, which he selects from 
St. Bernard: “Petitio quam Regula praecepit, non est facta pro eo à parentibus, wanting to 
say: although the defunct father of this young man had some will that he was of your [order], 
however it did not have any sort of effect.” 86  Again, compare this passage with the 
corresponding one of St. Bernard’s letter: “[T]here is no doubt that the boy was promised to 
the monastery without any formal oblation, for the petition prescribed by the Rule was not 
made by his parents…and the offering made before witnesses.”87  However, immediately 
preceding this passage St. Bernard appears to undermine the importance of parental offering: 
“Let them see and judge which has the more force: the vow a father makes on behalf of his 
son, or the vow a son makes on his own behalf.”88  Ayrault chose to ignore this point, adding 
in his narrative: “what your rule and ours requires notably, that this one who wants to enter 
                                                 
83 “vous, à qui il n’estoit question- de fuïr le Paganisme, ou les persecutions d’i-celuy: non d’aller és deserts de 
Scytie, mais és plus beaux lieux & plus riches maisons, & plus belles Citez qui soient au monde.”  Ayrault, 
Puissance Paternelle, 81. 
84 A. Lynn Martin, The Jesuit Mind: The Mentality of an Elite in Early Modern France (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), see especially chapter 8. 
85 “St. Bernard…condamne sans doute vostre pretenduë vocation & inspiration dont vous vous flattez.” Ayrault, 
Puissance Paternelle, 83. 
86 “Petitio quam Regula praecepit, non est facta pro eo à parentibus, voulant dire: Bien que le defunct pere de ce 
jeune homme eust eu quelque volonté qu’il fust de vostres: toutesfois elle n’avoit point sorty d’effect.” Ibid. 
87 St. Bernard, 6. 
88 Ibid. 
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into religion, be offered by his parents and before testimony (he [St. Bernard] added still) 
which is not found in your profession made to Cluny.”89  Reading the above passage from the 
letter, it is clear that this quote by Ayrault is not verbatim but rather it is Ayrault paraphrasing 
his own interpretation (unless we assume that Ayrault misunderstood the Latin, which would 
be highly unlikely).  Not only is Ayrault extending Benedictine Rule to the Society of Jesus 
(which had its own constitution), but he switches St. Bernard’s negative construction to a 
positive one.  That is, he takes St. Bernard’s point that Robert was not offered by his parents 
and before witnesses to mean that both are required to take monastic vows.  It is a subtle ploy, 
but in so doing, Ayrault emphasizes St. Bernard’s case of rapt as he sees it. 
Even in St. Bernard’s case of rapt and outcry against deception, Ayrault sees blame 
assigned to the victim.  Consider this passage from the letter: “And so if you left through my 
fault, as you believe and I do not deny, or through your own fault, as many believe but I do 
not affirm, or, as I think more probable, through the fault of both of us, from now on you 
alone will be to blame if you do not return” (my emphasis).90  Ayrault echoes this sentiment 
saying: “either you or I have erred: you, to undertake to be a Jesuit against my will, me, to be 
offended by it.”91  Likewise he states: “But just as the girl abducted immature, as long a she 
remains with her abductor, does not reach adulthood, the majority that you acquired in the 
hands of those who detain you against my will, will never excuse you, nor them either.”92  
Ayrault thus recognizes both the guilt of the Jesuits and his son’s guilt while building a case 
of rapt.  That is, Ayrault (perhaps alongside his robin associates) defines clandestine vows 
                                                 
89 “Ce que vostre reigle & la nostre requiert notamment, que celuy qui veut entrer en religion, soit offert par ses 
parens, & devant tesmoins (adjouste-il encores) ne se trouve point en vostre profession faicte à Cluny.” Ayrault, 
Puissance Paternelle, 83. 
90 St. Bernard, 2. 
91 “c’est celuy auquel vous, ou moy avons erré: Vous, d’entreprendre d’estre Jesuite contre ma volonté.  Moy, de 
m’en offenser…”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 37. 
92 “Mais tout ainsi que la fille enlevee immatura, quandiu apud raptorem est, aetatem non attingit, aussi a 
majorité que vous acquerriez entre les mains de ceux qui vous detiennent contre ma volonté, ne vous excusera 
jamais, ne eux aussi…”  Ibid., 99. 
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(marital or religious) as an act of disobedience and thus illegitimate, and he justifies this 
estimation because the deed did not result from necessary discretion: the will of parents.  This 
legal action, in turn, presumes (despite the innocence of seduction) the son’s recognition of 
his disobedience which permits an accusation of contumacy.  Moreover, Ayrault tries to 
convince René that his disobedience will have consequences that he did not anticipate and 
which actually contradict his religious aspirations.  
Ayrault emphasizes the idea of damnation, also borrowed from St. Bernard: “And the 
fault of this nephew, to change monastery only, was such (said St. Bernard) that he was going 
there to the damnation of his soul.  What to the son who stomps under foot so arrogantly the 
commandment of God and the holy decretals?”93  Compare this to St. Bernard: 
[T]he whole significance of the suit was nothing more than that the robbers could keep their 
spoils…And withal a soul for whom Christ died must be lost to please Cluny….a clean heart 
will avail more than crafty words….May Christ save you from this, dear son, for at the last 
judgment you will incur a greater penalty on account of this letter of mine if, when you have 
read it, you do not take its lesson to heart.94   
 
While these two passages both make the pretension of being concerned with the offending 
party’s salvation, it is important to note that St. Bernard does not mention the commandments 
or decretals in his letter but rather sin only.  More about the commandments will be explained 
in Chapter Three.  Notice also, as Ayrault must have, the label of “robbers” for the Cluniacs 
and then compare it to the title of the treatise, where Ayrault accuses the Jesuits of “stealing” 
his son.  The passages indicate the complexity of Ayrault’s understanding of René’s guilt, for 
although being stolen implies innocence, damnation implies guilt. 
It seems fitting to conclude this comparison between Ayrault and St. Bernard by 
examining emotion in the two accounts.  The clearest correlation comes from the opening of 
                                                 
93 “Et si la faute de ce nepveu, pour changer seulement de Monastere, est telle (dit S. Bernard) qu’il y alloit de la 
damnation de son ame: qu’est-ce au fils de fouler aux piedz si arrogamment le commandement de Dieu, & les 
saincts Decrets, non pour changer de foy, mais de robe? non d’Eglise, mais  de College?”  Ayrault, Puissance 
Paternelle, 83-84. 
94 St. Bernard, 5 & 10. 
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both works.  Ayrault addresses the reader: “It has been three years and more that I have been 
trying to learn where the Jesuits are holding my son.  If I had discovered the place, I would 
have made this remonstrance to him privately.  But seeing that I was losing time, and more, 
my hope, I wanted to write to him as to the contumacious.”95  Compare this to St. Bernard: 
“Long enough, perhaps too long, have I waited, dearest Robert, for the Lord that he might 
deign to touch your soul…moving you to salutary regrets for your error….But seeing myself 
still disappointed of my hope, I can no longer hide my sorrow, restrain my anxiety, or 
dissemble my grief.”96  The opening of this letter is perhaps merely a topos; nevertheless, the 
similarities are striking.  Elsewhere, Ayrault adopts some of the emotion in the letter: “[W]hy 
therefore (said Saint Bernard) have you charmed and robbed me of my nephew, my pleasure, 
my contentment….he called them thieving wolves what opportunity can I have of it who was 
deprived and despoiled of my son.  Fortè miserti sunt tui.  You were lost from between the 
hands of father and mother, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters all Catholic.”97  Compare this to 
the actual letter: “Unhappy man that I am who have not you by me, who cannot see you, who 
am obliged to live without you…So I do not ask why you left me, I only grieve that you do 
not return; I do not blame your going away, I only blame your not coming back….No doubt it 
may have been my fault that you left.  I was too severe with a sensitive youth….you who have 
been the cause of so much grief to me.” 98   While these two passages do not directly 
correspond, Ayrault’s treatise echoes the sentiment expressed by St. Bernard.  Another 
passage from the letter expresses perhaps Ayrault’s unspoken sentiment: “Sadly I weep, not 
                                                 
95 “Il y a trois ans & plus, que je suis à apprendre où les Jesuites tiennent mon fils.  Si je l’eusse peu d’escouvrir, 
je luy eusse faict ceste Remonstrance en privé.  Mais voyant que je perdois temps, &, qui plus est, mon 
esperance, je luy ay voulu escrire comme aux contumax.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, note to the reader. 
96 St. Bernard, 1. 
97 “Pourquoy donc (dit Sainct Bernard) m’avez vous ravy & enlevé mon nepveu? mon plaisir, mon 
contentement.…ils les appelle loups ravissans: qu’elle occasion en puis-je avoir, qui suis frustré & spolié de mon 
fils ?  Fortè miserti sunt tui.  Vous estiez perdu entre mains de pere & de mere, oncles, tantes, freres & sœurs 
tous Catholiques.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 83.   
98 St. Bernard, 2-3. 
 48
for my lost labour, but for the unhappy state of my lost child.  Do you prefer that another 
should rejoice in you who has not laboured for you?”99  It may demonstrate the extended 
utility of St. Bernard’s letter, whereby Ayrault can speak through it.  It is merely the hint of a 
sentiment otherwise buried beneath the oppressive and calculated rhetoric of an outraged 
father. 
However, Ayrault does not, in his passage on St. Bernard, remove all responsibility 
from René, who “flatters” himself with his “pretended vocation and inspiration.”  By saying 
that St. Bernard would disapprove, Ayrault recruited the authority of a saint to his cause.  
René is not among the Jesuits against his will, but has rather been wholly convinced (and 
deceived) into believing that his irreverence is actually pious.  He moves to accuse René of 
willful arrogance against a commandment.  These accusations implicate René in the crime as 
Ayrault sees it.  If Ayrault identifies on a certain level with St. Bernard then there is a certain 
amount of tenderness and genuine concern here as well; behind the threat of damnation is 
concern about it.  But added to this concern is an appeal to a father’s “pleasure and 
contentment” in the company of his son, of which he has been deprived without so much as 
even a letter.  Furthermore, Ayrault adds Latin passages, which in many ways condense his 
main points, to underscore the importance of his argument.  The opposition between the 
sacred and deception, religion and seduction (or perhaps coercion) serves as a distinction 
between what René thought he was doing and what actually happened. 
The final point of Ayrault’s case of rapt is his equation—in typically melodramatic 
fashion—of the offense to murder: “[I]t is good to remark that to kill our children or to attract 
them to the Monastery without our permission, is placed in the same rank.  For is it not 
murder to render our children in such a state that they are no longer ours? that they do not 
                                                 
99 St. Bernard, 7. 
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inherit from us nor us from them? that posterity and succession are lost by it? sight even, 
frequentation, presence?...it is homicide.”100  The language of rapt emerges through the word 
“attract” which, as has been observed, is synonymous with such ideas as luring, seduction, 
and coercion (because the children are not making the choice under their own reasoning will).  
By such an accusation, Ayrault does not imply merely an abstract symbolic social death 
through which the children are no longer in the world but rather a more personal symbolic 
social death.  It was personal because parents were deprived of the company of their children 
and because it interfered with robin networking practices.  Such a disruption posed a threat to 
the family and undermined robin values, which sought to secure inheritance and succession.   
Beyond accusing the Jesuits of rapt Ayrault realizes that at some point he needs to 
come to terms with his son’s own will.  After having spent the greater part of his treatise 
arguing that his son’s will cannot deviate from the interests of his father, he uses the language 
of rapt to face his son’s apparent heartlessness:  
Whether this would be therefore even of my consent that you made yourself Jesuit, could you 
well have the heart to remain there now, to be there hearing speak, in security and repose, of 
the calamities where we are; of the miseries of our France; of these piteous and impious wars; 
to not make a case to come console us, defend us, support us.  Maybe one detains you by force.  
I like to believe it so better than to esteem you so felonious, so denatured, so stupid as to be 
absent from us in these misfortunes.101   
 
Ayrault constructs even this moment of tenderness in terms of rapt, preferring to believe that 
his son was being held by force of abduction (“detained”) rather than that his son could be so 
cruel as to deny his parents his company in times of crisis and hardship.  It suggests that 
Ayrault does not want to believe his son’s guilt but nevertheless acknowledges it in spite of 
                                                 
100 “[I]l est bien à remarquer, que, tuer noz enfans, où les attraire au Monachat sans nostre vouloir & 
consentement, est mis en mesme rang.  Car n’est-ce pas meurtre, que rendre noz enfans en tel estat qu’ils ne 
soient plus nostres? qu’ils ne nous heritent, ny nous à eux? que la posterité & succession en soit perduë ? la veuë 
mesme, la frequentation, la presence?...c’est homicide.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 86-87. 
101 “Quand ce seroit donc mesme de mon consentement que vous vous fussiez fait Jesuites: pouvez vous bien 
avoir le coeur d’y demeurer maintenant? d’estre là à ouïr parler en seureté & en repos des calamitez où nous 
sommes tous? des miseres de nostre France? de ces piteuses & impieuses guerres? ne faire cas de nous venir 
consoler, nous defendre, nous soustenir? Peut estre qu’on vous detient par force.  J’aime mieux le croire ainsi, 
que de vous estimer si felon, si desnaturé, si stupide que de nous manquer en ces malheurs.”  Ibid., 91. 
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rapt.  It is unclear whether Ayrault underwent any personal hardship himself (other than his 
son’s disappearance of course), but as a confirmed royalist, he was certainly affected and 
troubled by the religious-political turmoil in the aftershocks and aftermath of the League. 
Life, Liberty, and Bourgeoisie 
Addressing the will of the son, inevitably it seems, leads to questions of gratitude.  In a 
context of robins trying to secure their social position, a child’s taking of clandestine vows 
appears to have undermined their efforts and rejected their ambitions.  Oftentimes the 
patriarch had specific plans for his eldest children, including marriage arrangements, and in 
the case of sons, occupations.  To prepare a son for his future vocation required special 
training and education.  The security of the family’s wealth and status frequently rested on the 
success of this son.  All of the hard work and sacrifices that the family had made were 
theoretically in vain if these children took clandestine vows.102  Proceeding from family 
ambitions, Ayrault argues that rebellious children are ungrateful for the secular gifts which 
they have received over the course of their lives. 
Ayrault characterizes youth in general as ungrateful: “so presumptuous, so foolish, so 
rash, and going along with and accommodating itself so little to the will and discretion of 
those from whom it holds its being and beginning.”103  In other words, children owed their 
existence to their parents: “Now what obligation is there in the world greater than that which 
is owed to parents?  They are, after God, the second authors of our life and our being.”104  
Members of the new generation who resisted their fathers’ plans and preparations for them 
failed to appreciate the work and sacrifices involved in raising, training, educating, and caring 
                                                 
102 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.” 
103 “si presumptueuse, si fole, si temeraire, & d’elle-mesme se rangeant & accommodant si peu à la volonté & 
discretion- de ceux desquels elle tient son estre et son commencement.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 7. 
104 “ Or quelle obligation plus grande y a-il au Monde, que celle qui est deuë aux parans? ils sont, apres Dieu, les 
seconds autheurs de nostre vie & de nostre estre.”  Ibid., 25. 
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for them.  Furthermore, youth resisted discretion which rendered him or her incapable of 
making sound decisions and rationalizing, which would impede his or her ability to take 
marital or religious vows without the wisdom and judgment of parents.  Ayrault attributes 
René’s abandonment to the impulsiveness of youth thereby suggesting that he made a poorly 
calculated decision and was stubborn to not admit it.  The idea connects carefully to the 
concept of the necessity for a sufficient age of reason so that a parent’s reason may govern 
youth until his own develops.105  Rapt would be a violation of this principle. 
Ayrault extends this idea to explain how indebted children are to their parents: “That 
which we can [give] all our lives…is nothing compared to what once they gave to us: life, 
knowledge, liberty, bourgeoisie, training, institution, and goods.”106   Children essentially 
receive everything from their parents, most of which is impossible to repay.  Thus, children 
must be in a constant state of gratitude toward their parents because without them, they would 
be and have nothing.  These “gifts” are all secular and in some ways particular.  “Training,” 
“institution,” and “bourgeois” are practically speaking, class-specific.  The bureaucratic class 
at this time was trying to maintain its newly elevated position (or rather still working to 
elevate it),107 which required a particular training, most often including law school for the 
magistrates.  But these “gifts” have a more profound meaning.  They imply a certain level of 
reciprocity in the parent-child relationship.108  Children owe everlasting gratitude, but parents 
have a responsibility to provide for their children and to earn this gratitude. However, what is 
missing is more striking than what is present in this list.  Ayrault makes no mention of 
religion or morals as something for which to offer gratitude, even though in other parts of the 
                                                 
105 For more information on conceptualizations of youth see Griffiths, Youth and Authority. 
106 “Ce que nous pouvons toutes nos vies…n’est rien, eu esgard à ce qu’une fois ils nous ont donné: la vie, la 
lumiere, la liberté, la bourgeoisie, l’education, l’institution, & les biens.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 25-26. 
107 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.” 
108 Molinier, “Nourrir.” 
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treatise he allows leeway for the obedience requirement for converting children of non-
Christian parents (although he still fundamentally frowns upon even this deviance). 109  
Perhaps, taking religious vows out of fervor would be too easy to justify as gratitude to a gift 
such as this. 
Conclusion 
Ayrault thought of his son’s disappearance as a crime and constructed his treatise to 
reflect such sentiment. His concept of the crime derived from his legal training but more 
importantly from his connections within Parlement.  It allowed him to treat his son as a 
contumace and accuse the Jesuits of rapt, but as we have seen, ambiguity arises out of the 
question of guilt because contumacy and rapt are theoretical opposites.  Nevertheless, a son’s 
knowledge of his own disobedience, even if it results from seduction, implies guilt which 
Ayrault’s emphasis on return reveals.  But this case of rapt, far from simply dialoguing with 
robin perspectives, reveals concerns more profound than merely a rebellious child.  It is 
symptomatic of the breakdown of the une loi, un roi, une foi ideology.  The conflict of 
jurisdiction between Parlement and the Council of Trent results in part from Gallican 
mentalities and attempts to cope with disintegrating older forms of authority and unity. 
                                                 
109 Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 66. 
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Chapter Two: Un roi 
 
 
A family may be defined as the right ordering of a group of persons owing obedience to a 
head of a household, and of those interests which are his proper concern.  The second term of 
our definition of the commonwealth refers to the family because it is not only the true source 
and origin of the commonwealth, but also its principle constituent.1 
 
 
Jean Bodin, native of Angers,2 established the family as the foundation for a well-governed 
commonwealth, and not surprisingly, he placed the father at the head of the household.  As 
Bodin indicates, family was a broader term in the sixteenth century and included domestic 
servants as well as blood relatives.  Regardless, the father was the dominant ruling figure.   
There were three predominant father figures who had certain conceptually 
interchangeable characteristics in the sixteenth century: God, the king, and the head of the 
household.3  They were characterized as creators, protectors, and sovereigns, who formulated 
and upheld certain rules and laws over their charges.  Of course, there were other father 
figures, such as priests, but they did not embody the same set of paternal characteristics, 
although the pope came close in many minds (whether this was good or bad depended on who 
was asked).  Thus, as Alain Molinier has noted, in the sixteenth century mind “Paternal 
authority has a double goal: to assure the life and upbringing of the child and to maintain 
familial unity.”4  In other words, the father had a simultaneous individual (the child) and 
collective (the family) responsibility.  “The duties of the father are therefore very great toward 
his children and family….The father has a general right of command and particular rights: the 
right to childcare which consists of keeping his children next to him or of giving them other 
                                                 
1 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, abridged and trans. M. J. Tooley (New York, Barnes and Noble, 
1967), book 1, chapter 2-5, p. 6. 
2 Ibid., introduction, vii. 
3 Sabine Melchior-Bonnet, “De Gerson à Montaigne, le pouvoir et l’amour,” in Histoire des Pères et de la 
Paternité,  ed. Jean Delumeau and Daniel Roche (Paris: Larousse, 1990), 59. 
4 Alain Molinier, “Pérenniser et concevoir,” in Histoire des pères et de la paternité, ed. Jean Delumeau and 
Daniel Roche (Paris: Larousse, 1990), 72. 
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educators; the right to correction which aims to punish ungrateful or rebellious children.”5  
This chapter is concerned primarily with the objectives of “maintaining family unity” and the 
punishment of children labeled “rebellious.”  In particular, the rhetoric of unity and rebellion 
has broader communal and societal implications and interests. 
Paul Griffiths noticed the political significance of age metaphors in defining a 
person’s place within authoritative structures.  He argues that  
Magistrates became fathers and fathers became magistrates.  The parent-child relationship was 
proposed as a pattern for imitation, thereby casting all social relations in a paternal hue, while 
retaining the valued qualities of perpetual subordination and education.  The language of 
‘place’ provided one way of articulating this familial ideology, which was also given 
institutional precision and permanence in the ‘place’ structure.6 
 
He continues by stating that the early modern consensus was: “If this sequence was disrupted, 
if superiors failed to educate their juniors, or subordinates elected to evade or even resist 
appointed authority, there would be utter confusion.”7  Ayrault follows these ideas carefully 
when arguing the political aspect of paternal authority and its important implications for 
stability within the state.  Cristina Quarta also sees a significant pattern in the way Ayrault in 
particular, but also Bodin, constructed the relationship between paternal authority and 
institutional sovereignty in order to “reorganize family and state through the common 
principle of power.”8  She focuses on Ayrault’s lamentation and reassertion of the paternal 
right to juvenile correction, especially in regard to upbringing and the right of life and death, 
examining his reflections on the development of paternal prerogative in Roman law and 
practice.9  It should be remembered from Chapter One, though, that Ayrault may have utilized 
                                                 
5 Molinier, “Pérenniser,” 73. 
6 Paul Griffiths, Youth and Authority: Formative Experiences in England, 1560-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), 66. 
7 Ibid., 67. 
8 Cristina Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin: Diritto, famiglia, e formazione morale nel XVI secolo (Manduria, Italy: Piero 
Lacaita Editore, 2004), 59.  On the subject of political philosophy, she sees Ayrault as a precedent to Grotius, 
who, arguably, established a connection between paternal authority and political sovereignty.  See pp. 19-23. 
9 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin. 
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the example of the right of life and death to emphasize the decline in paternal authority but 
did not actually advocate a revival of this practice. 
This chapter will discuss the domestic monarchy as it appears in Ayrault’s political 
argument concerning paternal authority.  Ayrault used Bodin’s ideas about the family’s role in 
the commonwealth to make a suggestive accusation against his son and the Jesuits.  On the 
one hand, he constructed a father’s authority using monarchical language.  On the other hand, 
he suggested that disobedience to this fundamental stabilizing unit of society led to rebellion 
and treason.  In fact, one could even argue that Ayrault considered disobedience to parents to 
be high treason against the state proper.  These implications were important in 
conceptualizing the highest secular authority: the sovereign father, embodied in both king and 
head of household.   
“This domestic monarchy” 
Regardless of the influence of the Society of Jesus on young René, his disobedience 
was his own responsibility.  He ignored his father’s pleas and evaded attempts to locate him.  
However, this disobedience had broader implications than merely disrupting family harmony, 
for a prevailing ideology in the late sixteenth century likened the king to a father and vice 
versa.10  Fathers literally ruled over their households in the way the king ruled over his 
subjects.  In constructing the authority of fathers, Ayrault incorporated the concept of the 
domestic monarchy as a major line of reasoning into his argument.  In so doing, he appears to 
have derived much of his understanding of this role for fathers from Jean Bodin’s De La 
République (published in 157611), in particular from his section “De La Puissance Paternelle.”  
It is doubtful that Ayrault would not have known or been influenced by Jean Bodin, a 
                                                 
10 Julie Hardwick, The Practice of Patriarchy: Gender and the Politics of Household Authority in Early Modern 
France (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). 
11 Tooley, Commonwealth, introduction, xi. 
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prominent figure of the sixteenth century.  His section on “puissance paternelle” would surely 
have inspired some of his articulations of paternal authority.  Fathers enjoyed an absolute 
power and a special place within secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies, and these ideas 
allowed Ayrault to reimagine and reinterpret the highest secular authority.  Because Ayrault 
did not develop his ideas in an intellectual vacuum, it is important to examine the context in 
which he operated. 
Jean Bodin’s primary work was focused on the commonwealth, so his construction of 
the family and paternal authority are necessarily viewed from this vantage point.  He argues 
that “the well-ordered family is the true image of the commonwealth, and domestic 
comparable with the sovereign authority.  It follows that the household is the model of right 
order in the commonwealth.”12   Therefore, the family or household (because the family 
included more than parents and children) was a miniature commonwealth.  Succeeding this, 
paternal authority includes the right to command another which “is either of a public or a 
private character; public when vested in a sovereign who declares the law, or in the magistrate 
who executes it, and issues orders binding on his subordinates and private citizens generally; 
private when vested in heads of households.” 13   Bodin makes an important distinction 
between public (general) and private (particular) authority.  Fathers rule over their household 
as the domestic counterpart to (or perhaps representative of) the king who rules over his 
people.  This separation gave the father a measure of autonomy in their authority which would 
presumably serve the interests of the commonwealth.   
A father’s sovereign authority relies on a reciprocal relationship with his children: 
“The rightly ordered government of a father over his children lies first in the proper exercise 
of that power which God gives to a father over his natural children, and the law over his 
                                                 
12 Bodin, Commonwealth, book1, chapter 2-5, p. 6. 
13 Ibid., 9. 
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adopted ones, and second in the obedience, love, and reverence that children owe their father.  
Authority properly belongs to all those who have recognized power to command another.”14  
“Rightly ordered government” requires in part that the son recognize the sovereignty of his 
father in addition to the authority he derives from external sources such as God and law.  This 
reciprocity becomes more evident in questions directly addressing obligations:  “And just as 
nature impels the father to foster his child so long as he is defenceless, and educate him in 
honourable and virtuous principles, so the child is prompted, and by an even stronger impulse, 
to love, honour, serve, and care for his father, to be obedient to his commands…and to spare 
neither goods nor life to preserve the life of him from whom he draws his own.”15  Children’s 
duties thus mirror those of their parents, with both incorporating notions of provision and 
care-giving.    
Paternal authority, in addition to its relative autonomy, characteristically includes right 
reasoning: “But if a father is not out of his mind, he will never be tempted to kill his own 
child without cause, and if the son has merited such a fate, it is not for the magistrate to 
intervene.  The affection of parents for their children is so strong, that the law has always 
rightly presumed that they will only do those things which are of benefit and honour to their 
children.  The real danger lies in the temptation of being too partial.”16  Parents are just, or 
perhaps indulgent, in their punishments “[b]ut I hold that the natural affection of parents for 
their children is incompatible with cruelty and abuse of power.”17  A father holds supreme 
authority over his household of a character similar to the sovereign of a nation, but he is 
immune to abusing that power according to Bodin.  Fathers themselves are governed by 
reason and love.  This naïve idealism justifies the relative autonomy of a father in his own 
                                                 
14 Bodin, Commonwealth, book 1, chapter 2-5, p. 12. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 14. 
17 Ibid. 
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sphere—a sphere to which the magistrate is not invited.  But this explicit distinction was not 
nearly so clearly defined outside of this book’s bubble of idealism, for while Ayrault was 
evidently inclined to agree with the absoluteness of a father’s authority, and of its benefit for 
promoting political stability, the magistrate was not willing to compromise “public” authority, 
either, by creating multiple jurisdictions. 
At this point, it is necessary to complicate these ideas even further by examining 
several works by Sarah Hanley, who has done extensive work on the relationship between the 
French state and the new bureaucratic class in the early modern period.18  While she places 
emphasis on the role of women in this endlessly renegotiated relationship, she offers the idea 
of a “Family-State compact” which “purveyed a family model of socioeconomic authority 
based on gender distinctions” and “influenced the state model of political authority in the 
making.”19  Families invested in royal offices, and legists in Parlement worked to secure these 
positions by “promoting the superiority of French judicial expertise” and “constructing and 
consolidating family networks.” 20  Thus, the new bureaucratic class sought to secure its 
position through the regulation of marriages.  Similarly, the monarchy used the ideas and 
methods which came from Parlement to secure its own position, much in the same way and 
using the same language as the establishment, management and regulation of a household.21 
This “Family-State compact” was thus symbiotic22 and reciprocal.  The king gained 
more authority as the father of the state at the expense of ecclesiastical and seigneurial courts.  
And, if the fundamental unit of the paternalistic state model and legal order, the family, 
strengthened and consolidated its power, then ideally the monarchy’s power continued to 
                                                 
18 Sarah Hanley, “Engendering the State: Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern France,” French 
Historical Studies 16:1 (Spring, 1989): 4-27. 
19 Ibid., 6. 
20 Ibid., 7-8. 
21 Ibid., 8-15. 
22 Hardwick, Practice of Patriarchy. 
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strengthen as well.  By this logic, if the king supported the privileges of the new bureaucratic 
class, he was supporting himself.23 But this idea has already been complicated in an earlier 
chapter by pointing to Alain Molinier’s conclusion that the king actually benefited from 
undermining paternal authority.24 
Hanley also argues that the monarchy in this period was a “marital regime.”  By this 
she means that popular iconography presented the king as the husband of his kingdom: “They 
created instead the marital maxim, which linked family formation and state building by 
contractually uniting king and kingdom in a political state marriage likened legally to that of 
husband and wife in a social civil marriage.”25  She attributes this phenomenon to attempts 
within the government (“shocked and embarrassed”) to reconcile Salic Law26 into the legal 
system: “From the early 1500s to the decades around the 1650s, legists and parlementaires 
propagated a French Law Canon, which secured legal foundations for the male right to 
govern along the lines of a Marital Regime in law.”27  She argues in particular that marital 
status offered legal foundations that did not come with fatherhood and that “marital governing 
power was recognized as legitimately French, whereas paternal power was Roman.”  She 
even cites Jean Bodin as making this distinction promoting the maxim “The law of paternal 
power is not legitimate [in France]” which “legally structured a formidable Marital Regime 
                                                 
23 Hanley, “Engendering the State,” 1989. 
24 Alain Molinier, “Nourir, éduquer, et transmettre,” in Histoire des pères et de la paternité, ed. Jean Delumeau 
and Daniel Roche (Paris: Larousse, 1990), 113. 
25 Sarah Hanley, “The Monarchic State in Early Modern France: Marital Regime Government and Male Right,” 
in Politics, Ideology and the Law in Early Modern Europe: Essays in honor of J.H.M. Salmon ed. Adrianna E. 
Bakos (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1994), 110; see also Hanley, “Social Sites of Political 
Practice in France: Lawsuits, Civil Rights, and the Separation of Powers in Domestic and State Government, 
1500-1800,” The American Historical Review 102:1 (Feb., 1997): 27-52, esp. pp. 27-31. 
26 The Salic Law originated in about the sixth century; editions were forged (still claiming to be original) in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to justify succession to the French throne through a male line only.  This 
“French Salic Law” was discovered to be fraudulent in the sixteenth century, prompting the creation of the 
French Law Canon to preserve succession custom.  See Hanley, “Monarchic State,” 107-9. 
27 Sarah Hanley, “Monarchic State,” 109. 
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model of government that drew under its singular aegis both family and state units.” 28  
However, while she offers some convincing evidence, she also fails to do justice to another 
equally convincing corpus.   
Far from trying to undermine Hanley’s arguments, this study merely seeks to 
complicate them.  It is entirely possible that the husband and father ideologies existed 
simultaneously, that early modern legists, despite protestation, may not have clearly 
distinguished the two.  For example, while Hanley clearly found evidence that Jean Bodin did 
not view the king’s power as a paternal power, we have seen that, in the exact same book, he 
clearly conceived of a father’s power as a sovereign authority.  He also argued that the family 
was a model for the commonwealth and that the breakdown of paternal authority could have 
political consequences (which will be discussed at length shortly).  Now, it could be argued 
that Bodin was linking the father’s authority as husband to govern his family to the king’s 
authority as husband to govern the realm, but this distinction is not explicit.  In fact, the title 
was “On Paternal Power,” and he definitively used the term father for the head of household, 
which indicates that he meant father and not husband (if he had been consciously making a 
distinction, he would have used an alternate term).  Of course, the father necessarily had the 
authority of a husband as well as head of household.  Likewise, in that the husband supervised 
the well-being of his family, he had a broadly paternal role as well.   
Bodin was not the only one who appeared to have trouble distinguishing the roles of 
father and husband.  Ayrault himself makes ambiguous representations of the king’s authority: 
“Good or bad treatment does make Princes legitimate or illegitimate, Kings or Tyrants, no 
more than severity or indulgence makes a man a father or not, a husband or not, master or not; 
                                                 
28 Hanley, “Monarchic State,” 112. 
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it’s the law, it’s the contract.”29  By this he clearly connects kings to fathers, husbands, and 
masters as figures of authority.  He also links rebellion to these figures: “No, no, the goal of 
these claimed propositions, excommunications, and opinions, was to make, by wrong or by 
right, this late king odious to his subjects….There is not a man so insolent that he would dare 
say at the first opposition kill your father.”30  Again, Ayrault links regicide and parricide, 
which indicates that he considered paternal and regal authority to be comparable, even if the 
monarchy officially liked to characterize itself in a husband role. 
This study will delve into the king’s role only marginally and only to focus on its 
logical inversion—the father as a king—for the sake of understanding Ayrault’s construction 
of paternal authority.  Fathers possessed absolute authority in “this domestic monarchy.”31  By 
this, Ayrault explicitly adopted the ideal of the father as king of the household and used ruling 
terminology and analogy to describe the father’s role within it. Ayrault compares military 
discipline and hierarchy to the family dynamic with the father commanding his household as a 
dictator: “[A]s military discipline required that the least disobedience…was capital, otherwise 
all the army would be able to desert; so, domestic discipline, where the father is like a dictator, 
desired that from his voice alone depended all of what is under him…”32  The relationship of 
soldier to captain equates to that of son to father, and the entire army relates to the entire 
society, all with the possibility of capital punishment for insubordination.  The father is the 
supreme authority with wife and servant subjected to his will along with the children.  If one 
                                                 
29 “Le bon ou mauvais traitement ne fait pas les Princes legitimes ou illegitimes: Roys, ou Tyrans: non plus que 
la severité ou indulgence ne fait pas l’homme, pere, ou non pere: mary, ou non mary: maistre ou non maistre: 
c’est le droit, c’est le contract,” Pierre Ayrault, Deploration de la mort du roy, Henry III. & du scandale qu’en a 
l’Eglise (n. p., 1589), French political pamphlets, 1547-1648, UM Special Collections; 59. 
30 “Non, non: le but de ces pretendues propositions, excommunications & avis, estoit de render, à tort ou à droit, 
ce feu Roy odieux à ses sujets….Il n’y a homme si effronte qui ostast dire au fils de prime face, tue ton pere. 
Ibid., 15-16. 
31 “ceste Monarchie domestique.”  Pierre Ayrault, De La Puissance Paternelle: Contre ceux qui sous couleur de 
Religion vollent les enfans à leurs peres & meres (Tours: Jamet Mettayer, 1593), 32. 
32 “Certes, comme la discipline militaire a requis que la moindre desobeissance & contumace du soldat à son 
Capitaine, fust capitale: autrement toute l’armee se pouroit perdre.  Aussi la discipline domestique, où le pere est 
comme Dictateur, à voulu que de sa voix seule dependist tout ce qui est sous luy…”  Ibid., 22. 
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subordinate in this model rebels, the entire “commonwealth” could potentially be turned 
upside down.  Protecting society by controlling his family is one of the father’s primary duties. 
Ayrault could not help but note that, customarily, the father’s authority sometimes 
extended beyond the confines of the private sphere.33   As seen in the previous chapter, 
Ayrault does not advocate fathers usurping public jurisdiction and punishing crimes in the 
public sphere.  It is important to consider, however, that the boundary between public and 
private was not clearly defined during this period.  Thus, Ayrault’s apparent confusion is 
symptomatic of the beginning of attempts to develop this distinction. 
Moreover, Ayrault places the authority of the father over his “subjects” above the 
authority of the king because of proximity.  And this authority, this power, has, from antiquity, 
been “more absolute than that of the Prince.”34  That is, a father’s power is more timeless and 
less subject to politics than the power of a king.  Ayrault even argues that this power is more 
than just divine right.  It is natural and universal.35  This absolute and primary authority 
becomes clear over the right of life and death where Ayrault evokes the nostalgia of ancient 
Roman paternal authority, saying that: “[N]either the authority that the high priest bore over 
her, was authorized sufficiently, if he did not have her from the hands of the father, which 
having alone…the power of life and death, could alone in good right dedicate his child to this 
vocation and genre of life which relates to a form of banishment and exile, not from a city but 
from the world.”36  Ayrault’s construction of death is suggestive.  By entering a religious 
order, a child (in this instance a daughter entering the Vestal order) becomes essentially dead 
                                                 
33 Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 19. 
34 “(Denis d’Halicarnasse) [C]este puissance plus absoluë que celle du Prince.”  Ibid. 
35 Pierre Ayrault, De L’Ordre et Instruction Judiciaire, dont les Anciens Grecs et Romains ont usé en 
accusations publiques (Paris: Jacques du Puys, 1576), 12. 
36 [N]y que l’auctorité que le grand Pontife prenoit sus elle, fust auctorisee suffisamment, s’il ne l’avoit des 
mains du pere, lequel ayant seul…la puissance de la mort & de la vie, pouvoit seul à bon droict dedier son enfant 
à ceste vacation & genre de vie qui se rapporte aucunement à une forme de bannissement & exil, non d’une ville, 
mais de ce monde.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 45. 
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to the world.  Only the father holds the right of life and death over his child, even if only 
symbolically.  This idea is even more poignant when one considers the previous chapter when 
Ayrault equated clandestine vows to murder. 
Furthermore, Ayrault constructs a suggestive hierarchy.  He states explicitly that a 
high priest (pontifex) does not hold sufficient authority to usurp the privilege of making a 
symbolic sacrifice.  Thus, a father has more authority over the person of his child than the 
priests.  He has more influence over his child than the magistrate (de facto), but the magistrate 
has more punitive authority over the child than the father (de jure).  And if parents claim 
sacred reverence as an aspect of that which is due to God, how does the hierarchy shape itself?  
It is certainly not linear.  While not usurping a theological authority, the father has a power 
over his child that reigns above and outside of legal or religious structure.  The relationship 
between child and father is the fundamental base of human social networks, but it has 
autonomous characteristics.  However within a legal hierarchy, the magistrate is above the 
father and the father above the ecclesiastical hierarchy.  This construction is in some ways a 
covert assertion of Gallican ideals of the autonomy of the French state and the relative 
autonomy of the French Church. 
Seduction and Sedition 
Comparing the father to a king and establishing the family as the model on which the 
stability of the state rested created interesting implications.  If king and father were 
ideologically linked, then so were parricide and treason, in fact, regicide was commonly 
called parricide.  Ayrault went only a little further in his analysis by linking disobedience to 
rebellion.  From this arose the suggestion that not only were rebellious children dangerous to 
their immediate family, but also to their collective family in the form of the state at large.  
Thus, René’s disobedience was in a sense double treason.  Ayrault even used the term lèse-
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majesté explicitly to characterize the deed.37  René disavowed paternal authority, and he 
rejected the model and foundation responsible for the stability of the French state.  More 
importantly, his insubordination was symbolic of the Society’s aspirations and the inherent 
problems with reformist and counter-reformist initiatives, which led to tension and civil war.   
Once again, it appears that Ayrault drew inspiration from Jean Bodin on this point.  
Bodin argues that reciprocal obligation does not necessitate reciprocal denial: “A father is 
bound to educate and instruct his children, especially in the fear of God.  But if he fails his 
duty, the son is not excused his.”38  Regardless of prescription, children still pose a threat to 
the state through disorder in the family: “For children who stand in little awe of their parents, 
and have even less fear of the wrath of God, readily set at defiance the authority of 
magistrates, who in any case are chiefly occupied with the habitual criminal.  It is therefore 
impossible that a commonwealth should prosper while the families which are at its foundation 
are ill-regulated.”39  Bodin goes a step further by suggesting that the state of paternal authority 
was at a dangerous low in his own time: “Nowadays, fathers having been deprived of their 
paternal authority, and any claim to property acquired by their children, it is even suggested 
that the son can defend himself and resist by force any unjust attempt at coercion on the part 
of his father.”40  Perhaps Bodin was using this chain of ideas to attribute some contemporary 
societal problems (religious civil war) to a breakdown in the former or necessary authority of 
father figures (excluding the clergy and especially the pope). 
Moreover, Julie Hardwick argues that gender roles influenced power relations within 
the state.  She argues that “ways of thinking about gender…illuminated and signified relations 
                                                 
37 Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 56-57. 




of power of all kinds.” 41   She continues this argument by stating that the comparable 
relationship between fathers and family and rulers and kingdom “became a central 
representation of and justification for royal authority,” and patriarchal authority was linked to 
social stability.42  While she focused primarily on notarial families, her ideas are nevertheless 
interesting.  Paternal authority seems to have been the basis for law and order, which would 
help to explain why authority within the family appeared to have semiautonomous 
characteristics.  It also reveals why the idea of insubordination to paternal authority became 
such a preoccupation.  The idea of insubordination was applicable to many different 
ideologies of paternal authority, including those with familial, religious, political, and legal 
meanings.43 
Ayrault builds on these ideas of the importance of paternal authority in order to give 
fathers a place of privilege and prestige in the social hierarchy.  In so doing, he allows his 
Gallican views to shape his commentary: “The oldest Senators, the magistrates, and the high 
priests had been able to do nothing in her place.”44  (“She” refers to Veturia mother of 
Coriolan who led troops against the state; only she was able to convince him to stop).  This 
passage is remarkable because Ayrault neatly places parental authority above that of both 
secular and ecclesiastical authorities.  Furthermore, it suggests that such authority restrains 
youthful ambition and confines the forces of anarchy and chaos.45  Such an argument is all the 
more resonant in light of the religious civil wars and League rebellions.  It was the family and 
not the legal system or the Church which preserved stability and held society together.  
Parental authority and family values were the foundation on which other authorities operated. 
                                                 
41 Hardwick, Practice of Patriarchy, x. 
42 Ibid., xi. 
43 See Griffiths, Youth and Authority. 
44 “Les plus anciens Senateurs, les Magistrats, les Pontifes n’avoient rien peu en son endroict.”  Ayrault, 
Puissance Paternelle, 3. 
45 See Paul Griffiths, Youth and Authority. 
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It follows that Ayrault argued extensively that disobedient children were a menace not 
only to the family but to society as well.  In so doing Ayrault made use of his favorite Old 
Testament authority, Moses: 
‘When a man has an arrogant and rebellious child, who does not obey the voice of his father 
and mother, and when they have chastised him and his does not want to hear them, then the 
father and mother will take him and lead him to the elders of the city and will tell them: this 
son of ours is perverse and rebellious, and does not want to obey our voices…All the men of 
the city will throw stones at him and he will die.’  Are those crimes only crimes to the father 
and mother?46   
 
Ayrault quotes this passage from Deuteronomy 47  to characterize a disobedient child as 
“perverse and rebellious” but then adds that this “crime” concerns all of society.  Ayrault then 
expands upon this idea, apparently drawing inspiration from Bodin, to suggest that the 
stability of the state relies on strong paternal authority: 
He who wants therefore to maintain a State well, to rule it well, and to govern it well; he who 
desires to banish from it so many crimes, so many insolences, and so much luxuriousness, 
establishes straightway domestic police and discipline.  Men and women manage from there 
and will come to habituate themselves in public, channeled to obedience, modesty, and plied 
and accommodated to live there sweetly and happily.  Laxity and slackening: you will only 
see murders in the Republic [Commonwealth], bawdiness, superfluities, rebellions, and 
seditions.48 
 
These two passages suggest that rebellion is a persistent insolence toward any authority and 
so concerns all.  This authority could be the “government” of the family proper, but it could 
easily be applied to a state (a kingdom or otherwise).  Quarta claims that Ayrault advocates a 
                                                 
46 “‘Quand un homme aura un enfant arrogant & rebelle, lequel n’obeisse point à la voix de son pere ny de sa 
mere, & quand ils l’auront chastisé, il ne les vueille ouir: lors le pere & la mere le prendront & le meneront aux 
anciens de la Cité, & leur diront: Ce nostre fils est pervers & rebelle, & ne veut obeir à nostre voix…Tous les 
hommes de la Cité le lapideront, & moura.’ Ne sont-ce pas là crimes qui ne sont crimes qu’au pere & à la mere? 
crimes domestiques, crimes cendriers?”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 21-22. 
47 Ayrault appears to quote the passage directly see Deut. 21.18-21 in Michael D. Coogan (ed.), The New Oxford 
Annotated Bible, 3rd edition, college edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2001), Hebrew Bible, 279.  
Quarta emphasizes Ayrault condoning severe punishment for disobedience.  Ayrault e Bodin, 27. 
48 “Qui veut donc bien maintenir un Estat, le nien regir, & bien gouverner: qui desire en bannir tant de crimes, 
tant d’insolences, & tant de luxe: establisse estroictement la police & discipline domestique.  Les hommes et 
femmes desmenageront de là, & se viendront habituer en public, duits à obeissance, tous modestes, tous pliez & 
accommodez pour y vivre doucement & heureusement.  La lache, & la detende: vous ne voirez que meurtres en 
la Republique, que paillardises, que superfluitez, que rebellions & seditions.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 30-
1. 
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decentralization of power, ensuring collective stability by preserving particular authority.49  
When the parents led the child before a tribunal, it reinforced this “domestic crime” as a 
concurrent a crime against the state.  Ayrault also affirms the punishment for rapt by linking it 
to this ancient punishment, which was a form of communal retribution, being performed by 
“all the men of the city.”  Disobedience to parents was therefore subversive to the state and 
dangerous.  The converse was also true; domestic discipline transferred to an orderly society.  
In other words, disobedience to parents was the source of all of society’s ills.  Ayrault 
established the family, which also served as a sort of policing force, as the model for a state.  
Crimes and insolence in the family created instability in the state, but family authority trained 
good subjects. 
It follows that Ayrault makes a serious accusation against the Jesuits.  If the Jesuits 
encouraged children to defy paternal authority, they were, by extension, encouraging treason, 
which only confirmed circulating rumors of their role as Spanish agents.  Pasquier also 
accused the Society of treasonous activities and of trying to subvert the French state.  Their 
Spanish origins and Romanist loyalties suggested conspiracy of the highest degree.  They 
were “Spanish spies” (d’espies Espagnoles) and “sworn enemies of France” (ennemis jurez de 
la France).50  Their international operations and their lack of commitment to any state or 
authority except the pope (“that wicked vow”51) rendered them especially threatening to the 
Gallican church and the stability of the French state.   
In fact, Pasquier dedicated an entire book of another work to Jesuit political 
involvements.  He accused them of masterminding not one, but two assassination attempts 
                                                 
49 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 31. 
50 Étienne Pasquier, “De la Secte des Jesuites, Livre III, Chapitre XLIII,” from Les Recherches de la France in 
Les Œuvres D’Estienne Pasquier, (Amsterdam: La Compagnie des Libraires Associez, 1723), 1:324. 
51 Étienne Pasquier, The Jesuites catechisme, 1602, ed. D. M. Rogers, vol. 264 of English Recusant Literature, 
1558-1640, (London: The Scolar Press, 1975), 145. 
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against the French king, the father of the French state and legal system: “yet without doubt 
they have made profession of, & taken glory in, the murther of Kings and soveraigne 
Princes.”52  He argues that the Jesuits instigated Pierre Barrier and Jean Chastell (one of their 
students) to attempt parricide against Henry IV on two separate occasions, for “the trade of 
murthering was lodged within their Colledges” and “al their Lectures and Sermons, tend to no 
other but bloodshed, exhorting men to murther.”53  Pasquier does not stop there.  He continues 
to suggest that the Jesuits are heretics because they “hath maintained, that it is lawfull for 
subjects to kill the Tyrant, and to expell a misbeleeving Prince out of his Realme: as if the 
people could or should give lawes unto their King, whom God hath given them to be their 
soveraigne Magistrate.”  He suggests that they defy God’s will in trying to affect political 
control and then explicitly links king to father:  
Yet ought not a King abuse his power, but know that he is a father, not to provoke his subjects, 
his children…for if he do, God the father of Fathers, & king of Kings, wil (when he least 
thinks of it) dart his vengeance against him…To conclude, seeing that thou Jesuit, yeeldest a 
blind obedience to thy superiors, who are but thy adopted Lords, thou owest it in greater 
measure a hundred-fold unto thy King, thy true, lawfull, naturall Lord, & father.54  
 
Thus, the Jesuits have misplaced their blind obedience and actually disobey the one who 
should be their most important Father.  Pasquier does “redeem” the Jesuits in part of this book 
by claiming:  
[T]hat their harts are Spanish, I utterly deny.  It proceeded not of any especiall devotion, 
which they had to the late King of Spayne, more then to any other Prince, but for that 
(following the course of the Jesuits, who measure the right and justice of a cause, by the 
advantage of theyr owne affaires) they devote themselves usually to him, whom they suppose 
to have the strongest partie, and from whom they stand in expectation of greatest commonditie, 
which is no small secret in matters of state, for them which in their harts stand neutrall, & 
indifferent.55 
 
                                                 
52 Pasquier, Jesuites Catechisme, 156. 
53 Ibid., 155 & 156 (marked as 148). 
54 Ibid., 158. 
55 Ibid., 169. 
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It is doubtful that the Jesuits would have found this to be much consolation.  Instead of being 
Spanish agents, they were neutral and had no allegiance at all.  Theoretically, this was exactly 
what they wanted for the international service of Catholicism above secular concerns, but the 
suggestion that this neutrality followed from a selfish expectation of reward thoroughly 
undermined their noble intentions.  In fact, it seems that as much as Pasquier and others 
wanted the Jesuits to stay out of political affairs, they feared this neutrality because it could 
lead them into unforeseen or undesirable allegiances due to their lack of loyalty or 
commitment.  Neutrality was a dangerous thing to negotiate. 
A. Lynn Martin’s research on the Jesuits is insightful in this regard.  The relation 
between the Society of Jesus and France was extraordinarily complex.  First of all, Martin 
argues that “Oddly enough, the Huguenot threat was a fortunate situation as far as the 
Society’s mission to France was concerned.  Had it been otherwise, Jesuits would have 
probably not been permitted to work in the kingdom.  The rights of the Gallican Church in 
opposition to papal supremacy were ardently championed by the University, the Parlement, 
and the Bishop of Paris.”56  Furthermore, he argues that “a man with ability, given a humanist 
education, sent out in the world to lead a life of active Christian service, and urged to court 
ecclesiastical and secular rulers would stand a good chance of becoming involved in political 
affairs.”57 
More importantly, Martin makes a distinction between the individual and the 
collective: the Society tried to remain apolitical, but there were individual Jesuits who took 
                                                 
56 A. Lynn Martin, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1973), 25.  “It wasn’t until after 
the meeting at Poissy in 1561 that the Catholic bishops, angered by Calvinist arrogance, decided to admit the 
Jesuits.  Hence, on 13 February 1562 the Parlement of Paris issued a decree giving the Society legal existence in 
France, but with severe limitations.”  Ibid., 26. 
57 Ibid., 22. 
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initiatives and became involved in matters of state.58  It was these individuals that earned the 
Society an especially bad reputation.  Emond Auger received criticism from fellow Jesuits for 
making excuses to avoid obeying the general’s orders and for involving himself in court 
politics.  He accompanied Henry, duke of Anjou, as army chaplain on campaign against 
Protestant forces, and when Henry became King Henry III of France (he was king of Poland 
for a little while), Auger eventually became court confessor.  After awhile, he even opposed 
adopting the decrees of the Council of Trent in France!  Needless to say, those Jesuits who 
supported the Catholic League, especially in Paris, where factionalism was particularly strong, 
had a difficult time maintaining an apostolic community of love.  Other Jesuits operated under 
aliases for their covert missions, which included trips to Rome without informing the general.  
For example, Henri Samier also went by Jacques La Rue and Hieronymo Martelli, Robert 
Persons went by Richard Melino, and Claude Matthieu (fierce rival of Auger) went by the 
number 120.  General Aquaviva, however, took an ambiguous role in his views about political 
involvements.  Thus, Henry III, upon hearing of Jesuit involvement in assassination attempts 
in England and League operations, regarded assurances from the general that the Society 
strictly opposed political involvement with the utmost suspicion and even perhaps defensive 
hostility.59 
It follows that Ayrault constructed his argument about the Jesuit threat very 
methodically: “If the Council is above the Pope, the Estates above the Prince, if the popular 
government is more free, if diverse religions have to be suffered…their conclusion, their 
catastrophe would be as soon schisms, seditions, civil wars….For he who has once placed in 
doubt the reverence and obedience that the son owes…he who once [tamed] Nature, 
                                                 
58 A. Lynn Martin, The Jesuit Mind: The Mentality of an Elite in Early Modern France (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 223; and Martin, Henry III. 
59 Martin, Henry III. 
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engenders in the end scorn, riots, parricides.”60  Ayrault offers several layers of interpretation 
and meaning in this quote.  At a more obvious level, he seems to suggest that a representative 
or popular form of government leads to disunity and ultimately, violence within a state.  This 
viewpoint is not necessarily unusual considering his advocacy of state stability and an 
authoritative, centralized governing force realized in the monarchy.  As a royal judge, he 
staunchly defended royal jurisdiction and prerogative.  He even advocated a raison d’état 
which permitted princes to operate outside of the law as means of ensuring the well-being of 
state and subjects.61  But Ayrault, also as a condition of his profession, was very procedure 
oriented.  He was careful to outline such raison d’état within a framework of an ideal form of 
justice based on proper trial procedure and defendant rights.  Only under the most extreme 
circumstances could a legitimate prince dispatch with an individual without hearing a defense 
of some sort.  He even went so far as to define what precisely he meant by legitimate:  
We can infer that if an occasion ever presents itself by which to close and terminate due 
process, that it is necessary that five points concur together.  The first, that those who would 
use that power are legitimate and natural Princes; the second, that those against whom one 
would make use of it are subjects; the third, that they are guilty of not just any crime but of the 
crime of lèse-majesté against the highest leader; the fourth, that they are nevertheless so 
powerful, pose such a risk, and the affairs be in such a state that Justice cannot do anything 
about it otherwise without extreme peril and danger to the Prince and the Republic; the last, 
that after the execution, one tries the cadaver or the memory, and then some of the 
accomplices and allies of the least estate, by the issue and event of which the machinations 
and enterprises of those who would have been the first punished, are entirely and undoubtedly 
discovered.62 
                                                 
60 “Si le Concile est pardessus le Pape: les Estats pardessus le Prince: si le gouvernement Populaire est plus libre: 
si diverses Religions se doivent souffrir…Leur conclusion, leur catastrophe, ce seroit aussi tost schismes, 
seditions, guerres civiles….Car qui a une fois mis en doute la reverance & obeïssance que doit le fils…qui a 
entamé une fois la Nature, il engendre à la fin des mespris, des riottes, des parricides.”  Ayrault, Puissance 
Paternelle, 33-4. 
61 Ayrault, Ordre et Instruction, 1576 ; and Donald R. Kelley, The Beginning of Ideology: Consciousness and 
society in the French Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 206. 
62 “Nous pouvons inferer que s’il se presente jamais occasion de commancer par où se doibt clorre et terminer 
l’ordre Judiciaire, qu’il est nécessaire que cinq poincts concurrent ensemble.  Le premier, que ceux qui useroyent 
de telle puissance, fussent Princes legitimes & naturels: le second que ceux à l’encontre desquels on en useroit, 
fussent subjects: le troisiesme, qu’ils fussent coupables non de tout crime, mais de crime de lese majesté au 
premier chef: le quartriesme, qu’ils fussent neantmoins tels, si puissans, si factieux, & les affaires en tel estat, 
que la Justice ne s’en peust faire aultrement sans le peril & danger extreme du Prince ou de la Republique: le 
dernier, qu’apres l’execution on fist le process au cadaver ou à la memoire, & puis encores à quelques uns des 
complices & aliez de moindre estat, par l’issue & evenement duquel les machinations & enterprises de ceux qui 
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Thus, even those assassinated should be ensured their eventual due process according to 
Ayrault. 
Ayrault also suggests that the family is the model by which other relationships are 
constructed and understood.  A child’s disobedience translates to instability, rebellion, and 
parricide in both literal and figurative terms.  Furthermore, while “diverse religions” almost 
certainly referred to Protestants, it may very easily refer to the Jesuits too, whom Pasquier 
accused outright of encouraging schisms: “[N]ourishing them among us is to introduce a 
schism.”63  The Jesuits, according to Ayrault, constituted a major threat to the interests of the 
state whether against the stabilizing force of the family or defensive strategies in international 
relations, not to mention the Gallican Church. 
Ayrault definitely exploits Gallican fears by ensuring that the international threat is 
realized:  
Fear of the authority of one [father] and the charity of the other [mother], hindered you from 
resolving anything there without their wish, you have fled their presence, you have hidden 
yourself and sped from them three years, without doing them the honor of writing them a 
single letter, without telling them where you are, if it is in France or in Spain.  You are afraid 
that your mother…says to you these words:…will your brothers who are little serve me? what 
assurance will I have that the will not play me such turn as you? they have the example of 
their oldest.64   
 
Ayrault seems to make a more personal appeal here: three years of silence, not knowing 
René’s state of health or even if he is in the same country, and speculation that he is in Spain, 
arch-rival of France.  It is interesting that Ayrault resorts to a plea from René’s mother as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
auroyent esté les premiers punis, fussent entierement & indubitablement decouvertes.”  Ayrault, Ordre et 
Instruction Judiciaire, 1576, 42. 
63 “[L]es nourrissans au milieu de nous, c’estoit y introduire un schisme…” Pasquier, “De la Secte des Jesuites,” 
324. 
64 “De peur que l’auctorité de l’un, & la charité de l’autre, vous empeschast d’y rien resoudre sans leur vouloir, 
vous avez fuy leur presence: vous vous estes caché & celé d’eux trois ans sont, sans que vous leur ayez fait cest 
honneur de leur escrire une seule lettre: sans que vous leur ayez faict entendre ou vous estes: si c’est en France, 
ou en Espagne.  Vous aviez peur que vostre mere (que vous appelliez, Hortensia) vous dist ces mots: Dieu ayant 
fait sa volonté de vostre pere, que me serviront voz freres qui sont petis? quelle asseurance auray-je d’eux qu’ils 
ne me joüent tel tour que vous? ils auront l’exemple de leur aisné.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 67-68. 
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mode of persuasion.  He falls back on the deeper bonds that ideally developed between a 
mother, as primary caregiver in infancy, and son.  This passage reveals that Ayrault had other 
sons but also the anxiety that such an example/precedent would set.  There were cases of a 
chain of sons joining religious orders without parental consent.65  The explicit naming of the 
Jesuits and Spain creates the link to the international loyalties and the threat that they posed. 
Ayrault’s explicit naming of Gallicanism cinches the allusion: “There is so much, to 
be brief, that in a foreign Empire, from which laws do not hold and obligate us, I oppose to 
you those of our kings, the decretals of the Gallican Church, the consent of the Estates of 
France, and the rulings of our sovereign courts.  Charlemagne made several laws touching the 
Church and made them…from the consent of the prelates of the Gallican Church.”66  Ayrault 
expounds Gallican ideals, which incidentally stand in opposition to “foreign empires” with 
which the Jesuits are connected, possibly including the Holy Roman Empire, Spain or 
“Rome” (i.e. the Roman Catholic Church).  The Jesuits and their nonallegiance to any one 
government except the Roman Church caused suspicion among robins.  They had been 
accused of conspiring to overthrow monarchs in England and even France.  Then, of recent 
memory, there was the conflict between Pope Julius II and the French state (Louis XII) where 
the pope was making deals with foreign powers to depose and replace the king of France.67  It 
perhaps seems strange that the Society was held under suspicion for its nonallegiance but then 
simultaneously accused of being Spanish agents.  This apparent contradiction is due primarily 
to their special vow of obedience to the papacy, the nationality of their generals (Spanish or 
                                                 
65 Barbara B. Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children: Patriarchal Authority and Parental Consent to Religious 
Vocations in Early Counter-Reformation France,” The Journal of Modern History 68:2 (June, 1996): 265-307. 
66 “Tant y a, pour le faire brief, qu’à un Empereur estranger, duquel les loix ne nous tiennent & obligent point, je 
vous oppose celles de noz Roys: les Decrets de l’Eglise Gallicane: le consentement des Estats de la France, & les 
Arrests de noz Cours souveraines.  Charlemagne fit plusieurs loix touchant l’Eglise, & les fist…de consentement 
de tous les Prelats de l’Eglise Gallicane.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 86. 
67 Frederic J. Baumgartner, “Louis XII’s Gallican Crisis of 1510-1513,” in Politics, Ideology and the Law in 
Early Modern Europe: Essays in honor of J.H.M. Salmon, ed. Adrianna E. Bakos (Rochester, NY: University of 
Rochester Press, 1994), 69. 
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Spanish subjects),68 the international character of Catholicism, and the recent hostility of the 
papacy to France, leading to special alliances with Spain.   
René allied himself with the enemy.  Ayrault takes advantage of these concerns about 
foreign infiltrations and allegiances in order to strengthen his case against the Jesuits.  He 
claims that they are opposed to and actively work against French values and interests and are 
therefore dangerous to the French state.  Moreover, the Jesuits were not only working to 
undermine paternal authority, which also translates to undermining the authority of the king 
over his subjects/children, but they were also recruiting and converting children to foreign 
powers.  The robins extended fear of the mysterious order to their own grievances.  Thus, 
robin values are a major issue in the attacks against the Jesuits. 
Politiques 
It is important to remember that while there were strong polarizing forces within 
French society, especially with regard to religion, these forces also encountered strong 
resistance.  While religion and politics were tightly intertwined, there were efforts to limit 
these polarizing forces within politics.  This is not to say that political masterminds sought a 
separation of religion and politics altogether but rather a separation of Church, as the 
institution, and state, and a compromise of coexistence to promote stability and prevent 
bloodshed.  In other words, there were those who recognized that the polarizing forces within 
France left it vulnerable to foreign invasion, and there were some who even went so far as to 
accuse foreign powers of fanning the flames of strife on French soil.   
Those who usually sought these compromises received what became the derogatory 
label “politique” and were usually identified with royalist allegiances, Gallicanism, and for 
                                                 
68 Martin, Henry III, 216. 
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some as being moyenneurs (similar connotation to “neutral”).69  They were also associated 
with Machiavelli’s prince archetype.70  Pierre Ayrault was a staunch royalist and a loyal 
Gallican.  While there are no references to his having received the label “politique,” his 
allegiances during the time of the Catholic League probably would have earned it.   
However, the concept of politique, which may be roughly described as doing or 
encouraging what is necessary to ensure one’s political status, came to be a word that 
propagandists liked to throw around almost as much as heresy.  For example, the Guise family, 
who basically controlled the Catholic League and thus the radical Catholic faction, also 
received the title “politique”.  Even Ayrault was not shy about suggesting that Leaguers 
operated on political ambitions rather than purely religious motives: 
But that the Roman Apostolic and Catholic Church was and are still the tool of this sacrilege 
and public parricide, of this Guisard rebellion and felony, what can one say of it?....It’s the 
College of Cardinals, it’s the pope, who undertook to damn and excommunicate for that alone 
that he [Henry III] dared to defend himself by all means against his traitors and disloyal 
(faithless) subjects, for that alone that he dared to chastise them and to use the blade of justice 
which he has from God not them.71 
 
He also levels this charge at the papacy and the Jesuits. 
The Jesuits posed numerous threats.  They were not merely kidnapping and corrupting 
children for the sake of undermining paternal authority and toppling the French state.  The 
distinct impression that arises from the sources is that beneath the rhetoric, authors like 
Ayrault and Pasquier felt that the Jesuits were meddling where they had no business.  If they 
were to be considered papal agents, then this accusation of meddling included the pope as 
well.  The Gallican sense of autonomy in relation to Rome meant that they did not want help 
                                                 
69 Thierry Wanegffelen, Ni Rome Ni Genève: Des fidèles entre deux chaires en France au XVIe siècle (Paris: 
Honoré Champion, 1997). 
70 For Machiavellian tradition in France see Donald R. Kelley, “Murd’rous Machiavel in France: A Post 
Mortem,” in Political Science Quarterly 85:4 (Dec., 1970): 545-559. 
71 “Mais que l’Eglise Catholique, Apostolique & Romaine ait esté. & soit encores l’outil de ce sacrilege & 
parricide public: de ceste rebellion & felonnie Guysarde: qu’en peut on dire?...C’est le College des Cardinaux, 
c’est le Pape, qui a entrepris de le damner & excommunier, pour cela seul, qu’il a osé se defender par tous 
moiens contre ses trahistres & infidels subjets: pour cela seul qu’il a osé les chastier, & user de juste glaive qu’il 
a de Dieu, non pas eux.”  Ayrault, Deploration, 5 and 6-7. 
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or intervention.  In fact the Jesuits exacerbated polarizing tendencies by stepping on toes.  In 
other words, they made matters worse by inciting Protestants to action in an effort to 
counteract them.  Gallicans were perfectly happy to sort out their contentions with the 
Protestants on their own while hopefully holding the state together.  This is not to say that 
Gallicans approved of Protestantism or even that they had reforming tendencies.  To the 
contrary, Protestants were not viewed as passive agents in the ensuing chaos.  However, 
accusations of corruption did undermine the Church’s credibility, adding another justification 
to Gallican initiative.  Examining various modes of criticism against the Jesuits is crucial to 
understanding Ayrault’s nuanced hostility toward the Society in his Gallican construction of 
paternal authority, for religious and political conflicts were not separated from paternal 
concerns. 
Martin sees accusations of corruption as an important motivator for Jesuit activity, 
trying to combat Protestant arguments, which stepped on toes: “Another reason for the 
unfriendly relations between the Jesuits and some of the clergy was Jesuit criticism of clerical 
abuses and ignorance.  To a certain extent this criticism explains Jesuit interference with the 
rights and prerogatives of other clergy….Too often Jesuits behaved as if abuses existed in all 
the clergy rather than just in some, and in consequence they considered the Society to be the 
only source of help to many areas seriously affected by heresy.”72  Ayrault and Pasquier 
capitalized on the wounded egos and hostility of the French clergy to add an extra bite to their 
arguments.  In this way, jurisdictional conflicts within the ecclesiastical hierarchy itself 
translated to other jurisdictional conflicts such as those in the legal or perhaps educational 
system. 
                                                 
72 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 208. 
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Moreover, the Society’s sense of its mission is crucial for understanding its activities 
in France and the ensuing hostility, for “Jesuits had difficulty distinguishing between the 
honor and glory of God and the honor and glory of the Society.”73 Martin argues that this 
failed distinction developed out of a “concern for the Society’s honor” which “is to a certain 
extent understandable, for the order was a new one and Jesuits were justifiably anxious about 
its image and its reputation.  Another factor that helps explain this concern is the tendency to 
identify the good of the Society with the glory of God.”74  Martin continues: “Perhaps this 
identification of the Society with the divinity at least partially explains the tendency for some 
Jesuits to adopt means of questionable integrity to achieve the Society’s ends, as if the 
Society’s mission placed it above morality.  The correspondence yields no horrendous deeds, 
no murders or abductions perpetrated to advance the cause of Catholicism or the power of the 
Society, just various sneaky misdemeanors.”75  It is doubtful that Ayrault, Pasquier, and 
others would have agreed. 
The Society’s concern for its reputation created an interesting contradiction, for if 
people know nothing else about Ayrault, they almost assuredly know that his son’s joining 
their order was a huge scandal.  However, Martin argues that “The term that probably best 
describes the nature of Jesuit relations with the elite of French society is 
obsequious….Especially during the early years of the French mission, when the Society had a 
tenuous existence in France, Jesuits came to their patrons cap in hand, head bowed, begging 
(even fawning) for support and favors.”76  Martin fails to acknowledge the problem, by 
attributing complaints against the Jesuits to bad reputation or their sense of mission.  He only 
mentions Ayrault in the context of the conflicted attitudes of the Jesuits toward parental 
                                                 
73 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 122. 
74 Ibid., 121-2. 
75 Ibid., 122. 
76 Ibid., 204. 
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consent.77  While Martin’s study of Jesuit involvement in France is particularly insightful 
about what the Jesuits thought they were doing, this balance between the sense of mission and 
the obsession over reputation merits further study.  Where did they draw the line?  The answer 
seems to be imbedded somewhere in Ayrault’s case and others like it.78 
The Jesuits, despite the merit of Martin’s study, seemed to have earned part of their 
reputation, at least from a robin perspective.  Money appears to be a particular point of 
contention:  “Evidence indicates that money flowed from Jesuits and Jesuit institutions in 
France to their superiors in Rome rather than vice versa.”79  A Gallican nightmare scenario 
envisioned sending French money (extracted from an already cash-strapped state80) to Rome, 
supporting papal campaigns which often included anti-French offensives.  Pasquier, in 
particular, borrows this concern when he suggests that the Jesuits target wealthy heirs to usurp 
their inheritances.  It is interesting to note, then, as Martin argues, that “Jesuits were 
somewhat limited in the means at their disposal to acquire money to meet both ordinary and 
extraordinary expenses….but the only other source of income to which the Society had 
repeated recourse was the patrimonies of individual Jesuits.” 81    He continues, stating: 
“William Creichton attempted to obtain the small inheritance of one novice without his 
knowledge, even though Creichton doubted that the novice would persevere in the 
Society….These examples reveal that, to achieve the Jesuit strategy for France, the ends could 
                                                 
77 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 188. 
78 Diefendorf presents the controversy of Pierre Coton as parallel to that of René Ayrault.  His father opposed his 
joining the Jesuits as well, but Coton’s Jesuit biographer notes that his father eventually, if reluctantly, consented 
or at least gave up his appeal against the Jesuits.  This book provides a Jesuit perspective to “clandestine” 
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Back Our Children;” and J. M. Prat, S. J., Recherches Historiques et Critiques sur la Compagnie de Jésus en 
France du Temps de Pierre Coton, 1564-1626, 5 vols. (Lyon: Briday Libraire-Éditeur, 1876), vol. 1 is most 
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79 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 150. 
80 J.H.M. Salmon, Society in Crisis: France in the sixteenth century (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1975).   
81 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 151. 
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sometimes justify the means.” 82   Suddenly robin concerns about preserving a family’s 
property do not seem to have been so paranoid (see Chapter One).  Such funds were not only 
removed from the family, but were diverted to a mysterious international organization with 
allegiances to Rome and ties with other Catholic powers.  The more personal familial 
concerns mingled with political ones and raised questions of allegiance and investment within 
local communities.  As we shall see in Chapter Three, failure to honor local hierarchies not 
only offended the local clergy but also rendered their operations suspicious to local elites. 
Papal operations were of course another major point of contention.  Martin’s argument 
is particularly strong: “While ecclesiastical and secular rulers throughout Catholic Europe 
clamored for the services of Jesuits, one ruler need not clamor but simply command.  Jesuits 
took a special vow of obedience to the pope.  This vow could almost be regarded as the 
Pandora’s box of the Society’s involvement in politics.” 83   “Pandora’s box” is no 
understatement, for “[t]he successes achieved by Catholicism during this period were largely 
due to the vigor and militancy of these three popes”84  For France alone, Pius V sent a papal 
army to France; Gregory XIII celebrated the news of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre 
with a Te Deum and gave encouragement to the Catholic League; Sixtus V promised Philip II 
support for the Armada (important because it meant papal support of Spanish imperialism), 
the Duke of Savoy was encouraged to attack Geneva, and Henry of Navarre was 
excommunicated.85  Furthermore, as Martin suggests, Jesuits undertook missions for secular 
leaders as well: “Of course many of these mission [sic] were strictly concerned with spiritual 
matters.  Others were more political in nature.  However, the important thing to remember is 
that in the sixteenth century, the century of cuius regio, eius religio, it was oftentimes 
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exceedingly difficult to make a distinction between the spiritual and the political, the affairs of 
Church and the affairs of state.”86  Suddenly, royalist and Gallican fears do not seem to have 
been so paranoid either. 
Many competing forces threatened to tear France apart in the sixteenth century.  The 
nobility was still trying to preserve its rights and privileges at the expense of the monarchy 
and the new bureaucratic class to which Ayrault belonged.  Towns were also trying to 
maintain a measure of autonomy from the royal government and judicial system.87  The 
violence and instability of the religious wars often resulted as much from political and legal 
ambitions as it did from religious ideology and fanaticism.  Under the guise of moral and 
religious obligation, factional rivalries ran their brutal course, especially between the Guise 
family and the king himself, culminating in the rebellion of the Catholic League and the 
king’s forced flight from Paris, shortly before his assassination in 1589. 
At the same time, the king’s authority was being equated with paternal authority.  This 
meant that the king had a responsibility to protect and provide for his kingdom and to serve 
the interests of his children.  It also meant that subjects owed him a sacred obedience.  Thus, 
regicide was parricide and sacrilege.  Furthermore, Robert Muchembled has rightly argued 
that the sacralisation of justice and the connection to paternal authority was a means by which 
the monarchy could monopolize the judicial system.  This meant that the construction of the 
greatest secular authority held important implications for paternal authority by making the 
father figure into a crucial agent in the preservation of order.  Muchembled argues further that 
the monarchy cultivated and exploited the fear of strangers, foreigners, and outsiders at the 
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expense of local governments in order to extract obedience.88  The cultivation of fear perhaps 
transferred neatly through legal theorists like Ayrault to create animosity toward the Jesuits, 
who threatened to unravel the pattern. 
Jurisdictional conflicts almost defined the legal system during the sixteenth century.  
Not only were there conflicts between royal and regional jurisdictions but also between 
secular and ecclesiastical ones.  The monarchy was still trying to consolidate its power at this 
time.  The Catholic Church was recovering from the Protestant Reformation with new vigor 
after the Counter-Reformation around the middle of the century.  The monarchy tried to 
distance itself from the ultramontanist papacy while still remaining within the Catholic faith.  
It encouraged an idea of Gallicanism which promoted the ancient rights and privileges of the 
Franco-Gallican Church.  In so doing, the king emerged with a greater role as protector of this 
institution and had more influence over the distinction between royal and ecclesiastical 
jurisdictions.   
At the same time, the monarchy wavered in its policy toward the new religions.  
Competing religious ideologies impeded the stability of the French state because France was a 
Catholic nation with a strong Protestant minority, especially in the south.  The monarchy—
especially under Henry III (former leader in Catholic attempts to expel Protestants) and his 
mother Catherine de Medicis—avoided sympathizing with them but likewise avoided 
systematic, definitive, and violent persecution of them either.   
Meanwhile, the papacy, which was reputed to involve itself in stately affairs and the 
overthrow and replacement of rulers, still constituted a threat to French sovereignty.89  The 
most disconcerting group by far was the Society of Jesus which was mobile and overtly loyal 
to the pope alone.  Thus jurisdictional conflicts over clandestine marriage—and religious 
                                                 
88 Muchembled, Le Temps des Supplices. 
89 Salmon, Society in Crisis. 
 82
vows by association—led to attempts by both parties to define, outline, and distinguish 
between spiritual and temporal duties and responsibilities.  Depending on how well France 
stood in international relations and in defense against foreign powers, especially in what 
concerned Spain, the king could, and frequently did, maintain an ambiguous policy or change 
his mind in such conflicts to what suited him.90  For example, Donald R. Kelley has argued 
that Henry II’s coolness toward Rome prompted Charles Dumoulin to write his sensational 
Gallican “classic” Commentary on the Edict of Henry II against the Little Dates and Abuses 
of the Court of Rome in 1550, but that the king’s fear of schism removed the favor that 
Dumoulin had enjoyed and made him a scapegoat of anti-Protestant sentiment.91   
Conclusion 
France underwent a political and religious crisis in the sixteenth century.  Political 
propaganda circulating during the dominance of the League divided opinions about 
government and the institution of monarchical authority.  On the one hand, royalists asserted 
the supremacy of law and custom in determining who would reign as king; on the other, 
League supporters promoted Catholic identity as the superior qualification for a monarch.  
The first camp promoted the Salic Law against the League’s proposition to elect the Infanta of 
Spain as queen of France, although Gallican patriotism within the radical Catholic faction 
itself undermined this campaign.  Nevertheless, law and religion collided at politics.92  These 
conflicts disturbed and affected Ayrault.  His treatise on paternal power and his unabashedly 
anti-Leaguer pamphlet (Deploration) reveal royalist, Gallican, and robin concerns inseparable 
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from paternal ones in addition to demonstrating a more profound significance for the 
otherwise superficiality of one youth’s disappearance. 
Ayrault significantly established paternal power as a political entity.  Obedience in the 
family was the model that promoted the stability of the French state.  Therefore, Ayrault 
connected defiance of paternal will to rebellion against the state as a whole.  As constructions 
of paternal authority became linked to monarchical authority, they became entwined in 
Gallican concerns.  Conceptualizing the highest secular authority in this manner was a feeble 
attempt to recover une loi, un roi, une foi ideology which was quickly dissolving.  Boosting 
paternal authority should have served the interest of both types of fathers. 
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Chapter Three: Une foi 
 
 
This notwithstanding, these holy Fathers would not deliver the youth againe, so that the poore 
Father was faine to comfort himselfe, first with his teares, and then with his penne, by writing 
and printing a booke of the power of a Father, wherein he shewed, that it was impudently to 
abuse the holy Scripture, to take them rawlie, according to the Letter onely, as the Jesuits did, 
to the disadvantage of Fathers.  He spake like an honest & worthy man, as hee that felt no 
small griefe, for the stealing away of his sonne.  I will speake without passion, & say, that it is 
a hard thing, that the child should enter into orders of religion, against the will of his Father 
and Mother, of whom himselfe is a good part.  And yet I think it not onely excusable, but 
commendable, when being of a competent age, a man betakes himselfe to a Monasterie, 
though his Father and mother consent not to it: but when these things are carried by the crafty 
conveyance of Munks, the matter deserves extraordinarie punishment.1 
 
 
In this passage, Étienne Pasquier summarizes Pierre Ayrault’s predicament eloquently and 
succinctly.  At the same time, the pathos of this account, equally exemplifies Pasquier’s flair 
for the dramatic.  Pasquier paints the picture of a father whose grief prompted him to write a 
book on paternal power—the tears invite sympathy for the presumed despair of a father 
hopelessly separated from the company of his child, perhaps forever.  In this book, provoked 
by the “crafty conveyance of Munks” (rapt),2 the desolate father explains that the deed was 
flawed on religious grounds, “abusing” and misinterpreting scripture “to the disadvantage of 
Fathers.”  Having already examined Ayrault’s legal and political understanding of paternal 
authority, this chapter will delve into Ayrault’s complex religious understanding of his son’s 
disappearance, which he used to undermine his son’s supposed spiritual motives.  He attempts 
to show that René’s religious vocation was as flawed spiritually as legally, and as dangerous 
religiously as politically. 
It is important to understand the pervasive idea of the sacred authority of fathers 
during the sixteenth century, which developed over a long history and continued well beyond 
                                                 
1 Étienne Pasquier, The Jesuites catechisme, 1602, ed. D. M. Rogers, vol. 264 of English Recusant Literature, 
1558-1640, (London: The Scolar Press, 1975), 96. 
2 Conveyance can mean “taking away secretly” and a “transfer of property,” which implies that the son is family 
property. 
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the period of this study.  Sabine Melchior-Bonnet argues that in early modern ideology 
parents shared a complementary function: “The specialization of tasks—to women the cares 
of the body, to fathers the care of the soul—established nevertheless a sharing of 
responsibilities.”3  Fathers possessed a sacred and customary authority, but this privilege took 
on a sacred responsibility around the sixteenth century—a profoundly significant 
responsibility given the heightened sensitivity to heterodoxy following the Reformations.  
Almost simultaneously to the development of a new concept of sacred duties, the Church tried 
to remove a form of idolatry in the father/son relationship, exhorting, according to Odile 
Robert, a “biological father to assume his paternity remembering that his children, entrusted 
to him in deposit, have other fathers and above another Father…”4  While these ideas of 
sacred responsibility and multiple fathers, with varying levels of primacy, were part of 
sixteenth-century Catholic reformed policy as outlined at the Council of Trent, it is equally 
important to note for France that Robert relied heavily on sermons of the Jesuits, who were as 
popular in radical Catholic circles as they were the objects of fierce criticism, fear, suspicion, 
and hatred in more traditional Gallican circles. 
Defining the spiritual component of fatherhood during the sixteenth century proves 
difficult because of the varying and often contradictory conceptions of the father’s exact role 
within the family.  The only role that the competing ideologies seemed to be able to agree 
upon was a fundamentally biological role.  Beyond that, concepts of fatherhood clashed.  
Although Catholics and Protestants sacralized the Decalogue and emphasized the importance 
                                                 
3 Sabine Melchior-Bonnet, “De Gerson à Montaigne, le pouvoir et l’amour,” in Histoire des Pères et de la 
Paternité,  ed. Jean Delumeau and Daniel Roche (Paris: Larousse, 1990), 61. 
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of filial obedience, they disagreed about the proper extent of this obedience.  Robert argues 
that papal policy tended to limit the authority of the father, who shared paternal 
responsibilities with godparents and priests and was ultimately subject to God the Father.5  
Carbonnier-Burkard maintains that Protestants tended to assert more forcefully the 
prerogatives of fathers because fathers “partially assumed the role of ‘priest’” and because 
Protestants placed more emphasis on the Ten Commandments.6  However, Donald R. Kelley 
asserts that in Protestant circles “the family itself came to be supplanted by a sort of 
spiritualized domestic community.…the most essential step was the transcending of 
fatherhood – the replacing of one’s natural progenitor…by a more fulfilling source of 
authority and purpose.”  There was a sort of generational split, and the emphasis became one 
of brotherhood rather than a father/son dynamic.7  In any case, ecclesiastical prerogatives 
threatened to spiritually undermine paternal prerogatives during this period.  Ayrault attempts 
to reassert the spiritual nature of paternal authority by demonstrating that reverence to God 
and reverence to parents are not incompatible; on the contrary he contends, they are 
inseparable.   
Ayrault argues that sacred authority provides a firm basis for the paternal.  At the heart 
of this argument was his accusation that the Jesuits, albeit a religious order, had violated 
divine law by encouraging his son René to defy his father’s will and clandestinely join the 
Society.  Ayrault utilizes the Ten Commandments in order to prove that divine law 
established and supported paternal prerogative.8  He argues that the commandments must be 
taken as a whole, which he did to combat the Jesuits’ claim that it was permissible to abandon 
                                                 
5 Robert, “Porter le nom.” 
6 Marianne Carbonnier-Burkard, “Les variations protestantes,” in Histoire des Pères et de la Paternité, ed. Jean 
Delumeau and Daniel Roche (Paris: Larousse, 1990), 166 and 169. 
7 Donald R. Kelley, The Beginning of Ideology: Consciousness and society in the French Reformation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 81. 
8 The placement actually varied and this commandment could appear first on the second tablet, making the 
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parents for the Society since God was foremost in reverence.  Cristina Quarta explains 
Ayrault’s preoccupation with the Jesuits’ claim as evidence for his praise of religion, but his 
assertion that religious institutions are fundamentally fallible because they are human 
creations.9  While this argument offers important insight into Ayrault’s frustration with the 
Society, it neglects Gallican hostility toward the Society of Jesus in particular, which he 
capitalized on to assert paternal prerogative.   
Ayrault’s efforts to reconcile spiritual and familial obligation lead to an equally 
important component of his religious argument.  He suggests that the Jesuits are impious for 
encouraging his son to break God’s law and criticized the Jesuits for trying to erase rather 
than merely multiply and transform the father/son structure of authority.  At the same time, he 
uses Pasquier’s suggestion that Ignatius of Loyola was ignorant and a failed theologian to 
argue that the Jesuits took gross liberties in interpreting scripture.  In short, Ayrault contends 
that the Jesuits led his son astray by selectively and reductively misinterpreting scripture, 
prompting an elaborate accusation of heresy. 
Piety: The Ten Commandments and Reconciliation 
The idea of piety dually incorporated notions of reverence for both God and father.  It 
derives from the Latin pietas, which broadly means a respect for origins and translates 
roughly as a sense of responsibility or duty, devotion, and loyalty.  Ayrault hinted at the 
concept of piety (although never explicitly using the term) in order to link what he sensed the 
Jesuits were trying to distinguish.  That is, using this concept allowed Ayrault to reconcile an 
apparent contradiction between religious and familial obligations.  In so doing, he claimed 
that paternal authority contained a sacred or spiritual authority in addition the secular 
counterpart.  Fathers exercised legal rights over their children while at the same time enjoying 
                                                 
9 Cristina Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin: Diritto, famiglia, e formazione morale nel XVI secolo (Manduria, Italy: Piero 
Lacaita Editore, 2004). 
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divine sanction for their authority.  In the treatise, Ayrault appeals to his son by using 
arguments extracted from three systems of law, namely natural, civil, and canon.  Of these, 
canon law may be further subdivided into divine law (scripture and specifically the 
commandments) and ecclesiastical law (the Church’s official interpretation of scripture).  It is 
important to distinguish these subdivisions because Ayrault, in certain instances, uses 
scripture—and the Jesuits as a cover—to negotiate the dangerous waters of dissent toward 
Catholic Church policy on the taking of vows and so to combat an ecclesiastical prerogative.  
From this, obedience (honoring the commandments) becomes pious, which in turn means that 
parental consent is sacred and that the Jesuits are impious.  Ayrault gives his secular case of 
rapt important religious implications as he tries to contradict his son’s religious motives for 
disobeying his authority. 
Ayrault uses the idea of piety to suggest that parents are entitled to reverence similar 
to that of God because of their status as second gods; that is, reverence due to parents is an 
aspect of that which is due to God.10  Amidst abundant classical references, he maintains that: 
“[I]t is a crime against humanity…to be unobliging and ungrateful.  Now what obligation is 
there in the world greater than that which is owed to parents?  They are, after God, the second 
authors of our life and our being.”11  While juxtaposing a suggestion of ingratitude with a 
suggestion of crime, Ayrault claims that parents are a type of creator or, in this case, “author.”  
Ayrault continues this line of thought, adding that one of the simplest reasons for honoring the 
sacred authority of parents is that they too are creators, at least, when it comes to children: 
                                                 
10 Quarta claims that Ayrault emphasized loving parents “in the same manner and with equal intensity.”  Ayrault 
e Bodin, 32. 
11 “Toutefois la force & la prerogative de l’aage, donnent auctorité & commandement en tous temps, dit Aristote 
aux Politiques….Nous sommes obligez naturellement à rendre le bien (si Ulpien est croyable) & c’est crime 
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In the generation of children, God (he said) cooperates with fathers.  He supplies the soul, 
fathers, the body, passions, and affections: consequently, he who despises the one, despises 
the other, who is certainly the master and principal worker, but not the only.  The father and 
mother…are visible gods, which in generation imitate the one who is neither created nor 
engendered otherwise.  They differ (he said) in one thing: that God created this world, they 
their children, that God is the universal creator, the father and mother singular and particular.12  
 
Ayrault negotiates a fine line in his argument: he cannot call parents creators without serious 
hedging because he cannot and does not want to deny God’s primary role in generation.  He is, 
after all, trying in part to convince an ecclesiastic audience.  Instead, he describes a 
cooperative effort.  That is, God and fathers “cooperate” in the generation, with each party 
supplying a part of the whole.  He still maintains a distinction between worldly and 
otherworldly, with fathers supplying the flesh and God supplying the soul.13  He is also 
careful to acknowledge that God is the “master and principle worker,” and that parents play a 
role of imitation.  Furthermore, he distinguishes the role of creation between God and parental 
“gods” as that of universal versus particular.  That is, God is the creator of everything while 
parents’ role as creators is limited to their own children.  Nonetheless, arguing that reverence 
and obligation due to God and parents should not or, rather, cannot be differentiated allows 
Ayrault to dissolve an apparent contradiction between familial and spiritual obligation: 
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(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1994), 107-126.  For more on Hanley’s interpretation of the 
Salic Law see Les droits des femmes et la loi salique (Paris: Indigo & côté-femmes, 1994), introduction. 
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familial obligation becomes a spiritual one.  Since God is not in this world, parents move to 
the top of the worldly hierarchy. 
By this same token, Ayrault establishes a chain of piety by emphasizing the visibility 
of these “creators”: “[I]t is impossible for one to be pious and religious toward the immortal 
and invisible God if he is impious, unobliging, and disobedient to these second visible gods 
who touch and handle us.”14  Ayrault implies that those who cannot obey the “visible gods” 
will be unable to obey God, who is more abstract, invisible, and intangible.  He explicitly 
states that impiety and disobedience toward parents translate to such offenses toward God 
Himself.  In this sense, disobedience becomes impious both to the parents and to God because 
reverence to them is an aspect of reverence to Him.15  From this, Ayrault suggests that René’s 
defection, although intended to be an act of piety, was in reality an act of impiety. 
Ayrault undermines René’s presumed piety further with his interpretation of an 
episode from the life of St. Gregory, contraposing the actions of a saint to those of his son.  
First, he draws a parallel between St. Gregory and René because like René, St. Gregory 
“elected a contemplative and monastic life, against the intention of his father who was 
destining him his successor.”  However, unlike René “[St. Gregory] feared in the end to fall 
into this crime of disobedience, irreverence, and impiety toward his father” and “returned 
from the monastery.”16  This example again underscores the importance of repentance and 
return discussed earlier.  Gregory, in all humility, feared divine retribution and recognized, 
according to Ayrault, that his actions, while from the best of intentions, were actually contrary 
                                                 
14 “[I]l est impossible que celuy soit pieux & religious vers le Dieu immortel & invisible, qui est impieux, 
inofficieux & desobeissant à ces seconds Dieux visibles, qui se touchent & se manient entre nous.”  Ayrault, 
Puissance Paternelle, 28. 
15 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28. 
16 “jaçoit qu’il se fust retire des affaires de monde (comme lon dit) fuyant l’Evesché, & qu’il eust esleu une vie 
contemplative & monastique, contre l’intention de son pere qui le destinoit son successeur: il craignit toutefois 
en fin de tomber en ce crime de desobeïssance, d’irreverance & impieté vers son pere.  Il retourna de 
Monastere…”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 17. 
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to divine will.  The issue, then, revolved around a question of piety.  Ayrault insists that 
defying the will of a father makes even a religious vocation impious and irreverent.  Thus, by 
insisting that fathers are objects of veneration, Ayrault tries to convert René’s religious fervor 
back upon himself.  He thereby insists that not only is René misguided but his piety is also 
misplaced. 
Ayrault argues, rather, that the Commandments should be the foremost guide for piety 
and reverence.  He invokes the Ten Commandments to remind René that disobedience to 
one’s parents is a grave infraction.  Ayrault even places significance in the ordering of the 
Commandments, saying that “Moses, which among the precepts and commandments of God, 
had put from the beginning in the first place and on the first Tablet to love and honor God, 
begins by this of fathers and mothers, enjoining children to fear, revere, and love them, then 
said as much of God as if these two who it is necessary to serve and honor are gods in 
concurrence.”17  Ayrault links the reverence of and obedience to God to the reverence of and 
obedience to parents by simple textual proximity, emphasizing that the commandment to 
honor parents is on the first tablet and, further, on the same tablet as those to honor God.  It 
also allows him to support his claim that parents are entitled to reverence and that honoring 
parents is an aspect of honoring God.18  He explains these ideas further by saying that “to not 
obey one’s father and mother (whom the proximity of the first Commandments induces to be 
                                                 
17 “Et Moïse, lequel entre les preceptes & commandemens de Dieu, avoit de commencement mis au premier lieu 
& en la premiere Table, celuy d’aimer & honorer Dieu…commence par celuy des peres et meres, enjoignant aux 
enfans de les craindre, les reverer & aimer: puis en dit autant de Dieu: comme si ces deux qu’il faut server & 
honorer, c’estoient Dieux en concurrence.”  Ayrault,  Puissance Paternelle, 28.  Ayrault refers to Leviticus 19.3-
4: “You shall each revere your mother and father, and you shall keep my sabbaths: I am the LORD your God.  
Do not turn to idols or make cast images for yourselves: I am the LORD your God.” Michael D. Coogan (ed.), 
The New Oxford Annotated Bible, 3rd ed., college edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2001); Hebrew 
Bible, 169. 
18 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28. 
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honored as gods) is to sin more grievously than to be an adulterer, a murderer, a thief.”19  
Thus, defying one’s parents was above all other crimes, except those against God directly.  If 
René, presumably, decided upon a religious vocation to honor God first rather than be 
distracted by reverence to parents, he still erred according to Ayrault because by defying his 
father he inevitably, if unintentionally, defied God’s law.20   
It is no accident that Ayrault emphasized the Commandments to the degree that he did, 
for they had become the centerpiece of spiritual rhetoric by his time.  While modern Christian 
spirituality may deem this obvious, especially since the Commandments directly address 
paternal authority, John Bossy has argued that the Decalogue only returned to its central 
position within the Christian catechism in the sixteenth century, replacing the Seven Deadly 
Sins.  Among the reasons for previous neglect of the Decalogue, Bossy claims, were early 
Christians’ attempts to distance themselves from the old law, the relative ease in memorizing 
and allegorizing the Seven Sins and administering penance, and the fact that “[a]part from 
their brevity, the Sins had the advantage of fitting into, the Commandments the disadvantage 
of disrupting, a whole string of septenary classifications: the seven Sacraments, the seven 
works of mercy, the seven petitions of the Paternoster, and so on.”21   Fifteenth-century 
theologian Jean Gerson ensured that the Commandments received a greater theological status, 
leading to the development of a viable method of teaching them.22  The most notable element 
of this gradual transition, however, was the shift from an emphasis on sins against one’s 
neighbors to sins against God.23  This shift from a communal to a more personal spirituality 
                                                 
19 “[N]’obeïr point à ses peres & meres (que la proximité des premiers Commandemens induict d’estre honorez 
comme Dieux) c’est pecher plus griefvement que d’estre adultere, d’estre meurtrier, d’estre larron.”  Ayrault, 
Puissance Paternelle, 58. 
20 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28, 30, and 32. 
21 John Bossy, “Moral arithmetic: Seven Sins into Ten Commandments,” in Conscience and Casuistry in Early 
Modern Europe, ed. Edmund Leites (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 220. 
22 Ibid., 221-4. 
23 Ibid., 217. 
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helps explain the dominance of the Commandments in Ayrault’s argument because, in spite of 
other arguments, decline in paternal authority personally affected him, and he constructed his 
arguments from a personal (father’s) perspective.  In addition, the fact that “[t]he Decalogue 
was truly a law, in a way that the alternative system had not been”24 helps explain the 
attraction for Ayrault, himself a man of law.  The emphasis on the idea of breaking God’s law 
helped Ayrault not only assert the authority of parents, but also link reverence to God and to 
parents. Quarta draws attention to these ideas as well, claiming that Ayrault’s discussion of 
Jesus reveals the compatibility of spiritual and temporal authority and that it is necessary to 
love parents in the same manner and intensity as God.25 
Ayrault finds the proper adherence to the Decalogue in the model of Jesus, arguing 
that Jesus did not come to undo God’s laws but rather enhanced them by his example, thereby 
reinterpreting the traditional understanding of New Testament commands to leave family.  
Ayrault challenges his son to a disputation, which he then carries out one-sidedly: 
“Christianity (it seems to you) otherwise disposed of the reverence and obedience to which 
you were required me.  Let us see if it is true that Jesus Christ came to trouble Nature, civility 
and good morals…came to change the commandments of God his father, and by that give 
example to others to do the same.”26  Ayrault insists that Jesus did not come to break the 
authoritative relationship between father and son, which Ayrault links explicitly to Christian 
law and values.27  He implies that filial obedience is in accordance with “Nature, civility, and 
good morals.”  Therefore, the controversy as Ayrault sees it is not a question of civil or 
societal values opposing moral or religious values as others (i. e. the Jesuits) would argue 
                                                 
24 Bossy, “Moral arithmetic,” 217. 
25 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28, 30, and 32. 
26 “Le Christianisme (ce vous semble-il) a autrement disposé de la reverence & obeissance à laquelle vous 
m’estiez obligé.  Voyons s’il est veritable que Jesus Christ soit venu troubler la Nature, la civilité, les bonnes 
mœurs…soit venu changer les commandements de Dieu son pere, & par là donner exemple à vous autres d’en 
faire de mesme.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 51-52. 
27 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 32. 
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because filial obedience is in keeping with both value systems.28  Furthermore and finally, the 
commandments stand as authoritative and so those who would make the pretension of 
following Jesus in apostolic service (the Jesuits), must honor them all after the model of Jesus 
himself. 
This Model establishes Himself as Son, thereby reinforcing the father/son relationship.  
Moreover, in using Jesus as a model of filial obedience, Ayrault negotiates a balance, 
endorsing obedience to fathers while distinguishing between celestial and terrestrial fathers.  
Both claim authority, and both are to be recognized as having sacred authority.  But even 
more significantly, Jesus embodies both a sacred and temporal aspect for Ayrault.  Jesus is in 
some ways a terrestrial son, due to his relationship to Mary and Joseph and in others a 
spiritual son, due to his relationship with God the Father:  
[T]his great Doctor [Tertullian], in the book of the trinity, wants to prove against the Heretics 
that Jesus Christ was not God the Father but God the Son.  He said: I came to do the will of 
my father, not mine.  He did it until and in death.  He is therefore the Son.  What force would 
this argument have if the son did not depend on the will and discretion of the father?  What 
grandeur and authority would even this name of father, taken and borrowed from what we are 
(for otherwise God would not be intelligible to us), bring to God if this was only an imaginary 
name, without propriety or substance?29    
 
Ayrault navigates tricky Trinitarian theology.  He uses the distinction between God as Father 
and God as Son as his model for authority and obedience between fathers and sons.  In order 
for such a model to be intelligible to mere mortals, he states, the dynamic between father and 
son in this world must have authoritative substance.  He argues that God took the name of 
Father and that Christ made this distinction between Father and Son precisely because those 
                                                 
28 While Ayrault discusses nature at significant length, it is too large an area to be within the parameters of this 
study and so while not being ignored, will not receive the attention it merits. 
29 “[C]e grand Docteur [Tertulien], au livre de la Trinité, veut prouver contre les Heretiques, que Jesus Christ 
n’estoit pas Dieu le Pere mais Dieu le Fils.  Il a dit: Je suis venu faire la volonté de mon pere, non pas la miene.  
Il l’a faite jusques à la mort inclusivement.  Il est donc Fifs.  Quel force auroit cest argument, si le fils ne 
dependoit de la volonté & discretion du pere? qu’apporteroit de grandeur & d’auctorité à Dieu mesme ce nom de 
pere, pris & emprunté de ce que nous sommes (car autrement Dieu ne nous seroit intelligible) si ce n’estoit qu’un 
nom imaginaire, sans proprieté ny substance?”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 29. 
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titles and relationships had meaning for “us.”  The “son” depends on the “will and discretion 
of the father” (even if they are the same being in three manifestations).  Jesus becomes the 
model of piety because he honors his Father by honoring his parents.30   
To complicate things further, Ayrault seems to compromise his previous arguments by 
saying that “I agree with you that it is more necessary for a man to love God than his 
father.”31  Ayrault concedes that God is the foremost object of veneration, in keeping with the 
arguments of the opposition.  A tactical move, for he quickly qualifies such a concession: 
“But that it follows thereafter that it is more expedient to be a Cordelier or a Jesuit than to 
love and honor father and mother, I say that this is poorly concluded.”32  He maintains that 
one does not have resort to extremes to prove such veneration, especially since reverence to 
God and to parents are inseparably linked.  The commandments, he asserts, are more 
important to follow than a religious calling, for “There is no commandment from God to you 
and me to be Priests, but well did he command you to honor me.”33  Therefore, parental 
consent is essential in a religious calling to avoid disobeying a commandment: “This is a 
mortal sin, a curse, and an anathema for you to offend me.  To be a Jesuit or not is a matter of 
indifference.  You can be a good Christian and follow Jesus Christ without that.”34  Ayrault 
distinguishes between need and want, necessity and option.  A religious vocation is an option, 
a commandment is not.  To deny a commandment is a serious offence, but most people do not 
become priests.  A person can be a good Christian by obeying his parents, whether or not he is 
a religieux, but it is impossible to be a good Christian by adopting a religious vocation that 
                                                 
30 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28 and 32. 
31 “Premierement donc je vous accorde, qu’il faut plus aimer Dieu que son pere.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 
64. 
32 “Mais qu’il s’ensuive de là: il est donc plus expedient d’estre Cordelier ou Jesuite, que d’aimer & honorer ses 
pere & mere: Je dy que c’est mal conclu.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 64-65. 
33 “Il n’y a point de commandement de Dieu à vous & à moy d’estre Prestres: mais bien vous commande-il de 
m’honorer.”  Ibid., 65. 
34  “Ce vous est peché mortel, malediction, & anatheme de n’offencer: d’estre Jesuite, ou ne l’estre point, c’est 
chose indifferente.  Vous pouvez bien estre Chrestien, & suivre Jesus Christ sans cela.”  Ibid. 
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defies parental will.  Quarta sees in this line of reasoning Ayrault’s asserting the fallibility of 
these human institutions and their subordination to divine law.  She claims that Ayrault denies 
justification to joining a religious order,35 but she does not emphasize the idea of consent in 
this instance.  In asserting parental consent, Ayrault subtly reverses the object of indifference: 
instead of parental will being a matter of indifference to religious vocation as the Jesuits 
would claim, religious vocation becomes a matter of indifference to parental will.  This clever 
reversal reveals an ulterior motive for the treatise: to undermine the credibility of the Jesuits. 
The primacy of the Commandments leads Ayrault to conclude that consent is sacred 
and therefore an essential prerequisite for any religious calling.  Ayrault presumes that God 
placed fathers in a position of authority as heads of household.  As such, their discretion 
merited consultation in the taking of religious vows.  Ayrault cited his interpretation of the 
apostles James and John receiving permission from their father, Zebedee, before leaving to 
follow Jesus.  He used the presence of Zebedee to imply consent to their leaving: “For they 
[James and John] were with him [Zebedee] when Jesus Christ called them…Zebedee, not 
opposing it, consented by his presence that they follow him [Jesus].”  Thus, “to follow Jesus 
Christ does not mean to abandon one’s family.”36  By this, Ayrault insists that Jesus valued 
parental consent for religious vocations. 
Moreover, Ayrault questions the validity of vows taken without parental consent: “The 
question has always remained, if the vow subsists without the wish and consent of fathers.”37  
He argues that in fact the consent of fathers is essential for legitimizing religious vows and 
                                                 
35 Cristina Quarta.  Ayrault e Bodin, 30 and 32. 
36 “Suivre Jesus Christ, ce n’estoit donc pas abandonner sa famille.  Il y a plus: ces deux freres Jacques & Jean, 
de quelque aage qu’ils fussent lors, suivirent bien Jesus Christ: mais ce fut du consentement de Zebedee.  Car ils 
estoient avec luy quand Jesus Christ les appella.  Il s’ensuit doncques qu’ils prindrent congé de luy, on que 
Zebedee ne s’y opposant point, consentit par sa presence qu’ils le suivissent.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 60. 
37 “La question fust tousjours demeurée, si le voeu subsistoit sans le vouloir & consentement des peres.  Or est-il 
vulgaire, que si on deliberoit de faire sacrifice aux Dieux, & de leur immoler des enfans, c’estoient les parens qui 
les donnoient & offroient.”  Ibid., 40. 
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moreover that it is a father’s moral prerogative and duty to ensure that his son’s motives for 
taking said vows are sound: “[I]f you could marry rigor, either to make yourself a monk 
against my will, and that marriage, or the vow thus made, subsists of faith…you do not have 
to undertake it without my leave and opinion, without revealing to me your intentions and 
conceptions, so that I may experiment from where they come: if it is a good zeal or a lightness, 
subordination, and induction.”38  Ayrault argues that it is the father’s duty to evaluate his 
son’s desire to take religious vows because the only thing worse than taking religious vows 
without parental consent is taking them insincerely or by coercion (a clear allusion to rapt).  
The Angevin judge appeals to procedure: the son expresses his desire, the father scrutinizes it 
and then offers or withholds his consent based on his sense of moral duty.  If the son has 
reached the age of reasoning, then such a process is a choice but nevertheless a matter of 
honor.  By not revealing his motivations and intentions, René leaves them open to suspicion.  
Why else, according to Ayrault, would he hide them, except out of fear; of what would he, or 
the Jesuits, be afraid?  Ayrault creates this suspicion for his son’s defiance in order to more 
easily accuse the Jesuits of impiety. 
It so happens that René’s choice of religious order was as much at issue as his decision 
to take vows.  Ayrault evidenced particular hostility toward the Jesuits whom he accused of 
having seduced his son.  At stake were the proper boundaries between, and the relation of, 
secular and sacred authority.  Both Ayrault and Pasquier accused the Jesuits of being 
hypocrites and thieves because they claimed the strictest adherence to Catholic ideals while 
simultaneously encouraging children to abandon and defy their parents—a blatant violation of 
                                                 
38 “[S]i à la rigueur vous vous pouvez marier, ou rendre moyne contre ma volonté, & que le mariage, ou le voeu 
ainsi fait, subsiste de foy: toutefois, suyvant ce precepte, vous ne le devez pas entreprendre sans mon conge, sans 
mon avis: sans me reveler vos intentions & conceptions, afin qui j’experimente d’où elles viennent.  Si c’est d’un 
bon zele, ou de legereté, subordination & induction.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 47-48. 
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Christian law.39  It follows from the equation of obedience and piety that Ayrault implicitly 
accused the Jesuits of impiety and blasphemy.  Thus, Ayrault capitalized on a negative image 
and Gallican fear in order to reinforce his argument. 
One may detect the irony of a religious order being accused of impiety and, further, of 
the Jesuits, in particular, being condemned for encouraging disobedience to a paternal 
authority when they were infamous because of their strict and particular vow to obey the pope 
(a father figure).  That the Jesuits would be accused of condoning any form of disobedience is 
itself shocking, for they demanded strict hierarchical obedience within their order.  However, 
as A. Lynn Martin has shown in several works, the practice of this ideal was not nearly so 
neat.  He has shown through examination of Jesuit correspondence that this ideal of obedience 
caused uncertainty and concern among Jesuits because there was always the question of how 
far to take it.  Some followed it to the point of seeming to be unwilling to make any decisions 
on their own, thereby clogging the bureaucracy, while others such as Emond Auger at times 
only managed to thinly disguise their disobedience.40  Furthermore, complaints from people 
such as Pasquier indicate that the issue of obedience caused many problems for the Jesuits in 
France.  They were generally unreceptive to integrating into and honoring local hierarchies 
(of towns and regions and at the national level, both secular and ecclesiastical) in a country 
which was trying to distinguish its sovereignty from both secular and ecclesiastical foreign 
authorities. 
                                                 
39 Barbara B. Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children: Patriarchal Authority and Parental Consent to Religious 
Vocations in Early Counter-Reformation France,” The Journal of Modern History 68:2 (June, 1996): 265-307.  
See also Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle; and Étienne Pasquier, “De la Secte des Jesuites, Livre III, Chapitre 
XLIII,” and “Plaidoyé de l’Université de Paris, encontre les Jesuites, Livre III, Chapitre XLIV,” from Les 
Recherches de la France in Les Œuvres D’Estienne Pasquier, (Amsterdam: La Compagnie des Libraires 
Associez, 1723), 1: 323-52. 
40 A. Lynn Martin, The Jesuit Mind: The Mentality of an Elite in Early Modern France (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988); Martin, “The Jesuit Mystique,” Sixteenth Century Journal 4:1 (Apr., 1973): 31-40; 
Martin, Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1973). 
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Whatever their policy on obedience, which clearly shows a difference of priorities, 
veneration and service required indifference to other sources of authority for the Jesuits—an 
extremely controversial obligation for those who operated “in the world.”  Martin’s extensive 
research on the Jesuits indicates that they encouraged members to sever familial bonds.  As he 
suggests, this severing included authoritarian restrictions and even censorships of a novice’s 
correspondence.  Furthermore, he cites an example—that of Jesus leaving his parents and 
remaining in the Temple for spiritual service—extracted from Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises 
which reveals an effort to “develop indifference to all created things, which of course could 
include the family, so that a Jesuit could better devote himself to apostolic service.”41  Ayrault, 
on the contrary, uses the same passage about Jesus and the Temple to emphasize that Jesus 
nevertheless returned to his parents out of obedience.  He states that Jesus at one point left 
Mary and Joseph under the precept that “it was more reasonable that he employed himself to 
serve his celestial father than them [Mary and Joseph] who were merely his terrestrial and 
mortal parents.”  But he returned to them and later came to the realization that “it is 
compatible to serve and obey both without abandoning one to serve the other.”42  Ayrault 
concludes, Jesus was not indifferent to his parents and recognized his obligation to them, as 
outlined in the commandments.  Thus, the Jesuits emphasize Jesus leaving his parents to 
worship in the Temple, while Ayrault emphasizes his return to counterpoint them.  It is 
symptomatic of Ayrault’s attempt to reconcile the supposed “incompatibility” between 
spiritual and familial obligation by combining them.   
Nevertheless the issue of parental consent remained a slippery slope for the Jesuits to 
negotiate.  Martin suggests that there was some doubt about indifference toward parental 
                                                 
41 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 187.  For more information, see especially chapter 11. 
42 “il estoit plus raisonnable qu’il s’employast à servir son pere celeste, que non pas eux, qui n’estoient que 
parens terriens et mortels….il est compatible de servir & obeïr à tous deux, sans en abandonner l’un pour servir 
l’autre.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 52-53. 
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consent within the Jesuit community.  While it is unclear how widespread or pervasive this 
doubt was, he mentions the case of Ponce Cogordan who was apparently so “amazed” that 
children could join the order “without the permission of the parents, whose only purpose in 
sending their sons to the Jesuit colleges was to receive financial assistance from them once 
they had been educated free of charge” that he once demanded that the “general of the Society 
give [three boys] back” because “according to natural law the sons must return and relieve the 
poverty of their parents.”43  Cogordan’s doubt is interesting for at least four reasons.  First, 
Cogordan appeals to Nature and an obligation to parents in order to reinforce his argument.  
Second, this doubt recognizes a certain legitimacy for the secular ambitions of families.  Third, 
it suggests that Jesuits fulfilled a role in those ambitions, but that finally, they should not be 
allowed to assume that role to the point of usurping authority. 
Law greased the slippery slope for the Jesuits.  They had to be careful because as 
Martin rightly notes “law as well as custom supported the authority of parents over their 
children,” so “the support of the royal council was essential” to combat appeals of angry 
parents.44  He also notes, however, that the Jesuits had a sophisticated bag of tricks with 
which to circumvent the law, which included relocating the child (a delaying tactic in the 
legal process) and speeding up the admission process, “designed to present the parents with a 
fait accompli.”45  The main question is, if the Jesuits were obsessed with preserving their 
reputation and avoiding scandal in order to receive legal sanction from Parlement to be able to 
serve in France (as Martin suggests),46 why did they try to confront parents and in particular 
Ayrault, instigating a big enough scandal to become the defining moment in the lifetime of 
this influential barrister?  Martin offers the explanation that “in defense of such activities 
                                                 
43 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 198. 
44 Ibid., 188.   
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., part I. 
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Jesuits would have undoubtedly argued that parental authority must yield in cases where a son 
had a vocation to serve Christ.”47  Nevertheless, for a group that was trying to negotiate a 
legal status with Parlement, antagonizing Ayrault probably did not ingratiate the already 
hostile legists.  Such cases added fuel to Gallican fears of Jesuit attempts to undermine French 
sovereignty. 
Furthermore, Ayrault uses an example from the book of Isis and Osiris to argue that 
even in the absence of parents to consent, clerics should not be involved in a child’s decision 
to take religious vows: “If he who made offer of it did not find himself father, it is similarly 
vulgar that the Priest take whichever one he pleased; but it was the Magistrate who drew lots 
for it so that it was the Gods themselves who chose their host, not the Priest…”48  Ayrault 
asserts that the Church should not be drafting members at their whim.  This concern arose out 
of accusations like those of his friend Pasquier who claimed that the Jesuits targeted wealthy 
children in order to take advantage of their inheritances.49  However fantastic and exaggerated, 
this concern is not totally unwarranted and the accusation not wholly unjustified.  Martin has 
shown that the Society favored children from wealthier families—who had influence in the 
area—to help fund the cash-strapped collèges, either seeking incomes or the inheritances of 
those inducted into the Society.  While not actively preying on the wealthier children as 
Pasquier suggests, the Jesuits were attracted to bons moeurs and the potential influence of 
such children, making them particularly desirable candidates for the Society.50   
Along a similar line, Barbara Diefendorf has shown that from the perspective of 
inheritance, monastic children raised two concerns: the family might not be continued, and 
                                                 
47 Martin, Jesuit Mind, 188. 
48 “Que s’il ne se trouvoit pere qui en fist offre, il est pareillement vulgaire que le Prestre ne prenoit pas celuy ou 
celle qui luy plaisoit: mais que c’estoit le Magistrat qui les tiroit au sort, afin que fussent les Dieux qui 
choisissent eux-mesme leur hostie, non pas le Prestre…”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 40. 
49 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.”  See also Pasquier, “De la Secte des Jesuites,” and “Plaidoyé.” 
50 Martin, Jesuit Mind. 
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monasteries might come into the family fortune.  More personally, the parents would be 
deprived of the child’s company.  Monastic children left the world, constituting a symbolic 
social death,51 which Ayrault to banishment and exile.52  That is, monastic vows ideally 
created a new identity independent of previous social standing and kinship networks.  The 
dedication of a child and the taking of vows, then, according to Ayrault, was as much of a 
religious experience for the parents as for the child, in that, parents sacrificed said child to 
God.  Rapt, then, according to Ayrault, was in a sense the usurpation of the right of life and 
death which fathers had customarily held.  In any case, Ayrault rejected the Society’s 
privilege to pick and choose its members so discriminately and without considering the will of 
their parents.  Ayrault argued that a child entering into a religious vocation should be an 
offering from the parents and not a recruit of the monks; monks should not be taking 
advantage of their position as educators to influence the impressionable young minds of the 
children in such matters.53 
This position of influence created a prime environment for rapt de séduction, recalling, 
again, the letter of St. Bernard of Clairvaux.  However, whatever induced René to join the 
Jesuits, the decision was ultimately his own—a decision not only to join but to remain.  
Ayrault’s argument falls back on the Commandments: “[I]f the fault of this nephew, to change 
monastery only, was such (said St. Bernard) that he was going there to the damnation of his 
soul, what befalls the son who stomps under foot so arrogantly the commandment of God and 
the holy decretals?”54   Ayrault draws explicit attention to St. Bernard’s concern for his 
                                                 
51 Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children.” 
52 Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 45. 
53 For theories of education that Ayrault may draw upon, see Pasquier “De la Secte des Jesuites,”and 
“Plaidoyé,” and those presented in George Huppert, Public Schools in Renaissance France (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1984). 
54 “Et si la faute de ce nepveu, pour changer seulement de Monastere, est telle (dit S. Bernard) qu’il y alloit de la 
damnation de son ame: qu’est-ce au fils de fouler aux piedz si arrogamment le commandement de Dieu, & les 
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nephew’s salvation in order to suggest that what René did for salvation may in fact merit 
eternal damnation, for that supposed act of piety was in reality impious because of the willful 
arrogance against a commandment.  However, it is plausible that if Ayrault identifies with St. 
Bernard, he expresses genuine paternal concern for his son’s salvation.  Of course if that were 
the case, he could have consented. 
As Chapter One noted, Ayrault compares the seductiveness of St. Bernard’s Cluniacs 
to the Jesuits, whom Ayrault accuses of purposefully creating a misleading incompatibility 
between reverence owed to God and reverence owed to parents in order to lure in recruits like 
his son.  He claims that “the greatest evil in this is that it seems that our Religion…instead of 
establishing this domestic power, destroys it and that nothing dispenses much our children to 
the honor, reverence, and obedience that they owe,…the difficulty…to serve well both God 
and men conjointly, Precepts that agree…are reduced as contrary and incompatible.” 55  
Ayrault acknowledges the apparent and unfortunate contradiction in “our Religion” which 
seems to set the reverence due to God and the reverence due to parents at odds.  However, he 
tries to undermine this “evil” and impious incompatibility by reconciling spiritual and familial 
obligation.56  Ayrault disagrees not only with the Jesuits’ methodology, but also with the 
content of their persuasive devices. 
Ayrault concludes that, not only are reverence to God and reverence to parents linked, 
they are inseparable: one cannot honor and revere one without honoring and revering the 
                                                                                                                                                        
saincts Decrets, non pour changer de foy, mais de robe? non d’Eglise, mais  de College?”  Ayrault, Puissance 
Paternelle, 83-84. 
55 “Mais le plus grand mal qui est en cecy, c’est qu’il semble que nostre Religion (comme nous avons dit) au lieu 
d’establir ceste puissance domestique, la destruise: & que rien ne dispense tant nos enfans de l’honneur, 
reverence & obeisance qu’ils doivent, que la difficulté qu’on veut dire estre à bien servir Dieu & les homes 
conjoinctement Preceptes qui s’accordoient & marchoient d’un pied, sont rendus comme contraires & 
incompatibles.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 31. 
56 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28 and 32. 
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other.57  The commandments are interconnected and inseparable, and so, “[H]e holds [H]is 
first, second, third, and fourth commandments well accomplished when we serve him each 
one according to our vocation.”58  He adds that “[T]he first precept to which you run and the 
fifth that you despise are of God, are from the same Legislator and Author—either it is 
necessary that they each nullify each other and (contrary to human laws) that the first 
abolishes the one that follows, or they have to be maintained and observed together.”59  
Ayrault argues that the Commandments are not mutually exclusive; the first does not undo the 
second nor the second the third and so on.  Because they all originate from God, people are 
not free to pick and choose and furthermore, a person cannot honor one while violating 
another.  Spiritual and familial obligations are reconcilable, according to Ayrault, because 
they arise out of piety and so are manifestations of the same principal.  By this same token, he 
concurs with the maxim that “He who honors his father, honors God and he who honors God, 
honors his father,”60 for “He esteems [H]imself served and obeyed when we revere and honor 
those gods that [H]e approves, that [H]e holds for true, natural, and second after [H]im.”61  
Not only is it permissible then for René to honor his parents as he honors God, it is required. 
False Monks 
Beyond trying to reconcile the apparent conflict between spiritual obligation and 
familial obligation, Ayrault goes to the source of his problem and works to undermine the 
credibility of the Jesuits themselves.  He draws heavily on some of the anti-Jesuit rhetoric of 
peers such as Étienne Pasquier.  This rhetoric fans the flames of fear, hatred, and suspicion of 
                                                 
57 Quarta, Ayrault e Bodin, 28. 
58 “[I]l tient ses premier, deux, tiers, quatriesme commandemens bien accomplis, quand nous le servons chacun 
selon la vacation & vocation.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 55. 
59 “[L]e premier precepte dont vous couvrez: & le cinquiesme que vous mesprisez, sont de Dieu: sont d’un 
mesme Legislateur & Autheur.  Ou il faut donc qu’ils se destruisent l’un l’autre: & (au contraire des loix 
humaines) que le premier abroge celuy qui suit: ou ils se doivent garder & observer conjointement.”  Ibid., 54. 
60 “ Qui honore son pere, il honore Dieu: & qui honore Dieu, honore son pere.”  Ibid., 28. 
61 “il s’estime servy & obey, quand nous reverons & honorons ces Dieux là qu’il approuve: qu’il tient pour vrays, 
naturels, &seconds après luy.”  Ibid., 55. 
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the Society.  It encompasses Gallican fears of Spanish and Roman intervention which reveals 
itself on a more fundamental level by the Jesuits’ refusal to acknowledge local French 
hierarchies, be they secular or ecclesiastic.  For many critics, the novelty of the Society of 
Jesus both temporally and structurally became a major way to question the order’s legitimacy.  
From this developed an implicit accusation of illegitimacy and by extension heresy.  Ayrault 
uses suggestions of heresy (very much an extension of his accusation of impiety) in order to 
argue not only that his son made a poor choice in clandestinely joining a religious order but 
that his choice of religious order was equally poor.  It is the final feature of his argument 
which undermines René’s (imagined) religious excuses for defying paternal authority. 
As a first point, heresy itself is a problematic word because it includes a broad range 
of ideas, whose definitions seem to change depending on the person or group defining it.  
Catholics and Protestants (equally general) mutually referred to each other as heretics in order 
to establish their legitimacy as the true form of Christianity and to denounce and discredit the 
other.  In any case, heresy incorporates ideas of illegitimacy which are more useful for 
distinguishing a group of people as “other” than providing specific semantic distinctions.  In 
the political landscape of the latter half of the sixteenth century in France, heresy was a word 
that people used loosely as compared with previous centuries.  Protestantism, and Calvinism 
in particular, appears to have created a new sensitivity to heterodoxy, which then popularized 
discourses against heresy.  “Heresy” recalled disdain for previous heretical movements 
reaching back to antiquity, each of which was unique in its own right.  This return to antiquity 
not only coincided with humanist education but also with controversies surrounding 
reformers’ attempts to remain true to (or regain) the ancient, original (pure) Church.   
Certainly, Ayrault does not accuse the Jesuits of being Calvinists—the typical object 
of accusations of heresy leveled by Catholics in France.  Rather, he and Pasquier easily find 
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resonances between the Jesuits and any number of heterodoxies—with the Anabaptists as 
with Peter Abelard.62  The concern which their rhetoric feeds on and adds to is one that is 
intensely suspicious of novelty, in a context in which Catholics (and Protestants) fought wars 
with those who carried this novelty and reform beyond its ambiguous boundary distinguishing 
orthodoxy from heterodoxy.63  Therefore, heresy is no small accusation against the Jesuits, 
who in many instances represented a newly vamped “orthodox” Catholicism. 
Ayrault, perhaps because of his legal training, has an encyclopedic memory of 
examples at his disposal when constructing his argument that the Jesuits are heretics.  In a 
discussion of children in the past who had left their parents for a religious calling, he suggests 
that “they did it to be true monks.”64  Ayrault takes special issue here with René’s choice of 
religious order.  By referring to the older orders as real or true, he suggests that the Jesuits are 
not: they are false monks and an illegitimate order.  Older orders drew clearer distinctions 
between regular orders (removed from the world) and secular orders of priests (in the world).  
The Jesuits were a hybrid order, claiming the privileges of a regular order and of a secular 
order (specifically the right to administer the sacraments and to preach) without being 
constrained to the common rigors and hierarchy of each.  Ayrault recalls previous religious 
movements (regular) as pious and venerable—and in contrast to the trouble-making Jesuits. 
Pasquier elaborates ad nauseam on the illegitimacy of the Jesuits.  In fact, while 
Ayrault comes across as overbearing and argumentative, Pasquier can be downright nasty.  He 
dedicates several works to viciously railing on the Jesuits.  In one, Les Recherches de la 
France, he devotes several chapters to the matter.  He insists that not only are the Jesuits 
                                                 
62 Pasquier, Jesuites catechisme. 
63 For an interesting analysis of these boundaries as they develop in sixteenth century France (and those 
negotiating a middle ground between the extremes), see Thierry Wanegffelen, Ni Rome Ni Genève: Des fidèles 
entre deux chaires en France au XVIe siècle (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1997). 
64 “excepté qu’ils le faisoient pour estre vrays Moines.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 75-76. 
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illegitimate, but that they are monstrous: “this Monster, who being neither secular nor regular, 
was both together, and from the start introduced within our Church, a Hermaphroditic 
order.”65  This concern about how to categorize the Jesuits is much clearer in The Jesuites 
catechisme [sic].  In one chapter he has his advocate character describe a dream of a 
procession in which the apostles, popes, and the rest of the secular clergy went first; the 
hermits, monks, and the rest of the regular clergy went next; and university faculty 
(theologians) went last.  The Jesuits tried to join the procession but St. Peter, representing the 
secular clergy, rejected them, declaring that the name of “Jesuit” was “arrogant” (he spends 
two and a half pages in this chapter alone explaining why) and that “although Chastitie, 
Obedience, and Contempt of the world, were familiar matters with us, yet did we not this by 
vow; that was brought into the Church after our time…and to say the troth, wee never tyed 
our devotion to povertie.”  The vow here, although seemingly a technicality, is important 
because it puts them into the category of regular clergy.  Next, St. Antony rejected them on 
behalf of the eremites (hermits), saying: “I commend your intention, but it is nothing like unto 
ours.  Our devotion…was a solitarie life, without schollership or priesthood.”  Here the issue 
is the Jesuits’ privilege to say mass and pursue education.  St. Benedict (Benet) on behalf of 
the cenobites (monks) also rejected them because they do not wear the proper habit or tonsure 
and they do not hold rigorous fasts.  Finally, the university (represented by Jean Gerson) 
rejected them because they were “neither pure seculars, nor pure regulars,” (also a division 
within the university) and because “you be lying Sophisters, and verie bad Grammarians.”  
For good measure, the faculty adds that they do not acknowledge “the authoritie of your 
                                                 
65 “ce Monstre, qui pour n’estre ny Seculier, ny Regulier, estoit tous les deux ensemble, & partant introduisoit 
dedans nostre Eglise, un ordre Hermaphrodite.”  Étienne Pasquier, “De la Secte des Jesuites,” 323-24. 
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Bishops.”66  Their illegitimacy seems to center on an “unnatural” blend of privileges which 
other distinct groups of clergy enjoy in the sixteenth century.   
Along a similar line, Pasquier advances a conspiracy theory.  He claims that the 
Jesuits were “refused at Rome” and explains “by what cunning they were afterward received,” 
which amounted to them changing the object of the vow of absolute obedience from a general 
to the pope because Ignatius was “one of the most sharpe and worldly wise men our age 
afforded.”67  Thus, the Jesuits’ legitimacy was to be suspected because the pope did not 
immediately accept them and because somewhere in the negotiation they may have deceived 
the pope.  These accusations are not substantiated, but these Gallican fantasies are important 
to explore because they help to explain the animosity in France toward the Jesuits, even if 
they only skim the surface of deeper problems. 
This suggestion of illegitimacy paves the way for an accusation of heresy.  To return 
to a point started above, Ayrault, while establishing Jesus as a model of obedience, 
emphasizes Trinitarian doctrine: “[T]his great Doctor [Tertullian], in the book of the trinity, 
wants to prove against the Heretics that Jesus Christ was not God the Father but God the Son.  
He said: I came to do the will of my father, not mine….He is therefore the Son.”68   In 
reviving an example of ancient heretics, Ayrault neatly implies that the Jesuits, too, are 
heretics.  These ancient heretics (probably Arians) tried to interrupt the “family” dynamic of 
the Trinity by arguing that Jesus was not God the Son thereby dissolving the relationship 
between Father and Son.  Along a similar line, Ayrault and Pasquier accused the Jesuits of 
working to interrupt the authoritative relationship between father and son which Ayrault 
                                                 
66 Pasquier, Jesuites catechisme, book 1, chapter 15, pp. 48-56.  The faculty in Paris were some of the fiercest 
opponents of the Jesuits and the Council of Trent. 
67 Ibid., 20. 
68 “[C]e grand Docteur [Tertulien], au livre de la Trinité, veut prouver contre les Heretiques, que Jesus Christ 
n’estoit pas Dieu le Pere mais Dieu le Fils.  Il a dit: Je suis venu faire la volonté de mon pere, non pas la miene.  
Il l’a faite jusques à la mort inclusivement.  Il est donc Fifs.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 29. 
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associates, by means of this passage, with Trinitarian (and therefore fundamentally orthodox 
Christian) doctrine.   
Ayrault becomes more and more explicit in his accusation that the Jesuits are heretics.  
He questions their interpretations of Scripture: “Let us see if it is veritable that Jesus 
Christ…came to change the commandments of God his father…We will begin with his person 
and then we will come to the Church, which if your Theologians brought to it observations or 
interpretations more subtle, we will cede and acquiesce to them very willingly, for if we are 
all Christians, we are not however all interpreters of Christianity.”69  He implies that the 
Jesuits are at best in error and at worst heretics.  Qualifying the Jesuits not as theologians but 
as “your” theologians, throws them into a much narrower and subjective category.  By 
suggesting that “we are not all interpreters of Christianity,” he questions the Jesuits’ ability 
(especially under criticism of illiteracy) to furnish careful and subtle observations and 
interpretations which would permit the contradiction of a commandment.  (“Subtle” also has a 
sinister connotation: deception frequently arises from subtle arguments.) 
Pasquier similarly accused the Jesuits of not even being literate and thus not being 
qualified to interpret scripture at all.  If they could not read Scripture, it would have been 
difficult for them to properly interpret scripture, making their ideas dangerous, and in this 
case erroneous or heretical.  He argues that Ignatius not only dropped out of the study of 
Divinity (theology), but that he barely knew Latin: “for having (as he bragd) his mind wholy 
mounted up to heaven, he could not strike the wing to come downe, so low as the declensions 
                                                 
69 “Voyons s’il est veritable que Jesus Christ soit venu troubler la Nature, la civilité, les bonnes mœurs…soit 
venu changer les commandements de Dieu son pere, & par là donner exemple à vous autres d’en faire de mesme.  
Nous commencerons à sa personne: & puis nous viendrons à l’Eglise, en laquelle si voz Theologiens y apportent 
plus subtiles, nous leur cederons & acquiescerons tres-volontiers.  Car si nous sommes tous Chrestiens, nous ne 
sommes pas pourtant tous interpretes du Christianisme.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 51-52. 
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of Nounes.”70  It would be impossible for him to read and interpret scripture if he did not 
know Latin (unless he read one of the “heretical” translations into the vernacular).  Pasquier 
elaborates on this point: “I leave it to your considerations, whether these books were fit for 
him to handle…who studied his Gramer but two yeeres.”71 Pasquier suggests that considering 
Ignatius’ low level of education, it was improper for him to try to interpret the sacred texts.  
He even implies danger: perhaps the books were too much for him to “handle.”  However, 
Pasquier could not let his argument rest at ignorance.  He suggests more sinister implications: 
“for all these pretended contemplations of Ignace, were meer mummeries of the devill, who 
desired to present us with such a man, as might by his ignorance trouble the whole state of the 
Church.”72  Pasquier sees the Devil behind Ignatius’ ignorance, the purpose of which was to 
cause trouble for the Church.  Thus, the Jesuits were founded on ignorance, which could only 
bring trouble.   
It is useful at this point to consider France’s education system during the sixteenth 
century.  George Huppert has done extensive research on the beginnings of secular education 
in early modern French towns.  He argues that townsmen, becoming increasingly frustrated 
with the quality of education provided by the clergy and freelance masters, worked to regulate 
education themselves.  Tuition was to be free for all, and educators were to be qualified—
preferably educated in Paris.73  They divided the students into six or seven classes, the lowest 
learning the ABCs and the highest, rhetoric (the numbering is opposite of modern America, so 
the lowest levels receive the highest numerical designation, counting down to graduation).74  
                                                 
70 The Latin language is a case system which relies on morphology to distinguish the function of words.  It has 
five major groupings of endings (cases) for nouns, called declensions.  These would have to be mastered at the 
elementary level to understand the language.  Pasquier, Jesuites catechisme, 30. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Huppert, Public Schools, chapters 1-3.  Huppert adopts French words to stand in for specialized terminology 
or a usage peculiar to this group of people and as such uses common sixteenth century spelling. 
74 Ibid., chapter 4. 
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Judging by his breakdown, it would be doubtful, according to Pasquier, that Ignatius would 
have made it beyond the cinquième, that is the fifth level in a six level system—one above the 
ABCs.   
Huppert continues by describing the Jesuit schools as primarily outposts against 
heresy (Calvinism).  He argues that the townsmen were reluctant to hand control of their 
schools back over to the Church, in bitter remembrance of previous experience.  Furthermore, 
he claims that “[t]he Jesuits’ failure to replace secular teachers in more than a handful of 
French cities was in no way due to the fathers’ [Jesuits] intellectual shortcomings; and their 
success in Paris, Lyon, or Toulouse cannot be ascribed to their competence as teachers 
either.”75  In short, the Jesuits may not have been the ignoramuses that Pasquier portrayed 
them to be, but they may not have put education first for its own sake.  Thus, Pasquier, despite 
being well-informed of their educative backgrounds, still chose to characterize them as being 
founded on ignorance; this characterization therefore seems to be a cover for deeper animosity 
born toward the Society.  As a final note on the Jesuits, Huppert admits that: 
[T]heir notion of what the enfans [children] needed did not always coincide with the 
bourgeois’ view.  Under the new regens [instructors], orthodoxy was strengthened in the 
schools and more enfans turned toward clerical careers.  The bourgeois, however, had little 
interest in providing the Church with new recruits, and they particularly resented having 
horsains in the college—fledgling priests and monks trained at their expense.”76   
 
The resentment of the bourgeoisie, which included Ayrault and Pasquier, at having to pay for 
training new members for the Society—and members recruited from their own children at that, 
with or without permission—may explain part of the hostility toward the Society, especially if 
they felt that those who were not recruited were not receiving adequate education.  They did 
                                                 
75 Huppert, Public Schools, 108. 
76 Ibid., 125. 
 112
not feel that they were getting their money’s worth.77  Pasquier and Ayrault take advantage of 
this tension. 
After underscoring the ignorance of Ignatius, it was easy for Pasquier to launch an 
accusation of heresy against the Jesuits.  He begins with a simple accusation: “this Sect is in 
its principles schismatic and consequently heretical.”78  He continues, though, by ranking 
them among heresies: “Ignatius of Loyola introduced an error into the milieu of our Church, 
as dangerous as that of Martin Luther….I support that Ignatius was no less biased and 
disruptive of our Religion than Luther.”79  To compare Ignatius to Luther is no small charge, 
since Luther was credited with many of the problems which arose out of the Reformation, the 
division of Christendom, political instability and war.  The Jesuits are therefore heretics in 
Pasquier’s estimation, but they are also understood to be making the divisions within 
Christianity more pronounced and fervent.  The perceived divisive nature of the Jesuits helps 
to explain why a country wracked by civil war and so concerned about its political weakness 
when facing the powerhouse that was Spain would give the Jesuits a cold welcome.  The 
Jesuits, far from helping the situation in France, were seen only as making matters worse, 
making the enemy more resolved in its resistance.  Add to this mixture the perceived 
disloyalty of the Jesuits to local secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies and one better 
understands why the Jesuits were viewed as trouble. 
                                                 
77 Huppert explains that public schools were tuition free for city residents; however, tax money went into paying 
for them.  He argues that the Jesuits in some cases wanted to charge tuition to help cover costs, but this charge 
was a rarity because the school system was so well-developed by the time the Jesuits tried to take them over.  It 
is also interesting to note that A. Lynn Martin argues that the collèges were a near constant headache for the 
Jesuits, causing numerous problems, the biggest being funding and facilities.  He also notes that they were 
determined not to charge tuition, as part of their apostolic mission (and probably because of their concern to 
create goodwill toward the Society).  Apparently, they also resisted teaching young children.  Huppert, Public 
Schools; and Martin, Jesuit Mind. 
78 “cette Secte est en ses principes schismatique, & consequement heretique.”  Pasquier, “Plaidoyé,” 340.  This 
work of Pasquier’s is more concise in the accusation of heresy, but the other book is no less useful. 
79 “Ignace de Loyola introduisit un erreur au milieu de nostre Eglise, aussi dangereux que celuy de Martin 
Luther….je soutiens qu’Ignace n’a pas moins esté partial & perturbateur de nostre Religion que Luther.”  Ibid., 
340. 
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Ayrault himself not only accuses the Jesuits of being unable to interpret scripture, he 
suggests that they render selective readings for interpretation.  Intentionally or not, he 
concludes that René has been confused and misguided: “But (my son) what St. Mathieu and 
St. Luc report there was too clear, for a truncated passage puts you in perplexities and 
labyrinths.  Read the entire chapters…”80  Ayrault cites verses from Matthew and Luke which 
seem to contradict him—to not love parents more than God.81  He asserts however that these 
passages address martyrdom and shame to confess one’s religion rather than the question of 
obedience to parents because “otherwise God would be contrary to himself, which is 
impossible…what doctrine would that be that would stop at syllables and not sense? If he who 
hates him is a good disciple, by greater reason, he who would fight him would be a patriarch, 
and he who would kill him would be a good apostle.  See what absurdities arise out of a 
speech misunderstood.”82  In essence, the devil can quote scripture.  Ayrault suggests that 
René is being misled and manipulated by his “teachers,” who select certain passages out of 
context and more worrisome, misinterpret them too literally.  His use of the word “labyrinth” 
provides a strong image of confusion and suggests that the Jesuits were the monsters at the 
center.  Ayrault implicitly presents this confusion, coated in the rhetoric of rapt, as a 
deliberate ploy on the part of the Jesuits.  That is, they lure children into their order with 
“evil,” reductionist arguments that make devotion to God and devotion to parents seem 
incompatible.  But such deliberate manipulations require a literacy which has already been 
                                                 
80 “Mais (mon fils) ce que S. Matthieu & S. Luc raportent là, estoit trop clair, pour d’un passage trunqué, vous 
mettre en des perplexitez & labyrintes.  Lisez les chapitres entiers…”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 65. 
81 Mt 10.37: “Whoever loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me;” Luke 14.26-7: “‘Whoever 
comes to me and does not hate father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, yes, and even life itself, 
cannot be my disciple.  Whoever does not carry the cross and follow me cannot be my disciple.’”  Oxford 
Annotated Bible, New Testament, 27 and 126; Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 64. 
82 “car autrement Dieu seroit contraire à luy-mesme: se qui est impossible…quelle doctrine seroit-ce la, qui 
s’arresteroit aux syllables, non pas au sens?  Si qui le haïroit, seroit bon Disciple: à plus forte raison, qui le 
battroit, seroit Patriarche: & qui le tueroit, seroit bon Apostre.  Voyez quelles absurditez d’une parole mal 
entenduë.” Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 64. 
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brought into question.  Nevertheless, according to Ayrault, if the Jesuits were not malicious, 
they were mistaken and interfering where they had no place.83  Then again, Ayrault trusted 
them enough to send his eldest son to be educated by them in the first place. 
In addition to misunderstanding scripture, Ayrault argues that the Jesuits promote 
heresy in others, particularly youths, by encouraging disobedience to parents:  “[T]o take 
away honor and obedience from the children is to undermine nature…for atheism and heresy 
come of it.”  He continues in this convoluted section by citing Plutarch’s treatise on fraternal 
friendship: “‘there is no more certain sign of an Atheist than to put them [father and mother] 
to coolness or to commit some fault against them.’”  The second passage which he quotes 
from this section is from a “discourse of heresy in England” featuring a Jesuit:  
when he [the Jesuit] asks what made the English youths so prompt to succor heresy: ‘They 
were no longer (he [the protagonist] said) obedient to their preceptors and deviated from the 
honor and reverence that they owed to their fathers and mothers.’  Concluding from there 
that…they could depart easily from the faith and religion of their fathers, since they were 
beginning by irreverence and disobedience toward them.84  
 
In short, irreverence and disobedience to parents is not only a sign of, but also leads to, 
atheism and heresy.  It is rather ironic that a group whose mission was to fight heresy, by the 
very rules of their order, would ultimately end up promoting it; at least, this is the way 
Pasquier and Ayrault present the situation.  The real problem with the Jesuits is much more 
complex, but it suffices here to note that given the fear of heresy, Gallican Catholics like 
Ayrault nevertheless felt that the Jesuits’ mission was counterproductive, meddlesome, and 
unwelcome. 
                                                 
83 Quarta affirms this by suggesting that Ayrault encouraged direct readings of the texts.  Ayrault e Bodin, 26. 
84 “[O]ster l’honneur & l’obeissance aux enfans, c’est saper la nature…car l’atheisme & l’heresie en vient, dit 
Plutarque au traite de l’amitié fraternelle: dit le Jesuite qui a faict le discours de l’heresie d’Angleterre….’il n’y a 
point de plus certain signe d’un Atheiste, que de les mettre à nonchaloir, ou commettre quelque faute contre 
eux.’  Pour le regard du Jesuite: quand il demande, que c’est qui re-doit les jeunes Anglois si prompts à sucer 
l’heresie: ‘Ils n’estoient plus (dit-il) obeissans à leurs Precepteurs, & delaissoient l’honneur & la reverence qu’ils 
devoient à leurs peres & meres.’  Concluant de là, qu’ils pouvoient bien se departir facilement de la foy & 
religion de leurs peres, puis qu’ils commençoient par l’irreverence & desobeissance vers eux.”  Ayrault, 
Puissance Paternelle, 91-92. 
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Conclusion 
The motto une loi, un roi, une foi had been severely undermined by the time Ayrault 
wrote his treatise.  Bitter religious conflict and the disintegration of political order and 
stability all but completely destroyed it.  Here is one of the major threads of an argument 
within a treatise in which a man, both father and judge, struggles to reorder, redefine, and 
reconcile his ideological universe.  His attempts to create a dialogue with his son about 
religiosity and obligation reveal his conflicted and complex understandings of hierarchy and 
spirituality.  On the one hand, he fits his concept of fatherhood within a hierarchical structure.  
On the other, he appeals to a sense of collectivity, but both of these structures inhabit the same 
thought-world without an acknowledged contradiction. 
Ayrault frames his concept of fatherhood within the rhetoric of contemporary religious 
polemic, and it is not too much of a stretch to see a connection between his conflicted 
construction of fatherhood and a broader grappling with Gallicanism within society.  The 
Jesuits are a convenient screen (or, rather, target) for religious debate over bigger issues.  
Gallicanism was very much a struggle and a negotiation over hierarchy and sovereignty.  At 
the same time, those who would promote the autonomy of the French Church feared a split 
from Catholicism and adamantly insisted on a collective role within Catholicism.  Of course, 
there were those who heavily criticized Gallicanism as being politique or even Machiavellian, 
but these concerns ran deeper for people who felt themselves caught in the middle between 
two extremes.85  It does not appear to be a lack of commitment but an emotionally-charged 
internal conflict, a desire to hold together the irreconcilable and to return to a time of 
simplicity forever remote, even if perhaps only a mirage. 
                                                 





But just as the girl abducted immature, as long a she remains with her abductor, does not reach 
adulthood, the majority that you acquired in the hands of those who hold you against my will, 
will never excuse you, nor them either, that what you will attempt thereafter does not proceed 
from induction and impression made at the improper place and time and what is more, by 
detainers and possessors of bad faith.  The Holy Spirit is not where there is crime.  As the 
furtive thing is always so until it be returned into the power of its lord, so as much of a major 
as you may be, you will always be grievously and plagiaristically where you are, until my will 
intervenes.  To whomever will tell you the contrary, tell him that he does not have 
understanding.  For Plato wrote thus: Neither God nor wise man would ever advise a child to 
scorn his father and mother.1 
 
 
It seems fitting to conclude this study with Ayrault’s own final statements and incidentally, 
the sentiment which prompted him to write his treatise: outrage at his son’s defiance of his 
paternal will.  René was both the victim and the perpetrator of a serious crime which had 
implications for society as a whole.  The stability of the state and royal power relied on 
constructions of paternal authority.  This authority had legal, political, and religious facets, of 
which the sacred was sufficient to counter any religious vocation.  But, the very foundations 
of the Christian religion were experiencing considerable strain. 
However, it was not the Protestants, as any modern Catholic may expect, at whom 
Ayrault targeted his criticism.  On the contrary, it was militant Catholics, embodied in the 
Jesuits, who posed the more immediate threat in the mind of the Angevin judge and so many 
other robins (despite the fact that they were operating in reaction to Protestant forces in many 
cases).  Cynics may, as they did in the sixteenth century, attribute this hostility to Ayrault’s 
                                                 
1 “ Mais tout ainsi que la fille enlevee immatura, quandiu apud raptorem est, aetatem non attingit, aussi la 
majorité que vous acquerriez entre les mains de ceux qui vous detiennent contre ma volonté, ne vous excusera 
jamais, ne eux aussi, que ce que vous attenterez par apres, ne procede d’induction & impression faite en lieu, & 
en temps inconvenable, & qui plus est, par detenteurs & possesseurs de mauvaise foy.  Le S. Esprit n’est point 
où il y a crime.  Comme la chose furtive l’est toujours jusques à ce qu’elle soit retournee en la puissance de son 
seigneur : aussi, ta-t majeur que vous puissiez estre, vous serez tousjours doleusement & plagiairement où vous 
estes, jusques à ce que ma volonté y intervienne.  A quiconque vous dira le contraire, dites luy qu’il n’a point 
d’entendement.  Car Platon escrit ainsi: Jamais Dieu, ny homme sage ne conseillera à enfant de mespriser ses 
pere & mere.”  Pierre Ayrault, De La Puissance Paternelle: Contre ceux qui sous couleur de Religion vollent les 
enfans à leurs peres & meres (Tours: Jamet Mettayer, 1593), 99-100. 
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lack of religious conviction.  However, the reasoning was much more complex.  Gallican 
fears and his royalist allegiances influenced his reaction.  He was no less moved by religious 
concerns than the papacy was by secular ones. 
Paternal authority was a means of establishing control.  The promotion of paternal 
authority fit more or less neatly into robin ambitions during the sixteenth century.  Regulating 
the vocation of sons was a duty fathers performed in the interests of a larger kin network 
loosely referred to as the family.  Controlling religious vows became a logical extension of 
clandestine marriage controversies which involved substantial shifts in patrimony and thus 
significantly impacted family strategies.  The sacramental nature of the two lent urgency to 
restricting efforts and sparked controversy in spectacular secular and ecclesiastical 
jurisdictional conflicts. 
The Council of Trent landed in the middle of such controversies.  It did little to allay 
robin concerns and firmly asserted the Church’s prerogative to annul marital vows 
independent of parental wishes; nor did it quell Gallican concerns.  Gallicans adamantly 
promoted the privileges and relative autonomy which the French Church enjoyed, on behalf 
of the monarch.  The international threat posed by the papacy and Spain could not be ignored 
even under a pretext of religion.  The most Christian King also had a paternal duty to protect 
the interests of his kingdom and subjects. 
Paternal authority was a means of maintaining order.  En route to absolutism, paternal 
authority played a key role.  As Robert Muchembled has suggested, paternal authority was a 
new means of extracting obedience from independently-minded local governments.2  The 
royal government, of which Ayrault was an important part, also became an important line of 
                                                 
2 Robert Muchembled, LeTemps des Supplices: De l’Obéissance Sous les Rois Absolus, XVe-XVIIIe Siècle (Paris, 
Armand Colin, 1992). 
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appeal, further undermining local rulings.  Letters of remission helped in this regard as well.3  
In the domestic sphere, as a model of the well-ordered and well-governed Commonwealth, 
paternal authority played the important role of reigning in the forces of youths who 
challenged all sources of authority.  Those who would champion paternal authority capitalized 
on negative early modern stereotypes of youth.4 
Historians, to this point, have generally maintained, in J. P. Sommerville’s words, that 
“no fully developed patriarchalist theory of government was voiced in seventeenth-century 
France,”5  and, in Gordon J. Schochet’s words, that “[t]he combination of doctrines and 
interests that made possible a patriarchal theory of political obligation seems to have been 
peculiar to the England of the seventeenth century.”6  By patriarchalism they mean “royal and 
paternal power were not just similar (in that both were derived from God alone), but identical.  
In other words, the power of any independent father over his offspring was royal power.  
Conversely, the authority of a king over his subjects was patriarchal.”7  From this, these 
historians generally conclude that “By identifying royal with patriarchal power, writers were 
able to harness conventional social theory—which emphasized the divinely appointed duty of 
children to obey their fathers—to the king’s cause.”8  While they concede that there were 
hints of patriarchalist thinking and that France became a power-house of divine right 
absolutism, this thesis has suggested that a bolder assertion can be made with a systematic 
                                                 
3 Robert Muchembled, “Fils de Caïn, enfants de Médée: Homicide et infanticide devant le Parlement de Paris 
(1575-1604),” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales 62:5 (Sept., 2007): 1063-94; Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction 
in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth Century France (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1987). 
4 Paul Griffiths, Youth and Authority: Formative Experiences in England, 1560-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996).  Even though this book focuses primarily on England, it nevertheless provides information on early 
modern youth which is more conceptually valuable. 
5 J. P. Sommerville, “Absolutism and royalism,” in The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700, ed. 
J.H. Burns with the assistance of Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 360. 
6 Gordon J. Schochet, The Authoritarian Family and Political Attitudes in 17th-Century England (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 36. 
7 Sommerville, “Absolutism,” 355. 
8 Ibid. 
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study of the right sources.  Patriarchalist theory in England has received much attention owing 
to Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, which was designed to refute Sir Robert Filmer’s 
Patriarcha.9  Nevertheless, although patriarchalist theory in England has overshadowed any 
counterpart in France, this theory may lay hidden in different sources for France, which 
include those pertaining to marriage and the Jesuits. 
The motto un roi une loi une foi may never have been an achieved ideal, but it 
provided a useful means of conceptualizing unity and authority.  While Ayrault never 
explicitly hearkens to this model, his treatise does lend itself to these categorizations because 
his main arguments unify the three elements into one source of authority—the father—with 
whom anyone claiming paternal authority can associate himself.  It is precisely when 
instability brought about by the Wars of Religion threatens this unity that urgency develops to 
reassert it.  Nevertheless, despite Ayrault’s fears, paternal authority continued to strengthen 
into the seventeenth century. 10   In fact, Michel Foucault and Arlette Farge’s study of 
eighteenth-century families focuses in part on parents who requested that their children be 
thrown into the Bastille, suggesting that paternal authority, while still questioned, continued to 
enjoy immense legal and political authority.11  This authority extended to the regulation of 
marriages as well.12  In fact, as Gaudemet has noted, the crafty robin legists eventually found 
a way for parents to officially annul marital vows taken without their consent and “without 
doubt [with] some malign pleasure,” justified this annulment using the Council of Trent.  
Because vows were null between a woman and her abductor by the decrees of this Council, 
                                                 
9 Schochet, Authoritarian Family, 1. 
10 For more information see Jean Delumeau and Daniel Roche (eds.), Histoire des Pères et de la Paternité,  
(Paris: Larousse, 1990); and Philippe Ariès and Georges Duby (eds.), vol. 3 of Histoire de la vie privée (Paris: 
Seuil, 1986). 
11 Arlette Farge and Michel Foucault, Le désordre des familles: letters de cachet des Archives de la Bastille au 
XVIIIe siècle (Julliard: Éditions Gallimard, 1982). 
12 Sarah Hanley, “‘The Jurisprudence of the Arrêts’: Marital Union, Civil Society, and State Formation in France, 
1550-1650,” Law and History Review 21:1 (Spring, 2003): 1-40; and Hanley, “Engendering the State: Family 
Formation and State Building in Early Modern France,” French Historical Studies 16:1 (Spring, 1989): 4-27. 
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the legists effectively extended this solution for rapt de violence to rapt de séduction, arguing 
that vows taken without parental consent resulted from the same sort of coercion.  Therefore, 
they claimed, the Council did not sanction vows taken without parental consent.13 
The absence of Philippe Ariès’ study on paternal sentiment and the discovery of 
childhood has perhaps been notable to this point.14  The reason was two-fold.  First, while 
affection is certainly relevant to authority, especially regarding parents, the exploration of 
authority has been particularly rich, and the controversy surrounding Ariès’ study would have 
distracted readers from the primary focus of this study.  Second, the nature of the treatise does 
not lend itself to such investigations easily.  While it would be unfair to characterize the 
treatise as totally devoid of sentiment and Ayrault as a cold, methodical judge, the 
propagandist role of the work skews sentiment of disappointment to evoke outrage.  
Nonetheless, Ayrault’s direct addresses to his son provide a glimpse of genuine parental 
concern, especially when he speaks of forgiveness and urges his son’s return: “Now if you are 
afraid to fall into these inevitable chastisements of divine and human law, if this discourse can 
put you back into your natural sentiment, and that at this opportunity you wish to reshow 
yourself, defer no longer.  The Church always has open arms to retake the penitents; she does 
it at the example of fathers and mothers.”15   This concern also reveals itself in discussions of 
damnation: “[T]he greatest punishment of God to his creature, from father to son, from Prince 
to subject, is to be banished from their presence, to be deprived of the good and contentment 
                                                 
13 Jean Gaudemet, Le Mariage en Occident: les moeurs et le droit (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1987), 323. 
14 Philippe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood, trans. Robert Baldwick (London: Jonathan Cape, 1962). 
15 “Or si vous avez peur de tomber en ces chastiemens inevitables de droit divin & humain: si ce discourse vous 
peut remettre en vostre naturel sentiment, & qu’à ceste occasion vous ayez anvie de vous recognoistre: ne 
differez plus.  Ce que l’Eglise a tousjours les bras ouverts pour y reprendre les penitens, elle le fait à l’exemple 
des peres & des meres.”  Ayrault, Puissance Paternelle, 98. 
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of seeing them.  As for God, it is certain that damnation is not otherwise.”16  However, even 
these bits of sentiment focus on the transgressions of the son and on his lack of sentiment 
rather than Ayrault’s own sentiments.  Even when Ayrault suggests that separation is painful, 
he constructs his sentence such that it implies that the separation may be more painful for the 
subordinate. 
Regardless of his efforts, Ayrault lost his battle.  No system of law could or would 
intervene, and Ayrault never saw or heard from his son again.  He finally publicly disavowed, 
or, rather, disowned René in 1593, forbidding his other children from recognizing René as 
brother—a vow which he later recanted on his deathbed.17  René, on the other hand, had a 
brilliant career among the Jesuits.  He first earned the “esteem of his superiors for his piety 
and erudition,”18 having been sent to Germany (where he was a prisoner of the Protestants for 
a while) and then to Rome after he left his father.  He then served the Society as a teacher of 
rhetoric in Milan and Rome and as a rector in France.  René had a nephew who was also a 
Jesuit.  René’s younger brother Pierre continued where he had left off, succeeding his father 
as lieutenant criminel.19   
                                                 
16 “[L]a plus grande punition- de Dieu, à sa creature: du pere, au fils: du Prince, à son subjet, est d’estre privé du 
bien & contentement de les voir.  Quant à Dieu: il est certain que la damnation n’est autre chose.”  Ayrault, 
Puissance Paternelle, 95. 
17 V. Rosenwald, “Pierre Ayrault,” in Nouvelle Biographie Générale depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu’a 
nos jours, avec les renseignements bibliographiques et l’indication des sources a consulter ed. Hoefer (Paris: 
Firmin Didot Freres, 1855), 3:902-4. 
18 G. Lazare, “Pierre Ayrault,” in Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, ed. M. Prevost and Roman D’Amat 
(Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1948), 4:966. 
19 Lazare, “Pierre Ayrault,;” and C. Laplatte, “René Ayrault,” in Dictionnaire de Biographie Française, ed. M. 
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